West  Point 

:n 

1 1 .  '•  Only  Way  to  Create 
and  to  Maintain  an  Army 


Maxwell  Van  Zandt  Wbodhull 


West    Point 


in 


Our    Next    War 

The  Only  Way  to  Create 
and  to  Maintain  an  Army 


By 

Maxwell  Van  Zandt  Woodhull,  A.M. 

^ 

Late  Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General 

15th  Army  Corps  and  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
Brevet  Brigadier-General  United  States  Volunteers 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  and  London 
Gbe    fmfcfcerbocfcer 

1915 


COPYRIGHT,  1915 

BY 
MAXWELL  VAN  ZANDT  WOODHULL 


ftnfcfeerbocfcer  I>re0a,  Hew  lorh 


THE   MEMORY   OF 
MY  DEAR  AND   GALLANT  FATHER 

COMMANDER   MAXWELL  WOODHULL 

UNITED   STATES   NAVY 

THESE  PAGES  ARE  AFFECTIONATELY  DEDICATED 
BY  THE  AUTHOR 


331296 


INTRODUCTION 

1AM  the  son  of  an  officer  of  the  old  navy,  a 
Regular  of  Regulars,  and  I  had  the  honour  to 
serve  in  the  Volunteer  Army  of  the  United  States 
during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

My  Father  was  a  consistent  advocate  of  a  large 
and  powerful  navy.  As  a  youth  I  met  and  knew 
many  officers  of  the  two  services,  friends  of  my 
Father,  many  of  whom  distinguished  themselves 
in  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and 
in  the  service  of  the  South,  during  the  great  war. 

My  Father's  loyalty  was  of  the  sacred  kind, 
which  made  his  devotion  to  his  country  a  part 
of  his  religion.  Admiral  Ammen,  writing  to  me 
several  years  after  the  war,  speaking  of  my  Father, 
said,  "His  gallantry  was  unquestioned  by  all  who 
knew  him." 

Reared  under  such  auspices,  associated  from 
my  earliest  days  up  to  the  period  of  his  untimely 
death  with  so  noble  a  character  as  my  Father,  it 
would  have  been  impossible  for  me  not  to  have 
assimilated  as  my  own  some  of  his  feelings  and 
beliefs  as  to  the  service,  and  as  to  the  officers  of 
the  army  and  navy,  his  associates  and  comrades. 


vi  Introduction 

Owing  to  the  temper  of  the  times,  and  to  the 
spirit  of  secession  which  filled  the  air,  my  Father, 
whose  belief  in  the  national  character  of  our  people 
was  unchangeable,  wisely,  very  wisely  as  I  have  felt 
throughout  my  life,  sent  me  to  Miami  University 
in  the  State  of  Ohio,  instead  of  sending  me  to 
Harvard,  for  my  college  education.  He  told  me 
that  I  should  find  the  boys  with  whom  I  should 
play  on  the  college  campus  the  same  kind  of  boys 
with  whom  I  had  been  playing  in  Washington; 
that  in  character  and  in  all  essentials  these  boys 
were  Americans,  differing  from  the  boys  in  the 
East  only  in  non-essentials.  I  was  the  only  boy 
from  the  east  of  the  Alleghenies  in  the  college. 
My  associates  were  from  Ohio,  Indiana,  Michi- 
gan, Kentucky,  and  Tennessee.  After  the  novelty 
of  my  association  wore  off,  and  after  I  had  be- 
come used  to  the  difference  of  intonation  between 
the  East  and  the  West,  I  found  that  my  Father 
had  been  right:  that  the  boys — of  course  we 
called  ourselves  young  men — whom  I  met  in  the 
classrooms  and  on  the  college  campus  were  in  all 
essentials  the  same  kind  of  boys  as  my  young 
friends  in  Washington — all  Americans,  whether 
they  happened  to  come  from  Indiana  or  Michigan, 
from  Kentucky  or  Ohio.  I  look  back,  across  the 
dead  years,  upon  my  residence  at  Miami  with 
profound  thankfulness  for  the  judgment  shown  by 
my  Father  in  sending  me  to  this  Western  college, 
and  with  the  tenderest  recollections  of  my  in- 


Introduction  vii 

structors  and  my  college  associates,  from  what- 
soever part  of  the  country  they  may  have 
come. 

While  at  college,  in  anticipation  of  entering  the 
army,  I  read  several  military  books,  notably 
Jomini's  Art  of  War,  which  was  quite  the  vogue  in 
the  earnest  days  of  1861-1862.  I  followed  the 
movements  of  the  armies,  as  reported  in  the  public 
press,  with  close  attention,  often,  I  fear,  to  the 
prejudice  of  my  studies ;  but,  like  most  of  the  young 
men  about  me,  talked  and  thought  much  of  military 
matters,  impatiently  awaiting  the  coming  of  the 
time  when  I  should  have  the  opportunity  of  going 
into  the  army. 

After  entering  the  army,  guided  by  experience, 
I  had  to  modify  many  of  my  impressions  which 
I  had  considered  as  firmly  bedded  as  the  great  hills, 
and  to  form  new  impressions  as  time  passed  and 
experience  grew.  In  the  army,  in  time  of  war, 
men  grow  rapidly;  they  think  fast,  they  observe 
acutely,  and  they  form  impressions  readily.  If 
this  be  not  the  effect  of  service  upon  them  they 
are  useless  in  the  army.  If  a  man  does  not  grow, 
and  grow  rapidly,  as  experiences  unfold  them- 
selves, he  may  have  all  the  technique  of  the  pro- 
fession at  his  fingers'  ends,  and  yet  be  worthless 
as  a  soldier. 

I  think  I  may  say  that  I  carried  into  the  army  a 
clear  and  observing  mind,  disciplined  by  study, 
and  a  disposition  to  do  my  duty  cheerfully  and 


viii  Introduction 

to  the  best  of  my  ability,  a  disposition  which 
I  afterward  found  to  be  the  true  spirit  of  dis- 
cipline. 

So  much  by  way  of  introduction  to  my  entrance 
into  the  volunteer  army  of  the  United  States, 
shortly  after  I  had  passed  my  nineteenth  birthday, 
toward  the  end  of  1862. 

That  my  experience  in  the  army  during  the 
great  war  entitles  me  to  speak  upon  military  sub- 
jects will  become  apparent  from  the  perusal  of  the 
following  extract  from  the  "Rebellion  Records," 
and  the  three  following  letters,  two  from  Major- 
General  John  A.  Logan  of  the  volunteers,  and 
one  from  Major-General  Oliver  0.  Howard  of 
the  army,  two  as  gallant  gentlemen  as  ever  wore 
swords. 

The  extract  from  the  "Rebellion  Records"  is 
from  the  official  report  of  Major-General  Lew 
Wallace  of  the  battle  of  the  Monocacy,  which  was 
fought  on  the  9th  of  July,  1864,  in  which  battle 
I  acted  as  General  Wallace's  Adjutant-General. 
Although  one  of  the  smaller  battles  of  the  war, 
the  battle  of  the  Monocacy  was  one  of  the  most 
important  in  its  results  fought  during  the  war,  as  it 
undoubtedly  saved  Washington  from  capture  by 
the  army  of  Lieutenant-General  Early,  giving 
time  for  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  at  the 
national  capital.  In  his  very  interesting  account 
of  the  battle  given  in  his  Memoirs,  General 
Wallace  mentions  me  several  times  by  name. 


Introduction  ix 

The  extract  from  General  Wallace's  report  of  the 
battle  will  be  found  at  page  199,  series  I.,  vol. 
xxxvii.,  part  I.,  War  of  the  Rebellion.  Official 
Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies, 
published  by  the  War  Department: 

Extract. — Besides  the  officers  mentioned  in  my 
informal  report  of  loth  of  July,  the  following  de- 
serve similar  notice  for  their  excellent  behaviour 
in  action  and  the  services  they  rendered:  Lieut.- 
Colonel  Lynd  Catlin,  Assistant  Inspector-General; 
Major  Max  V.Z.  Woodhull,  Acting  Assistant  Adjutant- 
General;  and  Major  James  R.  Ross,  Senior  Aide-de- 
camp, all  of  my  Staff. 

After  the  battle  of  the  Monocacy  I  was  ordered 
to  duty  in  the  War  Department,  in  the  office  of 
the  Inspector- General  of  the  army,  Colonel  James 
A.  Hardie:  and  here  I  would  venture  to  remind 
the  gentlemen  of  the  army  of  today,  that  during 
the  great  war  the  position  of  Inspector-General 
of  the  army  only  carried  the  rank  of  Colonel.  I 
served  with  Colonel  Hardie  for  about  six  weeks, 
when,  on  my  own  request,  I  was  ordered  to  the 
Western  Army. 

I  had  known  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  army, 
General  Townsend,  as  a  youth,  but  I  made  the 
acquaintance,  while  on  duty  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment, of  Colonel  Vincent,  General  Fry,  Colonel 
Ruggles,  Colonel  Williams,  Colonel  Pelouze — 
all  of  the  Adjutant-General's  department,  General 


x  Introduction 

Fry  then  being  on  duty  as  Provost  Marshal 
General.  I  learned  to  esteem  highly  as  officers 
of  especial  worth  Colonel  Vincent  and  General  Fry. 
It  had  been  my  fortune  to  receive  my  training 
as  an  Assistant  Adjutant-General  under  the  eye 
of  Colonel  Wm.  D.  Whipple,  an  officer  of  the 
army,  and  I  wrote  to  him  immediately  on  report- 
ing for  duty  in  the  War  Department,  asking  for 
service  in  the  Western  Army.  I  received  the 
following  letter  from  him  upon  which  I  based  my 
request  to  the  Adjutant-General  for  orders  to  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NEAR  ATLANTA,  GA.,  Aug.  16,  1864. 
DEAR  MAJOR: 

Your  letter  was  received  at  the  time  changes  were 
taking  place  in  the  commanders  of  our  armies,  and  I 
deferred  action  upon  it  until  things  became  a  little 
more  settled.  I  have  since  conversed  with  Major- 
General  Howard,  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, on  the  subject. 

I  enclose  a  short  telegram  from  him  which  explains 
itself.  If  you  can  get  ordered  to  him,  he  would  be 
glad  to  have  you  come.  He  is  a  very  pleasant  officer 
and  I  think  you  will  like  him,  and  it  would  afford  you 
an  excellent  opportunity  to  participate  in  this  glorious 
campaign. 

Sincerely  yours, 

WM.  D.  WHIPPLE, 
A.  A.-G. 

MAJ.  MAXWELL  WOODHULL, 
A.  A.-G. 


Introduction  xi 

U.  S.  MILITARY  TELEGRAPH 

15  186 

By  telegraph  from  Howard. 
To  Gen.  Whipple. 

Let  Woodhull  come.     I  can  assign  him  to  duty. 

O.  O.  HOWARD, 

Maj.-Gen. 


I  reported  to  General  Howard  in  Georgia,  and 
was  assigned  to  duty  on  his  staff  as  aide-de-camp, 
and  also  to  duty  with  the  chief  of  artillery  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  as  Assistant  Adjutant- 
General. 

Upon  the  capture  of  Savannah  I  was  recom- 
mended by  General  Howard  to  General  Osterhaus, 
then  in  temporary  command  of  the  I5th  Army 
Corps,  as  Assistant  Ad  jut  ant- General  of  the  Corps, 
and  upon  the  return  of  Major-General  John  A. 
Logan  (a  few  days  later)  to  the  command  of  the 
Corps,  I  was  promoted,  on  his  recommendation, 
to  be  Lieutenant- Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant- 
General  of  the  I5th  Army  Corps.  When  General 
Logan  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  he  took  me  with  him,  under  as- 
signment, as  Assistant  Adjutant-General  of  the 
army. 

General  Logan's  letters,  referred  to  above,  are 
as  follows: 


xii  Introduction 

First  Letter. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  TENNESSEE, 

LOUISVILLE,  KY.,  July  31,  1865. 
Col.  MAX  WOODHULL, 

A.  A.-Gen'l. 
MY  DEAR  SIR: 

I  cannot  sever  our  official  relations  without  express- 
ing to  you  my  entire  satisfaction  with  the  manner  in 
which  you  have  conducted  the  Adjutant-General's 
Department  since  you  have  been  with  me,  and  also 
without  giving  you  to  understand  that  I  recognize 
the  fact  that  your  conduct  has  at  all  times  been  that 
of  a  soldier  and  gentleman,  ever  ready  and  willing  to 
perform  any  duty  that  was  imposed  upon  you.  You 
have  a  bright  future  before  you;  be  energetic  and 
assiduous  hereafter  as  you  have  ever  been  while  with 
me,  and  you  have  nothing  to  fear.  Wherever  you 
may  go,  or  in  whatever  position  you  may  be  placed, 
be  doubly  assured  that  you  have  my  kindest  regards, 
as  well  as  my  best  wishes  for  your  future  welfare  and 
prosperity. 

Your  true  friend, 

JOHN  A.  LOGAN, 

Major-General. 
Second  Letter. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  TENNESSEE, 

August  i,  1865. 
Lt.-Gen'l  U.  S.  GRANT, 

Com'd'g,  &c. 
SIR: 

Allow  me  to  earnestly  recommend  Col.  Max  Wood- 
hull  for  a  position  in  the  regular  army.  He  has 
served  with  me  as  A.  A.-General  since  I  left  Savannah 
in  the  15  A.  C.  and  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  a 


Introduction  xiii 

more  efficient  officer  in  his  Department  is  not  in  the 
army  anywhere.  He  is  honest,  energetic,  and  capa- 
ble; he  is  a  young  man  of  rare  abilities,  and  such 
a  man  as  should  be  placed  in  a  good  position.  I  think 
for  his  age  I  have  not  at  any  time  made  the  acquaint- 
ance of  a  man  with  more  attainments  than  he  possesses. 
I  think  he  should  at  least  have  the  rank  of  Major  in 
the  Department  of  the  Adjt.-General,  and  I  do  hope 
that  you  will  give  him  such  assistance  as  will  insure 
him  such  position. 

Your  friend  truly, 

JOHN  A.  LOGAN,  N 
Maj.-Gen'l. 

After  the  muster  out  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennes- 
see I  took  a  month's  leave  of  absence,  and  then 
reported  to  Major-General  Oliver  O.  Howard  as 
Adjutant-General  of  the  Bureau  of  Refugees,  Freed- 
men,  and  Abandoned  Lands,  which  position  I  held 
until  May,  1866,  when  I  resigned  from  the  army. 

I  was  brevetted  Colonel  on  the  recommendation 
of  Major-General  John  A.  Logan,  and  Brigadier- 
General  on  the  recommendation  of  Major-General 
Oliver  O.  Howard. 

Letter  from  General  Howard. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  BUREAU  OF  REFUGEES,  PREEDMEN,  AND 
ABANDONED  LANDS. 

WASHINGTON,  May  20, 1866. v 
Bvt.  Brig.-General  MAX  WOODHULL. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL: 

As  you  have  decided  to  leave  the  service,  permit 
me  to  express  to  you  the  great  satisfaction  your  public 


xiv  Introduction 

service  has  afforded  me.  You  joined  me  in  the  midst 
of  that  trying  campaign  under  General  Sherman,  just 
before  Hood  had  crossed  the  Tennessee  River,  and 
before  the  eventful  march  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah 
had  been  undertaken.  You  shared  in  that  campaign 
on  my  staff  and  so  conspicuous  your  merit  appeared 
to  me  that  I  recommended  you  to  Gen.  Osterhaus  for 
Adjutant  of  the  I5th  Army  Corps.  You  were  sub- 
sequently promoted  to  Lieut. -Colonel  and  Assistant 
Adjutant-General  of  that  Corps.  In  this  position 
Gen.  Logan  on  his  return  honoured  you  with  his  confi- 
dence, and  you  aided  in  no  small  degree  in  promoting 
the  system  and  order  that  prevailed  in  the  I5th 
Corps  during  the  remarkable  marches  and  combats 
that  occurred  on  the  march  from  Savannah,  Ga.,  to 
Washington,  D.  C.  Your  uniform  courtesy  to  me, 
your  promptitude  and  efficiency  as  an  officer,  and 
your  fidelity  to  duty  during  that  time,  and  subse- 
quently in  the  trying  duties  of  this  Bureau,  will  not 
soon  be  forgotten. 

Whenever  the  need  calls  you,  look  to  me  for  any  aid 
I  may  be  able  to  extend  to  you. 

Wishing  you  a  prosperous  life  and  a  sure  immortality 
among  the  blessed,  ,< 

I  am  affectionately 

.Your friend,  . 

O.  O.  HOWARD, 

Maj.-Gen.t  Com'ry  etc. 

These  letters  from  Generals  Logan  and  Howard 
are  autograph  letters.  General  Logan's  letter  to 
Lieut.-General  Grant  was  never  presented,  because 


Introduction  xv 

I  had  no  wish  to  go  into  the  regular  army.  It 
may  not  be  inappropriate  for  me  to  say,  however, 
that  I  could  have  gone  into  the  regular  army 
at  the  close  of  the  war  had  I  cared  to  do  so.  In- 
deed, the  Adjutant-General  of  the  army,  General 
Townsend,  said  that  I  was  one  of  the  volunteer 
officers  he  wished  to  see  transferred  to  the  regular 
service. 

In  the  following  pages  I  have  written  freely  and 
frankly,  and  as  I  am  giving  my  views  and  opinions 
upon  military  subjects,  I  have  not  hesitated  to 
write  personally,  using  with  entire  freedom  the 
phrases  "I  think"  and  "I  believe." 

I  have  stated  what  I  believe  to  be  the  true 
method  of  preparing  the  army  for  the  eventualities 
of  the  future,  indeed,  the  only  method  of  prepar- 
ing the  army  for  the  eventualities  of  the  future,  and 
I  submit  this  book  to  the  consideration  of  my 
countrymen,  asking  for  it  their  candid  judgment. 

MAXWELL  VAN  ZANDT  WOODHULL. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 
November  20,  1915. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION v 

CHAPTER    I 

UNREADY:  A  WARNING  i 

CHAPTER  II 

WEST    POINT:    ITS    EXPANSION    AND    REOR- 
GANIZATION         38 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  ONLY  WAY  TO  CREATE  AND  TO  MAINTAIN 
AN  ARMY 109 

CHAPTER  IV 

THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  AN  ARMY  FOR  WAR     .     179 

CHAPTER  V 

THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENCE  .    .  223 


POSTSCRIPT,  NOVEMBER  20,  1915 

A  CONSIDERATION  OF  THE  PLAN  OF  THE  SECRE- 
TARY OF  WAR  FOR  THE  NATIONAL  DEFENCE    253 


xvii 


West  Point  in  our  Next  War 


CHAPTER  I 
UNREADY:  A  WARNING 

WITHIN  the  past  two  years  a  general  officer 
of  the  army  said  to  me,  "The  army  of  the 
United  States  is  essentially  a  peace  army. " 

The  remark  was  made  and  was  received  as  a 
matter  of  course:  as  merely  the  statement  of  an 
incontrovertible  fact. 

Do  the  people  of  the  United  States  know  that 
their  army  is  essentially  a  peace  army?  Do  they 
want  an  army  which  is  merely  a  peace  army,  or  do 
they  want  an  army  capable  of  defending  the  country 
in  the  event  of  war  being  forced  upon  the  nation? 

The  United  States  is  always  for  peace  except 
when  her  vital  interests  and  rights  are  attacked, 
and  then  she  makes  war  in  self-defence.  She  does 
not  belong  to  the  class  of  ambitious  nations  ever 
striving  for  the  expansion  of  boundaries.  She  is 
content  with  her  present  boundaries,  and  yet  she 

i 


2     ;:W6st;PoiiJt  in  our  Next  War 

has  assumed,  within  the  past  few  years,  serious 
international  and  territorial  responsibilities. 

She  has  the  longest  coast  line  of  any  nation  in 
the  world,  and  fronts  the  two  great  oceans,  facing 
the  military  and  naval  powers  of  Europe  and  Asia. 
She  is  open  to  attack  on  the  Atlantic  and  on  the 
Pacific,  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  and  in  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico. 

Yet  her  army  is  "essentially  a  peace  army," 
and  her  navy,  upon  which  arm  of  the  national 
defence  the  first  shock  of  war  would  fall,  is  of 
insufficient  strength  to  meet  successfully  the 
weight  of  attack  of  the  fleets  of  any  one  of  the 
three  or  four  great  Powers. 

Sea  power,  or  the  power  to  defeat  an  enemy  in 
battle  on  the  seas,  is  of  pre-eminent  importance  to 
the  United  States. 

Without  command  of  the  sea  we  could  not  hold 
the  Panama  Canal,  nor  could  we  retain  control  of  the 
Hawaiian  Islands,  of  the  Philippines,  or  of  Alaska. 

As  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  its  life  is  in  the 
power  of  our  guns.  So  long  as  we  can  command 
the  sea  it  is  a  sound  and  living  force  in  interna- 
tional law.  The  moment  we  lose  command  of  the 
sea,  or  find  ourselves  in  a  position  where  our  com- 
mand of  the  sea  may  safely  be  questioned  by  a 
first-class  Power,  we  shall  be  compelled  to  let  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  drift  into  the  abyss  of  withered 
ambitions. 

It  was  argued  during  the  period  of  enthusiasm 


Unready  3 

under  the  influence  of  which  the  construction  of 
the  Panama  Canal  was  undertaken,  that  the  build- 
ing of  the  canal  would  double  at  least  the  efficiency 
of  our  navy.  Visions  of  the  concentration  of  our 
fleets  in  the  Atlantic  or  in  the  Pacific  as  we  should 
will,  or  as  occasion  should  demand,  victoriously 
to  meet  on  either  ocean  the  fleets  of  an  enemy, 
filled  the  imagination  of  the  country. 

Instead,  however,  of  the  canal  furnishing  an  inte- 
rior line  of  communication  and  defence,  the  con- 
struction of  the  canal  has  increased  in  a  vast  degree 
not  only  the  naval  and  military,  but  also  the  po- 
litical danger  of  complications  with  possibly  am- 
bitious enemies.  Instead  of  increasing  our  naval 
efficiency,  the  canal  has  brought  into  the  problem 
of  national  defence  new  responsibilities,  so  that 
now  not  only  are  we  compelled  to  be  in  readiness 
to  defend  ourselves  on  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific 
but  also  to  hold  command  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
and  the  Caribbean  Sea  in  order  to  retain  possession 
of  the  Panama  Canal. 

The  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal,  assum- 
ing that  the  peace  of  the  world  could  be  guaran- 
teed, is  a  great  accomplishment.  But  the  peace 
of  the  world  cannot  be  guaranteed,  consequently 
the  canal  has  become  a  prize  of  war  of  the 
nations.  Instead  of  being  an  influence  for  peace, 
it  is  an  inducement  to  war,  and  has  increased,  by 
extending  the  sphere  of  our  responsibilities,  the  need 
for  increased  armaments  and  more  battleships. 


4        West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Our  fleet  is  inferior  to  the  fleets  of  Great  Britain 
and  Germany  and  will  soon  drop  below  that  of 
France.  While  it  is  true  that  our  Atlantic 
Fleet  comprises  the  greater  part  of  our  fighting 
strength,  the  protection  of  our  Interests  in  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  and  in  the 
eastern  and  western  Pacific  compel  a  distinct 
allotment  of  ships  to  those  seas,  and  our  avail- 
able battle  fleets  on  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific 
are  consequently  outclassed  by  the  battle  fleets 
of  the  other  first-class  Powers.  They  have  re- 
stricted coast  lines  to  defend  whereas  we  have 
vast  and,  from  a  military  and  naval  point  of 
view,  almost  illimitable  reaches  of  coasts  to 
defend. 

The  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal,  instead 
of  increasing  the  availability  of  our  fleet  for  na- 
tional defence,  renders  necessary  the  construction 
and  maintenance  of  a  distinct  Caribbean  Sea  fleet 
for  the  defence  of  that  sea.  Without  such  a  fleet, 
strong  enough  to  hold  the  Caribbean  Sea  against 
any  probable  enemy,  the  Panama  Canal  can  be 
seized  and  held  by  any  enemy  dominating  the 
Caribbean. 

Whereas  the  principles  of  the  art  of  war  are 
immutable,  their  application  changes  with  the 
changing  conditions  of  the  world. 

In  the  days  of  sailing  ships,  and  in  the  early 
days  of  steam  men-of-war,  there  was  a  limit  to 
oversea  operations  determined  by  the  carrying 


Unready  5 

capacity  of  the  merchant  marine  which  could  be 
commanded  for  the  movement  of  troops. 

This  rule  holds  good  today,  with  the  difference, 
however,  that  the  carrying  capacity  of  the  mer- 
chant marine  of  the  world  has  been  so  vastly  in- 
creased that  what  was  difficult  then  is  easy  of 
accomplishment  now  once  command  of  the  sea  be 
obtained.  During  the  great  war  we  dispatched 
by  sea  large  expeditions  against  Hatteras  Inlet, 
Charleston,  Fort  Pulaski,  Mobile,  and  for  the  cap- 
ture of  New  Orleans  and  Fort  Fisher  in  co-opera- 
tion with  the  fleet,  in  all  of  which  expeditions  the 
arms  of  the  United  States  were  successful;  and 
during  the  greater  part  of  the  war  we  maintained 
an  entirely  satisfactory  supply  service  by  sea 
for  our  armies  in  the  coast  States  of  the  South, 
and  for  the  vessels  of  the  blockading  fleet  from 
the  capes  of  the  Chesapeake  to  the  Mexican  border. 
Now  it  is  entirely  possible  to  mobilize  fleets  of  trans- 
ports of  sufficient  tonnage  to  transport  large 
armies  across  the  seas  for  the  invasion  of  hostile 
shores,  and  to  maintain  such  armies  in  the  field 
by  re-enforcements,  and  with  supplies  and  muni- 
tions of  war. 

The  guns  of  the  fleets  of  fifty  years  ago  were 
inferior  in  effectiveness  of  fire  to  the  guns  of  fort- 
resses, calibre  for  calibre.  The  stable  gun  plat- 
forms of  the  fortress  guns  rendered  their  fire  more 
effective  than  that  of  the  guns  of  fleets. 

But  now,   with  almost   stable  gun  platforms 


6        West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

furnished  by  great  battleships  and  dreadnoughts, 
the  guns  of  the  fleet  and  the  guns  of  the  fortresses 
are  on  a  much  nearer  basis  of  equality,  with  the 
difference,  however,  still  in  favour  of  the  land 
defence,  gun  for  gun,  and  calibre  for  calibre,  but 
by  no  means  so  clearly  in  favour  of  the  army  as 
was  the  case  fifty  or  even  twenty-five  years  ago. 
The  determinative  difference  now  is  in  range  of 
fire,  and  here  the  dreadnoughts  of  foreign  navies, 
with  their  1 5-inch  guns,  have  an  advantage  over 
the  guns  in  our  fortifications. 

Our  coast  defences  were  mostly  planned  and 
constructed  before  the  day  of  the  modern  battle- 
ship and  of  the  modern  gun.  Whether  guns  of 
present  heavy  calibre  have  been  installed  in  all 
of  our  fortifications  supplanting  guns  of  an  earlier 
date  and  construction,  I  do  not  know.  I  doubt, 
however,  if  the  defensive  power  of  our  fortifica- 
tions has  increased  proportionally  with  the  in- 
creased power  of  offence  in  the  fleets  of  the  great 
powers. 

The  usual  defensive  work  on  our  coasts  is  either 
an  open  work  at  the  rear,  or  is  weak  on  its  land 
face.  The  effort  of  the  engineers  engaged  in  their 
construction  has  been  directed  to  the  development 
and  maintenance  of  seaward  fire,  relying  upon  the 
protection  of  the  good  God  for  defence  from  land 
attack.  Our  defensive  works  have  been  built  to 
defend  our  harbours  from  attack  by  hostile  fleets 
without  regard  to  the  changed  conditions  of  mod- 


Unready  7 

ern  war  which  not  only  provide  for,  but  almost 
demand,  simultaneous  attacks  by  both  land  and 
sea  forces. 

Without  a  mobile  army  of  sufficient  strength  to 
defeat  an  enemy  who  may  have  effected  a  landing 
on  our  coast  from  the  convoys  of  a  hostile  fleet, 
I  do  not  regard  a  single  harbour  on  our  coast,  or 
the  cities  lying  on  their  shores,  as  safe  from  success- 
ful attack  by  the  fleet  and  army  of  any  one  of  the 
first-class  Powers  with  whom  we  should  be  at  war. 

The  defeat,  or  serious  crippling,  of  our  fleet 
would  open  every  harbour  on  our  coast,  and  the 
coast  States  of  the  Union,  to  attack  by  a  combined 
naval  and  military  force  of  any  one  of  the  first- 
class  Powers  with  whom  we  might  be  at  war.  Nor 
need  there  be  the  slightest  doubt  as  to  the  suffi- 
ciency of  transport  capacity  abroad  to  land,  and 
to  maintain  by  reinforcements,  an  army  of  from 
a  quarter  to  a  half  million  of  men  on  our  shores, 
once  our  naval  defence  had  been  broken  or  driven 
from  the  sea. 

The  same  argument  and  the  same  course  of 
reasoning  leads  to  the  same  conclusion  as  to  the 
Panama  Canal.  The  first  condition  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  Panama  Canal  is  a  powerful  Carib- 
bean Sea  fleet,  which  could  meet  on  a  basis  of 
equality  the  convoying  fleet  of  an  enemy,  and 
defeat  or  seriously  cripple  such  fleet  of  the  enemy 
before  the  army  under  its  convoy  cpuld  effect  a 
landing  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  The  second 


8        West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

condition  for  the  defence  of  the  Panama  Canal  is 
to  be  found,  and  can  only  be  found,  in  the  presence 
of  a  mobile  army  large  enough  to  insure  the  defeat 
of  any  expeditionary  force  of  an  enemy  which 
should  succeed  in  effecting  a  landing  on  the 
Isthmus. 

It  should  not  be  doubted  that  the  fortifications 
erected  for  the  defence  of  Colon  and  Panama,  and 
of  the  debouches  of  the  canal  into  the  Caribbean 
Sea  and  the  Pacific  Ocean,  have  been  intelligently 
constructed  and  that  the  guns  in  place  are  of  ade- 
quate calibre  and  range,  but  it  is  seriously  doubted 
whether  they  are  defensible  from  land  attack. 

Equally  must  it  be  conceded  that  they  would 
amount  to  little,  so  far  as  the  defence  of  the  canal 
is  concerned,  without  the  aid  of  an  adequate 
mobile  army  on  the  Isthmus,  because  it  is  not 
thought  that  the  canal  would  be  attacked  by  a 
naval  force  alone.  It  is  believed  that  any  attack 
on  the  canal  will  be  made  by  a  combined  naval 
and  military  force,  the  naval  or  convoying  and 
covering  force  being  deemed  to  be  of  sufficient 
strength  to  overcome  our  Caribbean  Sea  fleet, 
and  the  military  force  being  deemed  to  be  sufficient 
to  overcome  any  military  force  which  we  might 
have  on  the  Isthmus. 

It  is  not  pretended  that  a  mobile  army  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  hold  the  Panama  Canal  against  the  attack 
of  one  of  the  first-class  Powers,  but  it  may  be 


Unready  9 

assumed  that  we  should  lose  the  canal  in  war  with 
a  first-class  Power  should  we  attempt  the  defence 
of  the  canal  zone  with  a  smaller  army  than  one 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men. 

With  this  estimate  of  a  mobile  army  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  in  addition  to 
the  necessary  coast  artillery  to  man  the  guns  in 
the  coast  defences,  required  for  the  defence  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  let  us  see  how  we  are  prepared 
at  present  to  resist  an  attack  on  the  canal. 

The  Secretary  of  War  says  in  his  last  admirable 
annual  report  addressed  to  the  President,  and 
dated  November  15,  1914: 

The  regular  army  of  the  United  States  on  June 
30,  1914,  consisted  of  4701  officers  and  87,781  men, 
.  .  .  which  includes  Quartermaster  Corps  3809, 
and  Hospital  Corps  4055,  ...  at  that  time  the 
various  characters  of  troops  were  disposed  of  approx- 
imately as  follows.  .  .  . 

In  the  canal  zone,  I  Regiment  of  Infantry,  3  Com- 
panies of  Coast  Artillery  (aggregate  strength  2179). 
...  Of  the  troops  that  we  now  have,  the  numbers 
and  organizations  of  which  are  shown  above,  it  will 
be  necessary  in  the  near  future  to  take  from  the 
United  States  and  put  in  the  .  .  .  Panama  Canal 
Zone  i  Regiment  of  Infantry,  I  Squadron  of  Cavalry, 
i  Battalion  of  Field  Artillery,  I  Company  of  Engineers, 
and  12  Companies  of  Coast  Artillery,  4774  men. 

Assuming  a  force  of  between  five  thousand  and 
six  thousand  men  as  constituting  the  strength  of 


io      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

the  army  of  the  United  States  on  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama — and  I  doubt  if  the  force  at  present  on 
the  Isthmus  is  of  such  strength — how  insufficient 
it  appears  to  be  for  the  defence  of  the  canal! 
How  utterly  inadequate  to  defeat  the  landing  of 
an  hostile  army  under  the  protection  of  the  guns 
of  a  victorious  hostile  fleet! 

All  that  the  commanding  general  of  our  forces 
on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  could  possibly  do  in 
the  event  of  being  attacked  by  a  greatly  superior 
force,  would  be  to  blow  up  the  locks  of  the  canal 
and  render  its  use  by  an  enemy  during  the  progress 
of  the  war  utterly  impossible. 

Nor  could  we  reinforce  our  garrison  on  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  except  through  certain  diplo- 
matic arrangements  discussed  in  the  concluding 
chapter  of  this  book,  should  we  find  ourselves  at 
war  with  one  of  the  first-class  naval  and  military 
Powers,  without  command  of  the  sea;  and  with 
the  demands  upon  our  fleet,  as  the  first  line  of  de- 
fence of  our  home  coasts  and  harbours,  it  is  difficult 
to  see  how,  unless  vastly  increased  in  ships  and 
guns,  our  navy  could  meet  the  first  attack  of  the 
enemy  upon  our  coasts  and  yet  provide  a  Carib- 
bean Sea  fleet  large  enough  to  defeat  a  naval  and 
military  attack  upon  the  Panama  Canal. 

Holding  the  Panama  Canal  makes  it  imperative 
that  we  should  command  the  sea:  not  only  com- 
mand the  Atlantic  and  the  eastern  Pacific,  but 
also  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea. 


Unready  1 1 

Losing  command  of  the  sea,  we  lose  the  Panama 
Canal,  unless,  before  hostilities  shall  begin,  we  fill 
the  fortresses  defending  the  debouches  of  the 
canal  with  coast  artillery,  and  establish  upon  the 
Isthmus  a  mobile  army  large  enough  to  defeat  a 
land  attack  from  an  enemy  able  to  overcome, 
through  the  superiority  of  his  fleet,  the  sea 
defence  of  the  canal  by  our  fleet. 

I  have  indicated  the  minimum  of  the  mobile 
army  needed  for  the  defence  of  the  Panama  Canal 
as  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men.  But 
mere  men  without  ammunition,  and  without  suffi- 
cient military  supplies  and  provisions,  do  not 
constitute  an  effective  army.  Without  adequate 
supplies  of  ammunition,  military  supplies,  and 
provisions — and  modern  war  seems  to  demand  an 
illimitable  supply  of  ammunition — we  could  not 
hold  the  Panama  Canal. 

Is  there  reason  to  believe  that  the  country  ap- 
preciates the  danger  there  is  of  losing  the  Panama 
Canal  should  we  find  ourselves  at  war  with  a 
first-class  Power? 

As  shown  above,  the  Secretary  of  War  reported 
to  the  President  under  date  of  November  15, 
1914,  that  the  regular  army  "on  June  30,  1914, 
consisted  of  4701  officers  and  87,781  men,"  and 
that  he  hoped  soon  to  be  able  to  concentrate  in  the 
Panama  Canal  Zone  between  5000  and  6000  men. 

With  such  a  force,  how  can  the  Panama  Canal 
be  defended? 


12      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

With  the  demands  on  our  fleet  so  great  as  they 
are,  and  as  they  will  become  the  moment  war 
breaks  out,  what  reason  is  there  to  believe  that 
the  navy  can  furnish  for  the  defence  of  the  canal 
a  fleet  strong  enough  to  command  the  Caribbean 
Sea? 

What  is  true  of  the  Panama  Canal  is  equally 
true  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  of  the  Philip- 
pines, and  equally  true  of  Alaska,  if  it  should  profit 
an  enemy,  strong  enough  for  the  effort,  to  attack 
Alaska. 

In  the  same  report  of  November  15,  1914,  the 
Secretary  of  War  gives  our  strength  in  the  Hawai- 
ian Islands,  in  the  Philippines,  and  in  Alaska  as 
follows: 

In  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  3  Regiments  Infantry,  I 
Regiment  Cavalry,  i  Regiment  Field  Artillery,  i 
Company  Engineers,  8  Companies  Coast  Artillery 
(aggregate  strength  8195). 

In  the  Philippines,  3^£  Regiments  Infantry,  2 
Regiments  Cavalry,  I  Regiment  Field  Artillery,  2 
Companies  Engineers,  1 1  Companies  Coast  Artillery 
(aggregate  strength  9572). 

In  addition  to  the  above  troops  of  the  regular 
army  there  are  in  the  Philippines  fifty-two  com- 
panies of  Philippine  Scouts  aggregating  182  of- 
ficers and  5733  enlisted  men. 

"In  Alaska  one  Regiment  of  Infantry  (aggre- 
gate 862)." 


Unready  13 

It  is  ludicrously  absurd  to  suppose  that  these 
garrisons  could  defend  these  islands  and  hold 
Alaska  in  war. 

Nor  is  our  Asiatic  Fleet  a  war  fleet:  and  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  it  could  be  increased  to  the 
proportions  required  to  give  it  strength  to  resist 
the  attack  of  the  fleet  of  any  one  of  the  first-class 
Powers  because  of  the  demands  upon  the  navy 
for  the  defence  of  our  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts 
and  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

It  would  be  matter  of  sincere  regret  should  we 
lose  the  Philippine  Islands  in  war,  and  yet  lose 
them  we  should  because  it  would  be  impossible 
for  us  to  re-enforce  the  garrison,  and  maintain  its 
supplies  of  ammunition  during  the  war,  without 
complete  command  of  the  sea,  and  it  would  be 
impossible  for  us  to  hope  to  hold  command  of 
the  sea  against  the  sea  power  of  any  one  of  the 
nations  which  would  be  likely  to  challenge  our 
right  to  the  possession  of  the  islands,  without  an 
unhoped-for  increase  ot  the  navy. 

No  attempt  to  estimate  the  number  of  troops 
required  for  the  successful  defence  of  the  Philip- 
pines is  undertaken  because  of  its  seeming 'futility. 

Should  war  break  out  with  one  of  the  first-class 
Powers,  the  commanding  general  in  the  Philip- 
pines would  have  but  one  course  open  to  him. 
He  should  at  once  concentrate  all  the  troops  under 
his  command,  with  all  accessible  ammunition  and 
material  of  war,  at  some  one  defensible  point  in 


14      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

the  islands,  and  there  to  provision  himself  for  a 
siege  of  at  least  a  year.  The  point  selected  for 
the  final  stand  of  our  army  in  the  islands  should 
be  chosen  for  purely  military  reasons,  free  from 
all  political  considerations;  and  it  should  be  chosen 
especially  because  of  its  freedom  from  dominance 
by  commanding  heights,  which,  if  seized  by  the 
enemy,  would  demand  the  evacuation  of  the  posi- 
tion or  the  surrender  of  the  army.  The  only  hope 
of  the  commanding  general  would  be  that  he 
might  be  able  to  hold  this  position  until  the  end 
of  the  war,  a  hope  which  it  is  feared  would  end  in 
disappointment. 

All  that  our  fleet  could  do  on  the  breaking  out 
of  war  would  be  to  sail  away  and  leave  the  islands 
to  their  fate. 

Instead  of  waiting  for  the  outbreak  of  war  the 
Philippine  Islands  should  be  sold  to  Germany  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  present  European  War,  re- 
serving to  ourselves  in  the  treaty  of  sale  and  ces- 
sion certain  advantages  of  trade  with  the  islands. 
The  presence  of  Germany  in  the  Philippines  should 
be  regarded  as  making  for  our  interests,  because 
her  possession  of  the  islands  would  create  a  much- 
needed  balance  of  power  in  the  Pacific,  and  would 
give  her  a  direct  interest  in  the  maintenance  of 
the  neutrality  of  the  Panama  Canal  through  its 
possession  by  ourselves.  The  chief  consideration 
of  the  sale  and  cession  of  the  Philippine  Islands  to 
Germany  to  be  expressed  in  the  treaty  of  sale  and 


Unready  15 

cession  shall  be  a  stipulation  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many guaranteeing  in  perpetuity  the  possession 
of  the  Panama  Canal  to  the  United  States. 

Germany  could  colonize  the  Philippine  Islands, 
and  could  develop  their  resources  as  we  cannot. 
They  could  become  a  constituent  part  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire.  They  can  never  become  a  constituent 
part  of  the  Republic  of  the  United  States,  because 
our  Republic  is  founded  upon  the  principle  of  the 
citizenship  of  its  people.  Germany  could  make 
the  islands  a  great  naval  and  military  stronghold 
in  the  East  by  settling  in  the  islands  considerable 
military  colonies,  and  she  could  find  home's  on 
the  fertile  lands  of  the  islands  for  millions  of  her 
subjects,  who,  under  her  aggressive  civilization, 
would  assimilate  the  present  inhabitants  to  herself 
greatly  to  their  own  advantage. 

With  the  Philippines  in  her  possession,  Germany 
need  not  let  her  eyes  rest  greedily  upon  southern 
Brazil,  contenting  herself  with  the  commercial 
advantages  which  she  derives  from  the  colony  of 
her  people  settled  in  that  section  of  the  southern 
republic. 

The  Philippines,  lying  upon  the  line  of  commun- 
ication between  British  India  and  Japan,  Ger- 
many would  measurably  neutralize,  or  at  least 
limit  to  a  certain  extent,  the  offensive  strength  of 
those  allies  in  the  Pacific,  thereby  creating  the 
much-needed  balance  of  power  in  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

Under  such  circumstances  the  possession  of  the 


16      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Panama  Canal  by  the  United  States  would  be  so 
much  more  to  the  interest  of  Germany  than  the 
possession  of  the  canal  herself,  that,  so  far  as  we 
may  look  into  the  future,  the  cession  of  the  Philip- 
pines to  Germany,  with  or  without  a  guarantee  of 
our  possession  of  the  canal  in  the  treaty  of  cession, 
would,  of  itself,  guarantee  our  possession  of  the 
canal.  The  inclusion  of  such  a  clause  in  the  treaty, 
however,  upon  which  we  should  insist  as  the  chief 
consideration  for  the  cession  of  the  islands,  would 
not  only  insure  us  the  support  of  Germany  in 
holding  the  canal  should  war  come  upon  the 
United  States  through  the  desire  on  the  part  of 
any  other  nation  to  possess  the  canal,  but  the  possi- 
bility that  the  flags  of  Germany  and  the  United 
States  should  fly  side  by  side  in  the  breeze  of  battle 
would  have  a  sensibly  chilling  effect  upon  the 
ambition  of  any  of  the  Powers  desiring  the  pos- 
session of  the  canal. 

That  we  have  the  legal  right  to  sell  the  Philip- 
pines cannot  be  doubted.  The  capture  of  Manila 
took  place  after  the  signing  of  the  preliminaries 
of  peace  between  Spain  and  the  United  States, 
and  consequently  our  title  to  the  islands  cannot 
be  held  to  be  a  title  by  conquest. 

We  paid  Spain  $20,000,000  for  her  property  and 
rights  in  the  islands,  and  the  Philippines  became 
ours  to  do  with  as  we  pleased. 

The  officious  in  contradistinction  to  the  offi- 
cial diplomatic  attitude  of  our  country  toward 


Unready  17 

Russia  during  the  Russo-Japanese  War  is  unac- 
countable from  any  correct  view  of  our  interests 
in  the  Pacific.  Our  interests  called  for  a  strong 
Russia,  with  open  ports  on  the  Pacific  Ocean 
throughout  the  whole  year.  The  long  and  loyal 
friendship  between  Russia  and  the  United  States, 
and  the  absence  of  points  of  contest  or  conflict 
between  the  two  countries,  seemed  to  assure  the 
continuance  of  friendly  relations  between  Russia 
and  the  United  States;  and  a  strong  Russia  in  the 
Pacific  should  have  been  taken  as  the  guarantee 
of  the  maintenance  of  a  balance  of  power  in  the 
North  Pacific.  Instead  of  a  strong  Russia  we  find 
a  strong  Japan,  and  the  consequent  complete 
destruction  of  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Pacific. 
This  destruction  of  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Pacific  places  us  vis-ti-vis  with  Japan. 

This  great  and  almost  uncontrollable  power  of 
Japan  does  not  appear,  for  the  moment,  to  be 
matter  of  serious  concern  to  us.  The  eyes  of 
Japan  are  fixed  upon  the  continent  of  Asia  and 
she  seems  to  see  there  the  seat  of  her  expanding 
power.  She  has  annexed  to  her  empire  the  king- 
dom of  Corea,  and  she  is  advancing  into  the  heart 
of  China  with,  as  yet,  undeterminate  plans,  but 
with  her  eyes  full  of  the  light  of  the  future. 

Japan  knows  very  well  that  she  can  seize  the 
Philippines  the  moment  she  deems  that  the  time 
has  come  for  action.  She  looks  upon  the  United 
States  as  her  locum  tenens  in  the  islands,  and  she 


1 8      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

does  not  wish  us  to  leave  the  islands  in  behalf  of 
any  other  Power.  She  knows  our  present  impo- 
tence, and  is  content  to  let  matters  stand  as  they 
are.  But  when  the  hour  strikes  she  proposes  to 
drive  us  out  of  the  islands. 

But  she  is  venturing  upon  endeavours  on  the 
continent  of  Asia  which  hold  within  the  mantle  of 
time  great  surprises  and  possibly  great  misfor- 
tunes. At  present  her  way  seems  clear  and  her 
future  bright.  Leaving  out  of  account  the  great 
reserve  force  in  a  people  so  vast  as  the  Chinese, 
occupying  a  country  so  vast  as  China,  it  would 
seem  that  Japan's  hold  upon  the  imperial  country 
cannot  be  shaken.  Japan  occupies  a  place  in 
China  similar  to  that  of  England  in  France  in  the 
time  of  the  Black  Prince. 

Has  the  future  the  same  transformation  in  store 
for  Japan? 

But  whether  continuously  victorious  or  ulti- 
mately vanquished  Japan  regards  herself  as  the 
inheritor  of  the  Philippines.  She  does  not  wish 
to  disturb  our  present  hold  upon  the  islands 
because  she  is  not  ready  at  present  to  take  pos- 
session of  them  herself. 

To  anticipate  this  ultimate  moment  of  contest 
would  seem  to  be  wisdom  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States,  and  especially  so,  if  it  could  be  possible 
to  use  the  Philippines  in  such  a  way  as  not  only 
to  avoid  the  conflict  ourselves  but  to  transfer  it  to 
other  shoulders;  and  especially  wise  would  it  be 


Unready  19 

if  we  could  use  the  Philippines  in  such  a  way  as 
to  create  a  balance  of  power  in  the  Pacific  strong 
enough  to  make  for  peace  in  the  Eastern  world, 
and  also  to  guarantee  our  possession  of  the 
Panama  Canal  by  one  of  the  great  Powers  of  the 
world. 

Perpetual  peace  is  an  iridescent  dream  beyond 
the  sphere  of  statesmanship.  But  the  mainte- 
nance of  peace  for  the  present,  or  for  the  im- 
mediate future,  is  the  duty  of  the  statesman. 

The  transfer  of  the  Philippines  to  Germany 
after  the  present  war  would  seem  to  solve  the 
problem  of  the  islands  to  the  benefit  of  the  United 
States,  while  insuring  to  the  islands  and  their 
inhabitants  an  enlightened,  an  energetic,  and  a 
civilized  government.  j 

The  present  policy  of  ultimate  withdrawal  from 
the  Philippines  in  favour  of  a  portion  of  the  pre- 
sent population  of  the  islands,  when  they  shall  be 
fit  to  assume  the  responsibilities  of  government, 
promises  no  advantage  to  the  United  States,  no 
advantage  to  the  people  of  the  islands,  and  fur- 
nishes no  guarantee  of  the  maintenance  of  the 
peace  of  the  Pacific.  Indeed,  wretched  misgovern- 
ment,  sanguinary  conflicts,  and  the  ultimate  an- 
nexation of  the  islands  by  Japan  as  a  welcome 
relief  from  useless  bloodshed  is  the  future  of  the 
Philippines  should  we  withdraw  in  favour  of  a 
section  of  the  population  of  the  islands.  And 
should  we  be  so  foolish  as  to  accompany  our  act 


20      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

of  withdrawal  with  a  guarantee  of  the  independ- 
ence of  the  islands,  we  should  certainly  be  led 
into  war  with  Japan,  because  the  islands  could 
not  be  expected  to  maintain  their  independence, 
unaided  by  us,  and  Japan  is  at  hand  ready  to  take 
them  over  when  they  shall  have  become  ripe  for 
annexation.  Japan  in  the  Philippines  is  of  no 
advantage  to  the  United  States.  Her  possession 
of  the  Philippines  not  only  does  not  create  a 
balance  of  power  in  the  Pacific,  but  aggravates 
the  present  condition  of  affairs  in  that  ocean.  The 
possession  of  the  islands  by  Japan  means  the 
virtual  closing  of  their  ports  to  our  commerce, 
because  we  cannot  compete  with  Japan  in  the 
commerce  of  the  East  whenever  she  resorts  to  the 
advantages  of  position,  and  to  the  occult  advan- 
tages which  she  affords  her  commerce. 

Whether  our  statesmen  are  clear-sighted  enough 
to  seize  the  opportunity  which  will  be  afforded  at 
the  close  of  the  present  war  to  retire  from  the 
islands  in  favour  of  Germany,  it  is  impossible  to 
say.  But  it  is  the  logical  solution  of  an  almost 
impossible  problem. 

As  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  Alaska,  we  must 
defend  these  possessions  at  all  hazards  and  to  the 
death.  But  to  do  so,  the  United  States  will  need 
a  large  army  and  a  large  navy. 

The  present  force  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  is 
barely  enough  to  give  warning  to  the  world  that 
they  belong  to  the  United  States.  As  a  war  army 


Unready  21 

the  force  in  the  islands  is  a  temptation,  not  a 
means  of  defence. 

Let  it  be  assumed  that  our  enemy  is  one  of  the 
first-class  Powers  in  alliance  with  Japan,  or  Japan 
herself. 

How  can  it  be  supposed  that  8195  men  could 
defend  the  islands  from  Japanese  attack?  Ten 
times  8195  would  scarcely  be  sufficient  to  insure 
the  continued  possession  of  the  islands  by  the 
United  States. 

In  war  with  Japan,  or  with  Japan  and  her  ally 
Great  Britain,  what  fleet  has  the  United  States  in 
the  Pacific  that  could  keep  the  seas  against  the 
fleets  of  those  allies? 

Alaska  must  be  defended  as  an  integral  part  of 
the  United  States.  The  loss  of  Alaska  would  be 
a  staggering  blow  to  the  power  and  the  prestige 
of  the  United  States.  Its  surrender  should  only 
be  thought  of  at  the  end  of  a  long,  a  bloody,  and  a 
disastrous  war.  Meanwhile  let  us  ask  each  other 
the  question  whether  we  are  satisfied  to  rest  the 
defence  of  Alaska  upon  its  present  garrison  of  862 
men? 

And  if  we  shall  be  disturbed  by  the  question, 
let  us  ask  ourselves  further  whether  we  prefer  the 
loss  of  Alaska  to  an  enemy  or  preparation  for  its 
defence? 

Upon  the  answer  to  those  questions  shall 
depend  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  national 
defence. 


22      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

National  defence!  The  vastness,  the  grandeur 
of  the  subject  should  stir  the  blood  of  the  most 
stolid  of  our  citizens. 

The  United  States  at  bay! 

The  United  States,  facing  the  defeat  of  its  fleet, 
and  the  invasion  of  its  territory,  should  awaken  the 
most  sluggish  of  our  people  to  action. 

And  we  may  have  to  face  the  destruction  of  our 
fleet  and  the  presence  of  an  hostile  army  on  our 
shores,  unless  we  withdraw  from  the  fool's  para- 
dise in  which  we  are  living,  and  face  the  future  as 
our  forefathers  faced  it  when  the  guns  of  Great 
Britain  were  sounding  in  their  ears. 

But  the  conditions  of  the  problem  of  the  de- 
fence of  the  country  have  changed  wonderfully 
in  the  past  fifty  years.  Fifty  years  ago,  even 
thirty  years  ago,  we  might  complacently  have 
rested  upon  the  reserve  power  in  our  people  as  the 
stronghold  of  our  defence.  But  today  there  is  no 
occult  stronghold;  no  defence  but  the  defence 
of  soldiers  with  guns  in  their  hands,  and  cannon 
in  abundance,  and  in  a  fleet  ready  to  meet  upon 
the  ocean  the  fleets  of  any  Power  which  shall 
array  herself  against  the  United  States. 

But  where  are  our  soldiers?  Where  our  can- 
non? Where  the  great  fleets  that  shall  be  strong 
enough  to  hold  the  seas  against  all  enemies,  and 
keep  open  communication  with  the  Panama  Canal, 
the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  with  Alaska? 

The  soldiers  do  not  exist;  the  cannon  and  the 


Unready  23 

ships  are  still  in  the  ores  of  the  mountains,  un- 
mined  and  unconverted  into  the  shapes  of  war. 

They  are  yet  to  be  created,  yet  to  be  called  into 
existence. 

In  the  very  able  report  of  Major-General  Wother- 
spoon,  chief  of  staff  of  the  army,  dated  November 
15,  1914,  which  report  it  is  sincerely  wished  could 
be  read  by  every  one  of  our  countrymen,  the 
General  says: 

The  army  is  154  officers  and  7533  enlisted  men  be- 
low its  authorized  strength. 

Of  the  total  present  enlisted  strength  of  the  army 
27.50  per  cent.,  including  recruits  and  recruiting 
parties,  belongs  to  the  noncombatant  and  non-effec- 
tive class,  and  is  not  with  the  colours;  19.45  per  cent, 
is  in  that  branch  whose  special  function  is  coast  de- 
fence; and  58.05  per  cent,  belongs  to  the  mobile  forces 
(engineers,  cavalry,  field  artillery,  infantry). 

Of  the  actual  strength  of  the  army  from  the  latest 
returns,  1067  officers  and  19,899  enlisted  men  (includ- 
ing recruits  and  men  engaged  in  recruiting)  belong 
to  the  staff,  technical,  and  noncombatant  branches  of 
the  army. 

Seven  hundred  and  forty-six  officers  and  17,201 
enlisted  men  belong  to  the  coast  artillery  and  2738 
officers  and  51,344  enlisted  men  belong  to  the  mobile 
army  (engineers,  cavalry,  field  artillery,  and  infantry). 

The  total  strength  of  the  field  or  mobile  forces  in 
our  army  is  therefore  less  than  52,000  enlisted  men. 
If  from  this  strength  the  noncombatants  and  non- 
effectives,  belonging  to  the  regimental,  troop,  battery, 


24      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

and  company  organizations,  such  as  the  noncom- 
missioned staff,  musicians,  cooks,  scouts,  etc.,  which 
aggregate  5376,  are  deducted,  the  actual  fighting 
strength  of  the  army  with  the  colours,  and  without  deduc- 
tions for  officers  and  men  sick,  on  furlough,  detached 
service,  etc.,  would  be  2738  officers  and  45,968  enlisted 
men. 

The  enlisted  men  of  the  mobile  army  are  distributed 
as  follows : 

In  the  United  States  proper . . .  30,481 

In  our  foreign  possessions 20,863  51,344 

Distributed  as  follows: 

In  the  Philippines 7, 21 2 

In  the  Hawaiian  Islands 6,832 

In  the  Panama  Canal  Zone. ...  1,681 

In  China 690 

In  Alaska 431 

In  Vera  Cruz  (since  returned  to 

the  United  States) 3,434  20,280 

In  Porto  Rico  Regiment 583        583  20,863 


As  to  the  coast  artillery  branch  of  the  army.  .  .  . 
Its  strength  has  no  relationship  to  the  strength  of  the 
mobile  army  other  than  that  the  strength  of  the  latter 
must  be  adequate  to  protect  the  fortified  positions 
from  attack  from  the  rear.  .  .  . 

The  coast  artillery  defences  in  the  United  States 
proper  are  to  be  manned  at  the  rate  of  fifty  per  cent. 


Unready  25 

of  the  gun  and  mortar  defences  by  the  coast  artillery 
corps  of  the  organized  militia. 


The  strength  of  the  coast  artillery  is  at  present 
566  officers  and  13,108  enlisted  men  below  the  neces- 
sities as  estimated  by  the  chief  of  coast  artillery  in 
addition  to  the  deficiencies  in  the  coast  artillery  corps 
of  the  organized  militia.  The  total  deficiencies  in  the 
coast  artillery  corps  of  the  regular  army  and  the  organized 
militia  are,  therefore,  856  officers  and  24,489  enlisted 
men. 

Naval  armament  in  the  last  few  years  has  rapidly 
developed,  particularly  in  respect  to  the  calibre  of  the 
guns,  their  ranges,  and  the  rapidity  with  which  fire 
from  these  can  be  delivered.  At  the  present  time  the 
tendency  is  to  place  on  the  higher  type  of  battleships 
guns  as  large  as  fifteen  inches  calibre.  These  guns, 
whilst  carrying  a  projectile  of  less  weight  than  those 
used  with  our  direct  fire  type  of  seacoast  guns,  have, 
owing  to  the  greater  length  of  the  guns  and  the  higher 
powder  pressure  used,  a  very  distinct  advantage  in 
range,  their  range  exceeding  that  of  our  fourteen-inch 
guns  from  2000  to  3000  yards. 


In  other  words,  it  is  my  opinion  that  careful  con- 
sideration should  be  given,  at  least  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  new  defence  districts,  to  the  question  of 
the  calibre,  length,  and  range  of  the  seacoast  guns, 
as  well  as  to  the  question  whether  the  turret  system 
for  the  protection  of  the  gun  and  its  crew  should  not 
be  adopted,  in  order  to  put  the  land  defences  somewhat 


26      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

nearer  on  a  parity  with  the  naval  guns  which  are  liable 
to  attack  them.  As  a  fleet  of  eight  battleships  of  the 
most  modern  type  can  throw  against  a  single  turret 
118  projectiles  per  minute,  the  danger  that  must 
arise  from  the  possibility  of  fragments  of  these  shells 
and  the  debris  thrown  up  from  their  impact  against 
the  concrete  parapets  which  protect  the  guns  to  the 
crews  as  well  as  to  the  delicate  and  complicated  ma- 
chinery which  operates  the  guns,  would  indicate  that 
overhead  protection  against  such  fragments  should 
be  provided  in  order  to  insure  the  most  effective 
operation  of  the  coast  armament. 

There  is  a  serious  deficiency,  however,  in  ammunition 
for  these  defences,  the  supply  which  the  department  has 
been  attempting  to  maintain  being  on  the  basis  of  approxi- 
mately an  hour's  full  and  active  operation  of  the  guns 
in  the  United  States  proper  and  a  two  hours'  full  and 
active  operation  of  the  guns  in  oversea  fortifications. 
According  to  the  report  of  the  chief  of  coast  artillery, 
the  amount  of  ammunition  now  available  and  provided 
for  by  appropriations  is  equal  to  about  seventy-three  per 
cent,  of  this  requirement  for  the  guns  and  fifty  per  cent,  for 
the  mortars.  The  amount  of  explosive  necessary  to 
load  and  operate  the  mines  now  provided  at  our  vari- 
ous coast  defences  for  one  charge  is  complete.  The 
deficiencies  in  the  matter  of  fire  control  and  search- 
lights are  of  the  most  serious  character.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  proper  fire  control  and  searchlight  installation 
is  only  maintained  in  a  limited  number  of  first-class 
defence  areas,  the  remainder  of  the  fire  control  systems 
and  searchlight  equipment  being  deficient  or  improvised. 


Unready  27 

Turning  again  to  the  admirable  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  it  may  be  permitted  to  quote 
therefrom  as  follows : 

In  continental  United  States  we  have  a  territory 
consisting  of  3,026,789  square  miles,  with  a  population 
of  98,781,324.  In  Alaska  we  have  590,884  square 
miles,  with  a  population  of  64,356.  Our  other  terri- 
torial responsibilities  which  must  be  considered  are: 
The  Panama  Canal,  where,  although  the  population 
is  small,  we  have  an  investment  of  $400,000,000  and 
the  destruction  of  which  waterway  would  be  an 
international  calamity;  Hawaii,  with  6449  square 
miles  and  a  population  of  191,909;  Porto  Rico,  with 
3606  square  miles  and  a  population  of  1,118,012;  the 
Philippines,  with  127,800  square  miles  and  a  popula- 
tion of  7,635,426,  together  with  certain  other  islands 
not  necessary  to  be  considered  in  this  connection. 


Scarcely  any  unit  in  the  army  ever  has  its  proper 
complement  of  officers,  and  the  need  for  an  increase 
of  officers  is  urgent  and  imperative.  In  continental 
United  States  we  had  in  the  mobile  army  on  June  jo, 
1914,  1495  officers  and  29,405  men. 

We  have  a  reserve — that  is,  men  who  have  been 
trained  in  the  army  and  under  the  terms  of  their 
enlistment  are  subject  to  be  called  back  to  the  colours 
in  time  of  war — consisting  of  sixteen  men. 


Anyone  who  takes  the  slightest  trouble  to  investigate 
will  find  that  in  modern  warfare  a  prepared  enemy  would 


28      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

progress  so  far  on  the  way  to  success  in  six  months  (the 
shortest  possible  time  allowed  for  the  creation  of  a  volun- 
teer army) ,  if  his  antagonist  had  to  wait  six  months  to 
meet  him,  that  such  unprepared  antagonist  might  as  well 
concede  defeat  without  contest. 

From  these  vastly  interesting  and  most  impor- 
tant reports  we  gather  the  following  startling  facts: 

That  on  June  30,  1914,  the  mobile  force  of  the 
army  in  the  United  States  was  1495  officers  and 
29,405  men,  a  total  national  defensive  army  of 
but  jo, goo  officers  and  men. 

That  in  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  we  had 
a  garrison  of  less  than  2000  officers  and  men, 
but  to  be  increased  ultimately  to  about  5000 
men. 

That  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  men  of  the  gun  and 
mortar  requirement  of  the  coast  defences  are  to 
be  furnished  by  the  National  Guard,  and  that  the 
total  deficiencies  in  the  coast  artillery  corps  of 
the  regular  army  and  the  organized  militia  are 
856  officers  and  24,489  enlisted  men. 

That  the  1 5-inch  guns  of  foreign  navies  outclass 
the  14-inch  guns  of  our  coast  defensive  works, 
with  a  superiority  of  range  of  between  2000  and 
3000  yards  to  that  of  the  heaviest  guns  in  our 
coast  defences. 

That  proper  fire  control  and  searchlight  instal- 
lation is  only  maintained  in  a  limited  number  of 
first-class  defence  areas,  whereas  in  the  remainder, 


Unready  29 

the  fire  control  system  and  searchlight  equipment 
are  deficient  or  improvised. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  without  danger  to 
themselves  a  hostile  fleet  of  dreadnoughts  might 
lie  in  safety  out  of  range  of  the  heaviest  guns  of 
our  work's  and  destroy  them  at  pleasure. 

That  theoretically  our  coast  defences  are  sup- 
plied with  ammunition  for  a  battle  of  an  hour's 
duration,  but  that  in  fact  ammunition  is  provided 
for  a  bombardment  of  but  about  three  quarters 
of  an  hour.  At  the  end  of  an  hour's  combat  the 
guns  of  our  defensive  works  would  be  out  of  action 
for  lack  of  ammunition. 

To  oppose  the  landing  of  an  hostile  army  on  our 
coast  the  United  States  could  put  in  line  of  battle, 
provided  every  man  of  the  mobile  army  could  be 
brought  to  the  front,  30,900  officers  and  men  of 
the  regular  army. 

I  quite  understand  that  theoretically  the  or- 
ganized militia  is  supposed  to  number  8323  officers 
and  119,087  men,  but  it  is  not  the  belief  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  that  all  of  the  National  Guard 
would  respond  to  the  call  to  the  colours  in  the 
event  of  war  breaking  out.  How  large  a  propor- 
tion of  the  National  Guard  would  come  to  the 
colours  is  matter  of  estimation.  By  some  60%  is 
considered  to  be  a  fair  proportion  of  the  men  of  the 
National  Guard  who  would  report  for  duty, 
whereas  by  others  the  estimation  rises  to  75%. 
Assuming  the  latter  percentage,  we  should  have 


30      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

as  a  reinforcement  of  the  30,900  regulars  about 
95,000  men  from  the  National  Guard,  more  or 
less  dependable  in  battle ;  or  if  the  whole  army  and 
National  Guard  should  be  concentrated  at  a  given 
point  to  meet  an  invading  army,  which  is  an  un- 
thinkable contingency,  we  should  have  with  the 
colours  an  aggregate  force  of  about  125,900  men. 

But  such  a  concentration  would  be  a  human 
impossibility.  It  would  mean  the  abandonment 
of  all  other  posts  and  sections  of  the  country  by 
the  regular  army  to  effect  the  complete  concen- 
tration of  its  mobile  strength  of  30,000  men,  and 
it  would  equally  be  impossible  to  effect  such  a 
complete  concentration  of  the  National  Guard, 
because  it  would  leave  the  rest  of  the  country  bare 
of  ostensible  military  force  to  perfect  the  concen- 
tration. It  might  be  possible  to  effect  the  con- 
centration of  the  mobile  force  of  the  regular  army 
by  substituting  portions  of  the  National  Guard  to 
take  the  place  of  the  regulars  on  the  Mexican 
border,  and  elsewhere  in  the  country,  but  such 
substitution  would  require  a  much  larger  force  of 
militia  than  of  the  regulars  withdrawn. 

I  doubt  if  it  would  be  possible  to  concentrate 
at  any  given  point  a  larger  force  of  regulars  and 
militia  than  75,000  troops,  with  which  to  resist 
an  invading  army  of  a  quarter  of  a  million  men. 

I  have  read  with  close  attention  Colonel  Roose- 
velt's book,  America  and  the  World  War;  Major- 
General  Green's  book,  The  Present  Military 


Unready  31 

Situation  in  the  United  States,  and  the  book 
(American  translation)  by  Freiheer  von  Edelsheim 
of  the  German  General  Staff,  Operations  upon  the 
Sea — The  Problems  of  Transporting  Troops  during 
War,  without  illumination  of  the  subject  of  how 
we  are  to  meet  such  an  invasion  as  Freiheer  von 
Edelsheim  indicates  as  entirely  possible. 

Colonel  Roosevelt's  book  is  written  in  a  lofty 
spirit  of  righteousness,  full  of  glittering  generali- 
ties, but  without  a  practical  suggestion  as  to  how 
the  nation  shall  be  prepared  for  war.  He  is  like 
a  great  bell  clanging  in  the  night,  sounding  an 
alarm  to  the  startled  city. 

General  Green  points  out  the  danger  of  for- 
eign invasion,  expresses  a  great  desire  to  see  the 
suppressed  parts  of  von  Edelsheim's  book,  and 
recommends  that  the  nation  should  support  the 
Secretary  of  War,  from  whose  admirable  report  I 
have  quoted  so  liberally,  in  all  of  his  suggestions 
for  the  increase  of  the  strength  of  the  army. 

Von  Edelsheim's  book  was  a  great  surprise. 
Its  reading  was  begun  with  avidity,  but  soon  it 
was  discovered  that  beyond  some  calculations  as 
to  the  transport  capacity  of  a  portion  of  the  Ger- 
man merchant  marine,  there  was  nothing  in  the 
book  which  was  not  known,  or  nothing  in  it  which 
at  least  should  not  be  known  to  every  soldier. 

Granted  the  defeat  .of  our  fleet,  the  question 
of  the  invasion  of  the  United  States  under  existing 
military  conditions  in  the  country  is  a  perfectly 


32      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

simple  and  a  perfectly  practical  matter.  It  is 
merely  a  question  of  transportation. 

With  the  superiority  of  gun-fire  possessed  by  the 
dreadnought  fleet  of  a  possible  enemy  conceded 
by  the  chief  of  staff,  Major- General  Wotherspoon, 
and  holding  in  memory  the  crushing  and  crumbling 
effect  of  the  German  fire  upon  the  fortifications 
of  Liege  and  Namur — concrete  walls  and  steel 
turrets  crumbling  under  this  fire  as  if  made  of 
pastry — our  whole  coast  is  open  to  the  fleet  of 
such  an  enemy. 

Major-General  Green  indicates  the  landing- 
place  of  the  invading  enemy  on  the  storm-swept 
southern  shore  of  Long  Island,  but  I  cannot  see 
why  the  enemy  should  risk  shipwreck  on  such  an 
open  coast  when  it  would  be  perfectly  possible 
for  him  to  force  the  eastern  entrance  of  Long 
Island  Sound,  and  then  have  his  choice  of  half  a 
dozen  harbours  on  the  mainland,  on  the  northern 
shore  of  Long  Island  Sound,  in  which  to  land  under 
cover  of  the  guns  of  the  fleet,  within  easy  striking 
distance  of  all  of  the  railway  connections  of  New 
York  City  east  of  the  Hudson  River. 

Of  course  no  soldier  would  dream  of  defending 
New  York  City  except  upon  its  sea  front  .from  an 
attack  by  the  enemy's  fleet,  or  at  a  distance  of  at 
least  thirty  or  forty  miles  from  its  farthest  suburb 
toward  the  enemy. 

The  duty  of  the  army  would  be  to  resist  as  far 
as  possible  the  landing  of  an  enemy,  and  when  he 


Unready  33 

had  effected  a  landing  to  meet  him  in  battle  out- 
side of  the  range  of  the  guns  of  his  fleet. 

Assuming  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
after  forcing  the  eastern  entrance  of  Long  Island 
Sound  to  seize  New  York  City,  he  would  be  able 
to  choose  his  point  of  landing,  and  consequently 
to  dictate  the  line  of  resistance  of  our  army,  which 
should  be  made  behind  an  intrenched  line  of 
defence. 

In  looking  over  the  tables  of  organization  and 
the  Field  Service  Regulations,  edition  of  1914, 
issued  by  the  War  Department,  I  find  no  especial 
provision  for  pioneers  except  with  the  cavalry, 
although  there  is  provision  for  engineers.  No 
army  would  need  an  efficient  force  of  pioneers 
more  than  our  army  engaged  in  resisting  an  enemy 
in  possession  of  Long  Island  Sound,  and  no  coun- 
try possesses  a  larger  or  a  better  class  from  which 
to  draw  men  for  a  body  of  pioneers  than  the 
United  States,  from  the  negro  population  of  the 
South.  A  study  of  the  pioneer  corps  of  Sherman's 
army  is  recommended  and,  as  the  result  of  such 
study,  it  is  thought  that  the  difference  between 
pioneers  and  engineers  will  be  perceived,  which 
will  be  suggestive  and  useful  in  future  military 
operations  in  front  of  an  enemy,  especially  in 
front  of  a  superior  enemy,  landed  from  an  ene- 
my's fleet  under  the  circumstances  indicated 
above. 

The  first  line  of  national  defence  is  the  fleet. 


34      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

In  this  book  the  fleet  has  been  spoken  of  as  the 
first  line  of  defence  for  our  harbours  and  our  coasts. 
It  must  not  be  understood,  however,  that  such  a 
^suggestion  contemplates  the  destruction  of  the 
fleet  organization,  and  the  segregation  of  the  ships 
of  the  fleet  among  the  various  ports  and  harbours 
of  the  country. 

Nothing  could  be  farther  from  the  thought.  It 
is  believed  that  the  safety  of  the  nation  from  for- 
eign invasion,  unless  there  shall  be  created  an 
army  of  sufficient  size  and  efficiency  to  serve  as  a 
warning  to  any  possible  enemy,  depends  upon  the 
fleet;  that  the  safety  of  the  Panama  Canal  from 
attack  by  invasion  depends  upon  the  creation  of 
a  distinct  and  powerful  fleet  of  sufficient  strength 
to  dominate  the  Caribbean  Sea;  and  that  the 
continued  possession  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  of 
Alaska,  and  the  safety  of  the  Pacific  coast,  depends 
upon  a  powerful  Pacific  fleet,  as  strong  as  the  full 
fleet  of  any  one  of  the  Pacific  powers. 

The  problem  of  national  defence  is  a  naval  as  ( 
well  as  a  military  problem. 

To  insure  exemption  from  invasion,  to  hold  the 
Panama  Canal,  Hawaii,  and  Alaska,  and  to  main- 
tain the  Monroe  Doctrine,  we  must  increase  our 
fleet  to  such  proportions  as '  to  be  as  strong  as 
Germany  in  the  Atlantic  and  in  the  Caribbean 
Sea,  and  as  strong  as  Japan  in  the  Pacific. 

Nothing  less  than  that  will  meet  the  conditions 
of  the  naval  problem. 


Unready  35 

Nothing  less  than  the  creation  of  an  army  strong 
enough  to  serve  as  a  menace  even  to  the  military 
\  empire  of  Germany,  will  be  sufficient  to  meet  the 
conditions  of  the  military  problem. 

The  almost   painful  position  of  Great  Britain 
/    as  a  military  Power  in  the  present  war  should  be  a 
\  warning  to  us  to  meet  the  conditions  of  national 
defence  as  they  now  present  themselves  to  us. 

Great  Britain  was  utterly  unprepared  for  such 
a  war  as  she  has  entered  upon,  with  a  small  regular 
army  scattered  over  the  earth  and  with  an  ineffi- 
cient militia  or  territorial  army,  as  her  second  line 
of  defence.  On  the  breaking  out  of  the  war  she 
began  the  creation  of  a  large  volunteer  army, 
which,  according  to  Lord  Kitchener,  was  to  be 
ready  for  the  field  in  May  of  this  year.  May  came, 
but  her  army  was  not  then  ready  for  the  field. 
July  has  passed,  and  nearly  a  year  after  the  break- 
ing out  of  the  war,  Lord  Landsowne,  speaking  in 
the  House  of  Lords,  says  that  the  British  army  on 
the  continent  amounts  to  "  approximately  420,000 
to  440,000  men,"  including  those  in  France  and 
those  engaged  in  the  attack  on  the  forts  defending 
the  Dardanelles. 

In  France  the  front  of  the  Allies  extends  from 
the  Atlantic  Ocean  to  the  Swiss  frontier,  and  yet 
of  that  long  front,  on  the  maintenance  of  which 
depends  the  safety  of  Dunkirk  and  Calais,  and 
the  freedom  from  invasion  of  England,  the  British 
troops  hold  but  forty  miles. 


36      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

England  has  held  to  the  volunteer  system  of 
recruiting  her  army,  and  manifestly  the  system 
has  broken  down.  For  a  long  while  she  depended 
on  the  ordinary  out-turn  of  munitions  of  war  for 
her  supplies,  and  here  also  her  system  of  produc- 
tion has  broken  down.  A  year  of  the  great  war 
has  passed  and  England  is  still  in  the  throes  of 
preparation  for  war.  She  is  supposed  to  have  in 
England  a  million  volunteers,  but  she  does  not  send 
them  to  France  where  her  fate  is  being  decided. 
Presumably  she  does  not  yet  consider  them  yet  to 
be  soldiers.  She  is  short  of  guns,  short  of  muni- 
tions of  war,  short  of  soldiers.  Should  Dunkirk 
and  Calais  fall  into  the  hands  of  Germany  the 
invasion  of  England  may  become  a  possibility. 

Should  we  become  involved  in  war  is  it  possible 
to  believe  that  we  should  be  able  to  make  a  better 
showing  than  England  has  made? 

Manifestly  not. 

Therefore  her  unsuccessful  undertaking  in  this 
war  should  be  thoughtfully  considered  by  us  as 
not  only  a  warning,  but  as  pointing  the  way  to  the 
necessity  of  perfecting  a  system  of  national  defence 
which  shall  put  us  beyond  the  danger  of  invasion 
and  defeat. 

As  an  American  by  over  two  hundred  and  fifty 
years*  descent,  the  author  believes  in  his  country 
and  in  his  countrymen.  He  believes  that  they 
have  been  made,  and  that  they  can  be  made  again, 
as  good  soldiers  as  the  people  of  any  country  in  the 


Unready  37 

world.  He  would  urge  upon  his  fellow  countrymen 
to  be  warned  by  the  situation  of  Great  Britain; 
to  be  awake  to  the  necessity  for  preparation 
against  war  lest  they  shall  have  to  suffer  the  biting 
mortification,  the  blinding  and  crushing  wretched- 
ness of  defeat. 

Prepared  we  can  face  the  world  with  confidence 
and  with  a  high  heart. 

It  is  to  point  the  way — the  only  way — to  safety 
and  success  through  thorough  preparation  that 
this  book  is  written. 


CHAPTER  II 
WEST  POINT:  ITS  EXPANSION  AND  REORGANIZATION 

FIFTY  years  ago,  or  at  the  close  of  the  War  of 
the  Rebellion,  and  while  I  was  still  in  the 
army,  I  advocated  an  enlargement  of  the  corps  of 
cadets,  and  the  reorganization  of  the  West  Point 
Military  Academy,  so  that  the  Academy  should 
be  prepared  to  graduate  all  the  officers  that  the 
regular  army  should  need,  and  in  addition  should 
graduate,  each  year,  a  certain  number  of  half-term 
men,  or  men  who  should  have  spent  two  years 
at  the  Military  Academy,  and  who,  leaving  the 
academy  at  their  graduation,  and  passing  into  the 
great  body  of  the  people,  should  be  ready  to  officer 
the  volunteer  army  which  our  military  system 
seemed  then  to  demand  should  be  created  on  the 
breaking  out  of  war  when  war  should  come.  My 
idea  was  not  alone  to  officer  the  regular  army  ex- 
clusively with  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy, 
but  also  each  year  to  send  out  into  the  body  of 
the  people  a  number  of  young  men  who  had  had 
the  advantage  of  two  years'  study  and  instruction 


West  Point  39 

at  West  Point,  as  a  reserve  of  officers  for  the  army 
or  the  volunteers  in  the  event  of  war. 

Although  I  discussed  the  subject  with  the 
enthusiasm  of  youth  and  with  the  judgment 
formed  by  service  in  the  volunteer  army  during 
the  great  war,  I  spoke  to  dull  ears.  The  country 
had  had  enough  of  war  and  of  talk  presaging  war. 
The  officers  of  the  army  with  whom  I  discussed 
the  subject  were  indifferent;  and  both  people  and 
army,  satisfied  with  the  prowess  of  the  volunteers, 
were  content  to  rest  the  future  of  the  country  in 
their  hands. 

When  it  is  remembered  that  we  were  separated 
by  three  thousand  miles  of  ocean  from  a  European 
enemy;  that  Japan  had  not  then  emerged  as  a 
modern  Power  from  the  state  of  Eastern  lethargy 
which  had  held  her  for  centuries;  that  the  steel 
battleship  and  the  modern  submarine  had  not 
then  been  invented,  and  that  a  three- thousand- 
ton  commercial  steamer  was  the  wonder  of  the 
seas;  that  the  railway  was  only  then  becoming  the 
power  in  transportation  which  it  has  since  become ; 
that  electricity  had  not  been  adapted  by  modern 
invention  as  since  has  been  done,  except  in  respect 
to  the  telegraph,  to  the  needs  of  man  in  peace  and 
in  war;  that  the  telephone  had  not  been  invented; 
that  12-inch  and  1 5-inch  guns  and  mortars  had 
not  entered  the  realm  of  speculation,  and  that  the 
motor-car  was  not  even  an  affair  of  dreams,  it 
need  not  excite  wonder  that  the  public  and  the 


40      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

army  were  not  prepared  to  consider  so  great  an 
increase  in  the  corps  of  cadets  at  West  Point,  as  I 
then  advocated,  as  a  preparation  for  war.  The 
ocean  was  our  great  defence  from  attack,  and  on 
this  defence  the  nation  was  prepared  to  rest. 

Ninety-six  per  cent,  of  the  army  of  the  United 
States  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  were  volunteers, 
and  at  Antietam  and  Gettysburg,  in  the  Wilder- 
ness, in  the  siege  of  Richmond,  and  in  the  final 
campaign  which  ended  with  the  surrender  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  the  troops  of  the 
regular  army  and  the  volunteers  fought  side  by 
side,  the  one  as  valiantly  as  the  other.  Many 
volunteer  batteries  of  field  artillery  were  as  fine  as 
the  finest  batteries  of  the  regular  army.  Such 
corps  as  the  I5th,  i6th,  and  I7th,  Grant's  and 
Sherman's  veterans,  and  such  an  army  as  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  with  Thomas  at  its 
head,  with  scarcely  an  exception  made  up  of 
volunteers,  were  as  fine  bodies  of  troops  in  the 
latter  part  of  1862  and  thenceforward  to  the  end 
of  the  war,  as  the  troops  of  the  regular  army  were 
during  the  great  war  or  are  today.  The  gallant 
Army  of  the  Potomac  speaks  for  itself  in  history. 

Why,  with  such  a  record  made  by  the  volunteer 
army,  should  the  country  doubt  its  safety  under 
the  protection  of  volunteers,  steadied  by  the  small 
and  efficient  body  of  regulars  constituting  the 
permanent  military  establishment? 

It  is  no  wonder,  as  I  look  back  over  the  period 


West  Point  41 

of  fifty  years,  that  I  spoke  to  dull  ears;  no  wonder 
that  I  could  awaken  no  enthusiasm  in  soldier  or 
civilian  for  a  large  increase  in  the  corps  of  cadets, 
not  only  large  enough  to  supply  entirely  the  needs 
of  the  regular  army  for  officers,  but  also  large 
enough  to  graduate  each  year  a  surplus  of  officers 
who  should  be  ready  to  give  their  trained  service 
to  the  volunteer  troops  on  the  breaking  out  of  war. 

In  that  long  ago,  I  advocated  the  increase  of  the 
corps  of  cadets  at  the  Military  Academy  to  a  body 
of  from  twelve  Imndred  to  fifteen  hundred  men, 
and  estimated  that  not  only  would  the  demand  for 
officers  of  the  regular  army  be  amply  supplied, 
but  that  there  would  be  graduated  and  distributed 
throughout  the  people  a  body  of  men  who  had  had 
two  years  of  military  training  at  the  Academy, 
who  would  develop  and  maintain  the  military 
spirit  in  the  people,  and  who  would  be  ready  to 
organize  at  once  the  volunteer  army  should  the 
nation  unhappily  fall  into  war. 

The  lesson,  which,  above  all  other  lessons  of  the 
great  war,  impressed  itself  upon  my  mind  was  the 
length  of  time  which  it  took  to  convert  citizens, 
ever  so  eager,  into  soldiers;  and  as  a  corollary,  the 
imperative  necessity  for  a  large  body  of  officers, 
at  the  breaking  out  of  war,  to  get  the  volunteers 
into  shape. 

No  one  is  readier  than  I  am  to  recognize  the 
value  as  soldiers  of  my  fellow  volunteers  when  they 
had  become  soldiers.  But  when  in  the  enthusiasm 


42      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

of  patriotism  they  volunteered  they  were  not 
soldiers,  nor  were  their  officers,  who  marched  at 
their  head,  officers  except  in  name. 

Long  months  of  weary  work  were  required  in  the 
first  place  to  create  officers  out  of  the  volunteer 
material  at  hand,  and  longer  weary  months  to 
change  the  volunteers  of  the  ranks  into  soldiers. 

No  one  can  teach  another  what  he  does  not 
himself  know. 

And  the  volunteer  officers  had  first  to  be  created 
before  they  in  turn  could  create  soldiers  from  their 
volunteer  comrades  of  the  army. 

In  war  the  orders  actually  issued  to  troops  are 
few  and  simple,  and  it  was  supposed  at  the  out- 
break of  the  great  war  that  when  the  soldier  knew 
the  manual  of  arms,  and  could  march  in  column 
or  go  into  line  of  battle  with  ease,  that  he  was  fit 
for  battle  and  for  the  campaign. 

The  troops  which  fought  the  battle  of  Bull  Run 
knew  the  manual  of  arms  and  could  and  did  march 
to  the  battlefield,  and  could  and  did  form  line  of 
battle,  and  could  and  did  advance  to  the  charge, 
following  bravely  the  lead  of  their  officers. 

But  they  were  not  soldiers  nor  were  they  a  mob 
as  they  were  called  after  the  battle,  and  as  they 
have  since  recently  been  called  by  regular  officers 
who  have  had  no  experience  of  battle  to  guide 
their  judgment. 

They  were  simply  men  in  the  first  stage  of 
becoming  soldiers. 


West  Point  A3 

In  addition  to  drill,  to  readiness  to  obey  the 
word  of  command,  to  discipline,  there  is  needed 
the  spirit  of  the  soldier,  which  is  morale. 

After  Bull  Run  the  troops  entered  upon  the 
period  of  self-creation  and  of  growth  into  soldiers. 
Boards  were  organized  throughout  the  army  to 
examine  officers  of  volunteers  as  to  their  fitness 
for  service.  Colonels  and  second  lieutenants 
were  called  before  these  boards  and  were  thor- 
oughly examined  as  to  their  fitness  to  hold  their 
commissions.  Many  officers  left  the  army  because 
they  could  not  pass  their  examinations,  and  many 
others  resigned  rather  than  face  the  examining 
board. 

Promotions  were  made  throughout  the  army 
as  the  result  of  examinations  for  fitness,  and  a 
spirit  of  emulation  and  of  appreciation  was  de- 
veloped in  the  troops.  Drills '  were  held  with 
regularity  and  pertinacity.  Discipline  developed 
and  grew  in  strength  and  fineness.  And  morale, 
that  intangible  force,  that  spirit  of  the  soldier, 
that  something  which  develops  in  the  soldier  that 
faith  in  himself,  in  his  comrade,  in  his  commanding 
officer,  which  co-ordinates  the  effort  of  the  com- 
pany, of  the  regiment  and  of  the  army,  and  which 
makes  the  soldier  and  the  army  capable  of  sus- 
tained and  coherent  action  in  victory  or  in  defeat, 
on  the  long  march,  in  the  encampment,  in  battle, 
was  born. 

It  may  be  asked,  why,  during  this  period  in 


44      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

which  we  were  engaged  in  creating  an  army,  the 
South  did  not  advance  on  Washington  and  end 
the  war  in  a  burst  of  triumph? 

The  answer  is  that  they,  too,  were  engaged  in 
creating  their  army  out  of  the  same  elements  as 
ourselves — volunteers  fresh  from  the  plough,  from 
the  counting-room,  from  the  college,  from  the 
market-place.  It  took  the  South  as  long  to  create 
the  infantry  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — 
"as  fine  an  infantry  as  ever  marched" — as  it  took 
us  to  create  the  infantry  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac, just  as  fine  an  infantry  as  the  infantry  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

This  schooling  of  the  armies  of  the  great  war, 
those  of  the  United  States  and  those  of  the  South, 
took  about  a  year.  And  it  may  be  taken  as  proven 
by  the  experience  of  war  that  it  takes  a  year  to 
create  a  soldier.  That  it  takes  a  year  to  weld 
soldiers  into  the  masses  that  make  an  army,  and 
that  unless  there  are  officers  ready  at  hand  to  take 
command  of  the  volunteers  of  an  army  at  the  out- 
break of  war,  it  takes  at  least  a  year  to  make  a  de- 
pendable officer  as  well  as  dependable  soldiers,  and 
dependable  armies  out  of  such  officers  and  soldiers. 

In  other  words — if  a  possible  enemy  will  assure 
us  that  we  shall  have  a  full  year  of  time  after  the 
declaration  of  war  in  which  to  create  our  army 
before  he  will  make  his  attack  upon  us,  we  may 
continue  our  dependence  on  volunteers  for  the 
national  defence,  otherwise  not ! 


West  Point  45 

But  what  enemy,  himself  prepared  to  strike, 
will  accord  us  a.  year  in  which  to  prepare  for  war? 
We  are  not  living  in  Utopia;  1915  is  not  the  year 
of  a  fool's  paradise. 

Therefore  it  is  necessary  that  we  shall  turn 
from  the  past  system  of  raising  and  training  armies 
to  the  newer,  the  better,  and  the  more  democratic 
system  which  it  is  the  object  of  this  book  to 
advocate. 

My  plan  of  1866  for  the  enlargement  and  de- 
velopment of  West  Point  is  my  plan  of  1915, 
modified  and  developed  by  the  intervening  growth 
of  the  country,  and  of  the  marvellous  growth  in  the 
offensive  strength  of  the  navies  and  the  armies  of 
the  great  Powers  of  the  world. 

The  ocean  no  longer  presents  a  barrier  to  in- 
vasion. The  struggle  for  the  supremacy  of  the 
seas  now  being  waged  introduces  problems  for  the 
United  States  undreamed  of  fifty  years  ago.  What 
was  sound  judgment  in  1866  is  sounder  judgment 
in  1915.  What  was  wisdom  and  prevision  in  1866 
is  absolute  necessity  in  1915  unless  the  nation  is 
prepared  to  suffer  defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  first 
great  Power  which  may  attack  us. 

I  can  see  no  reason  why  the  United  States 
should  be  drawn  into  the  present  European  War. 
It  is  manifestly  neither  to  the  interest  of  the  Allies 
— Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Russia — nor  to 
the  interest  of  Germany  and  Austria  to  excite  the 
hostility  of  the  United  States  to  the  extent  of  war. 


46      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

As  an  ally  of  the  Allies  we  could  render  immense 
service  to  their  cause,  and  it  can  -be  easily  under- 
stood why  they  should  wish  us  to  go  to  war  with 
Germany.  Equally  we  could  add  greatly  to  the 
offensive  strength  of  Germany  and  Austria  in  the 
war  by  the  invasion  and  annexation  of  Canada, 
should  the  attack  of  Great  Britain  on  our  com- 
merce drive  us  into  war  with  her  and  her  Allies. 

Looking  at  the  matter  purely  and  solely  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  United  States,  I  can  see  no 
conditions  making  for  war  with  one  or  the  other 
of  the  contending  groups  of  nations.  Diplomacy 
should  be  able  to  arrange  for  and  to  insure  the 
satisfactory  settlement  of  all  outstanding  ques- 
tions, or  of  all  questions  which  may  hereafter  arise 
between  the  belligerents  and  ourselves. 

At  present  our  relations  with  Germany  are 
somewhat  strained,  but  our  contentions  in  respect 
to  the  freedom  of  neutral  commerce  are  those  for 
which  Germany  has  stood  in  the  past,  and  our 
demand  in  respect  thereto  is  limited  to  the  simple 
statement  of  our  rights  under  international  law, 
and  the  assertion  that  those  rights  shall  be  re- 
spected. It  is  impossible  to  think  that  Germany 
can  see  a  sufficient  benefit  to  her  war  plans  in  the 
use  of  submarines  to  risk  the  advent  of  the  United 
States  into  the  war  as  an  ally  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Russia. 

And  on  the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be  thought  to 
be  possible  that  Great  Britain  in  the  effort  to 


West  Point  .47 

limit  the  food  supplies  of  Germany,  supplies 
which  Germany  does  not  need  for  her  support,  or 
to  limit  the  export  of  cotton  to  Germany  and  to 
the  neutral  nations,  because  it  is  an  element  in  the 
production  of  gun-cotton,  should  proceed  to  such 
length  as  to  compel  us  to  declare  war  against 
herself  and  her  allies  in  defence  of  neutral  rights 
and  the  freedom  of  the  seas. 

It  is  the  work  of  diplomacy  to  find  a  living 
ground  between  the  two  contesting  groups  of 
nations  so  that  our  rights  shall  be  preserved  and 
peace  be  maintained. 

When  diplomacy  has  the  sure  ground  to  stand 
upon  that  neither  the  Allies  nor  Germany  and 
Austria  have  any  reason  to  wish  to  go  to  war  with 
us,  it  seems  to  be  beyond  the  range  of  reason  to 
anticipate  that  war  with  either  of  those  groups  of 
warring  nations  should  occur. 

It  is  not  therefore  because  I  apprehend  im- 
mediate war  that  I  am  in  this  book  reviving  the 
plans  of  fjfty  years  ago. 

This  book  is  written  in  the  hope  of  introducing 
an  element  of  common-sense  into  the  discussion  of 
the  question  of  national  defence,  of  marshalling 
the  lessons  of  the  past  to  the  profit  of  the  present 
and  the  advantage  of  the  future.  We  have  fought 
one  great  war  with  volunteers  the  conversion  of 
whom  into  soldiers  consumed  the  first  year  of  the 
war,  and  frankly  I  think  it  the  height  of  folly  to 
allow  the  nation  to  remain  longer  in  the  fools' 


48       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

paradise  of  dependence  on  volunteers,  when  the 
conditions  of  modern  war  confirm  the  proposition 
that  the  nation  which  is  prepared  for  war,  when 
war  breaks  out,  is  the  inevitable  victor  in  the 
struggle. 

I  believe,  as  I  have  said  above,  that  volunteers, 
converted  into  soldiers,  are  as  good  soldiers  as 
regulars.  What  the  officers  of  the  regular  army 
are  not  sufficiently  clear-sighted  to  perceive,  or 
frank  enough  to  admit,  is  that  volunteers  of  two 
and  three  years'  service  in  time  of  war  are  as  much 
regulars,  so  far  as  efficiency  is  concerned,  as 
themselves. 

But  notwithstanding  this  belief  in  the  efficiency 
of  volunteers  as  soldiers  when  they  shall  have  become 
soldiers,  I  am  opposed  to  the  further  dependence 
of  the  nation  on  the  volunteer  system  of  raising 
and  maintaining  armies. 

The  volunteer  system  has  become  obsolete.  De- 
pendence upon  a  volunteer  army  will  result,  and 
can  only  result,  in  the  defeat  of  the  nation  in  the 
first  war  in  which  she  shall  engage  with  a  first- 
class  Power,  because  such  first-class  Power  would 
be  prepared  for  war  and  we  should  not  be  prepared 
for  war. 

This  is  demonstrated,  if  demonstration  were 
needed,  in  the  condition  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
present  great  European  War.  The  war  has  been 
going  on  for  a  year,  and  yet  Lord  Kitchener's  great 
volunteer  army  is  only  just  now  coming  into  the 


West  Point  49 

field.  Much  of  it  is  still  on  the  training-grounds 
of  England.  A  large  part  of  the  regular  army  of 
England,  which  was  sent  to  the  continent  at  the 
breaking  out  of  the  war,  has  ceased  to  exist.  Eng- 
land is  maintaining  her  position  in  the  war  behind 
the  guns  of  her  allies.  The  French  and  the  Rus- 
sian soldiers  are  doing  the  greater  part  of  the  fight- 
ing while  Lord  Kitchener  in  England  is  creating 
an  army  of  volunteers  which  in  time  he  hopes  to 
have  in  fit  shape  to  put  into  battle. 

When  we  fight  we  shall  probably  have  to  fight 
without  dependable  allies.  We  shall  have  no 
French  army  and  no  Russian  army  to  battle  for 
time  while  we  are  engaged  behind  their  guns  in 
creating  and  disciplining  a  volunteer  army,  as 
Great  Britain  has  been  doing  for  the  past  year. 

Wherefore  it  is  necessary  that  we  should  aban- 
don the  volunteer  system  of  creating  our  armies, 
and  rely  upon  the  creation  of  a  large  regular  army 
divided  between  the  active,  army,  and  the  reserve 
army,  which  shall  be  at  the  command  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  be  called  to  the  colours  the  moment  war 
threatens  the  nation. 

And  such  a  fundamental  reorganization  of  the 
military  system  of  the  nation  imperatively  de- 
mands a  vast  increase  in  the  number  of  officers 
for  the  command  of  the  troops  of  the  active  and 
the  reserve  armies,  both  armies  to  constitute  the 
regular  army  of  the  United  States. 

The  army  of  the  United  States  must  be  strong 


50      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

enough,  when  mobilized  for  war,  to  meet  at  the 
coast  any  army  of  invasion  sought  to  be  landed  by 
an  enemy,  and  to  defeat  his  army,  capturing  or 
driving  it  into  the  ocean. 

Not  only  must  the  United  States  be  strong 
enough  to  put  such  an  invincible  army  upon  the 
Atlantic  coast,  but  also  upon  the  northern  frontier 
and  upon  the  Pacific  coast,  so  that  our  country 
may  be  made  impregnable  to  attack  either  from 
Europe  or  Asia,  or  from  an  allied  attack  of  a 
European  and  an  Asiatic  nation,  should  such  an 
alliance  be  brought  into  action  against  us. 

Also  must  the  army  of  the  United  States  be 
strong  enough  not  only  to  hold  Hawaii  and  the 
Panama  Canal,  but  also  to  hold  Alaska. 

To  command  such  an  army  will  require  a  large 
body  of  officers  who  should  be  educated  officers, 
and  it  is  to  supply  such  a  body  of  educated  officers 
that  I  advocate  the  enlargement  and  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  Military  Academy. 

The  present  capacity  of  the  Military  Academy 
is  seven  hundred  cadets.  The  number  of  cadets 
should  be  increased  at  once  to  a  force  of  thirty-six 
hundred  young  men,  which  would  give  a  full  brigade 
of  three  full  regiments  of  twelve  companies  each — 
each  regiment  to  consist  of  three  battalions  of  four 
companies  each. 

One  of  the  material  advantages  of  such  an 
increase  in  the  corps  of  cadets  would  be  that  the 
cadets  themselves,  and  the  officers  in  command, 


West  Point  51 

would  have  the  opportunity  of  seeing  and  being  a 
part  of  a  large  body  of  troops,  which  would  be 
subject  to  brigade  drills. 

And  by  considering,  for  purposes  of  drill  and 
manoeuvres,  each  battalion  a  regiment,  and  each 
regiment  a  brigade,  there  could  be  introduced  di- 
visional drill  and  manoeuvres  which  would  be  of 
incalculable  advantage  to  the  cadets,  and  espe- 
cially to  the  officers  commanding  in  the  divisional 
manoeuvres. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  barracks  at  West  Point 
are  full  to  about  their  capacity  of  seven  hundred 
men.  But  this  suggestion  presupposes  that  the 
cadets  can  only  be  housed  in  stone  palaces. 
Barracks  and  classrooms  for  the  increased  corps 
of  cadets  can  be  constructed  rapidly  of  wood,  and 
made  quite  as  comfortable  as  is  necessary  for  the 
accommodation  of  the  full  complement  of  thirty-six 
hundred  cadets. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  plain  at  West  Point  is 
too  small  to  accommodate  a  brigade  of  thirty-six 
hundred  cadets.  So  much  the  better.  Let  the 
parade  and  drill  ground  be  over  the  hills  and 
valleys  adjacent  to  the  present  grounds  of  the 
Military  Academy,  thus  introducing  at  the 
Academy  actual  war  conditions  for  formation  and 
drill. 

I  have  thought  much  as  to  the  method  of  selec- 
tion of  cadets  for  the  enlarged  Military  Academy, 
and  as  to  the  standard  of  examination  for  admis- 


52       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

slon  to  the  Academy,  and  have  come  to  the  delib- 
erate opinion  that  the  standard  of  admission  to 
the  Academy  should  be  maintained  at  its  present 
high  level.  The  country  does  not  want  a  low  grade 
of  officer,  but  a  high  grade  of  officer  for  its  army. 
Nor  need  this  standard  for  admission  to  the  Acad- 
emy be  a  serious  hindrance  to  the  supply  of  cadets 
if  the  method  of  appointment  be  broadened  so  as 
to  be  open  to  the  whole  country. 

But  no  matter  how  broad  the  competition  for 
cadet  ships  shall  be  made,  the  examinations  for 
admission  to  the  Academy  should  be  stricter,  if 
anything,  than  they  are  at  present.  Admission 
to  the  Academy  on  certificate  from  schools  or 
colleges,  or  from  any  other  source,  should  be 
abolished. 

If  the  examinations  for  admission  be  strict,  and 
only  the  fit  be  admitted,  there  will  be  fewer  found 
incompetent  to  continue  the  course  of  studies  in 
the  Academy  than  is  the  case  under  the  present 
forms  and  conditions  of  admission,  and  conse- 
quently the  proportion  of  graduates  of  the  Acad- 
emy will  be  much  larger  than  at  present. 

To  insure  a  uniform  and  impartial  system  of 
examination  for  admission  to  the  Military  Acad- 
emy— and  much  of  these  remarks  apply  to  the 
Naval  Academy  as  well — I  recommend  that  all  ex- 
aminations for  cadetships  shall  be  confided  to  the 
Civil  Service  Commission  with  enlarged  powers. 

The    Academic    Board    should    establish    the 


West  Point  53 

conditions  of  examination,  and  the  Civil  Service 
Commission,  expanded  to  become  the  Examining 
Board  for  the  civil  and  military  services  of  the 
United  States,  should  hold  the  examinations 
territorially  throughout  the  United  States.  The 
territorial  distribution  of  cadetships  as  at  present 
established,  speaking  broadly,  should  be  main- 
tained, as  the  army  of  the  United  States  represents, 
and  should  represent,  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  and  consequently  the  cadetships,  with 
certain  limited  reservations,  should  be  distributed 
according  to  population  throughout  the  country. 
But  while  thus  creating  the  corps  of  cadets,  and 
bringing  to  the  Academy  the  representatives  of  all 
sections  of  the  country,  it  should  be  understood  as  a 
condition  of  examination  that  each  applicant  for  a 
cadet  ship,  upon  presenting  himself  for  examina- 
tion, should  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
United  States  in  which  he  shall  swear  fealty  alone 
to  the  United  States,  abjuring  any  subordinate  or 
foreign  allegiance,  jurisdiction,  or  citizenship,  and 
pledging  his  life  and  his  devotion  to  the  defence  of 
the  United  States  against  all  enemies  whatsoever, 
whether  domestic  or  foreign. 

All  appointments  to  cadetships  should  be  by 
competitive  examination,  and  no  cadet  should  be 
admitted  to  the  Academy  except  after  success  in 
such  competitive  examination.  All  young  men  of 
good  character,  whose  parents  are  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  should  be  eligible  to  enter  the 


54      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

competition  for  cadetships.  The  sons  of  officers 
of  the  army  should  have  the  privilege  of  appearing 
before  any  examining  board  in  the  country  for 
examination  for  admission  to  the  Military  Acad- 
emy, but  they  should  stand  the  test  of  competition 
in  such  examination  for  cadetships. 

The  Civil  Service  Commission  should,  for  the 
purposes  of  examination  for  admission  to  the 
Military  Academy,  be  assisted  by  either  members 
of  the  Academic  Board  or  by  representatives  of 
the  Academic  Board,  and  the  physical  examination 
of  each  applicant  should  be  made  by  medical 
officers  of  the  army  and  should  precede  the  mental 
examination  for  cadetships.  No  one  should  be 
admitted  to  the  Academy  except  he  be  the  holder 
of  a  certificate  from  the  Civil  Service  Commission 
to  the  effect  that  he  had  passed  his  examination  for 
admission  at  a  public  and  competitive  examination. 
The  Examining  Board  or  Commission  should  hold 
every  competitor  for  a  cadetship  to  strict  com- 
pliance with  the  conditions  and  requirements  of 
the  standard  of  admission  established  by  the 
Academic  Board,  and  no  one  should  receive  his 
certificate  of  admission  to  the  Academy  who  had 
not  fully  and  fairly  passed  the  examination  accord- 
ing to  such  standard  of  admission. 

The  broadest  and  completest  possible  competi- 
tion coupled  with  the  strictest  examination  for 
admission  to  the  Military  Academy,  in  which  the 
applicant  for  admission  shall  not  only  have  passed 


West  Point  55 

a  competitive  examination,  but  shall  also  have 
passed  satisfactorily  the  examination  according  to 
the  standard  of  admission  established  by  the 
Academic  Board,  should  be  maintained.  It  is 
believed  that  such  a  system,  which  could  not  be 
influenced  by  undue  pressure  of  any  sort,  would 
result  in  the  selection  of  cadets  of  as  high  a  condi- 
tion of  mentality  as  possible,  higher  than  the 
present  restricted  system  of  selection  of  cadets  can 
possibly  secure  for  the  Academy.  Indeed  it  is 
believed  that  one  of  the  reasons  that  such  a  large 
proportion  of  cadets  fail  to  graduate  into  the  army 
as  officers  is,  that  the  system  of  restricted  selection 
at  present  prevailing  does  not  insure  to  the 
Academy  a  sufficient  number  of  high-class  ca- 
dets, competent  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the 
scheme  of  studies  maintained  at  the  Academy. 

As  the  object  of  these  examinations  is  to  insure 
a  corps  of  cadets  at  its  full  maximum  strength, 
which  should  be  thirty-six  hundred  men,  the  ex- 
amining boards  should  be  required  to  file  with 
their  list  of  accepted  candidates  for  admission  to 
the  Academy  a  list  of  alternates,  who  shall  have 
passed  their  examinations  satisfactorily,  from 
which  list  all  vacancies  in  the  annual  allotment 
for  the  Academy  should  be  filled,  and  if  for  any 
reason  any  cadet  should  fall  out  during  the  first 
two  or  three  months  of  the  school  year  a  cadet  to 
fill  his  place  should  be  taken. 

Objection  may  be  made  by  the  unthinking  to 


56      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

the  proposed  strength  of  the  corps  of  cadets.  It 
may  be  said,  why  concentrate  in  one  school 
thirty-six  hundred  cadets?  Why  not  create  in 
different  sections  of  the  country  smaller  schools 
on  the  plan  of  West  Point  to  turn  out  the  same 
number  of  graduates? 

The  answer  is  that  the  great  need  of  the  army  is 
to  accustom  its  officers  to  see  and  to  be  a  part  of, 
to  grow  into  the  consciousness  of  being  a  part  of, 
a  large  body  of  troops. 

If  some  of  the  battles  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion 
are  studied  it  will  become  apparent  that  the 
commanding  officers  of  divisions,  on  several 
notable  occasions,  did  not  properly  estimate  the 
extent  of  ground  which  their  commands  could 
occupy,  such  failure  in  apprehension  resulting  in 
serious  losses,  and  this  failure  may  be  traced  to  the 
stunting  effect  upon  their  minds  and  upon  their 
imaginations  of  their  experience  with  small  bodies 
of  troops  in  the  old  army,  stunting  effects  from 
which  their  later  experience  with  larger  volunteer 
commands  was  unable  to  free  them.  Notably  this 
was  the  case  at  Antietam. 

I  have  long  thought  it  would  be  well  worth  the 
expense  to  send  to  Europe  each  year  as  large  a 
number  of  officers  of  the  army  as  would  be  received 
by  foreign  Powers — each  married  officer  to  be 
required  to  leave  his  wife  at  home  in  the  United 
States — to  attend  the  usual  autumn  manoeuvres 
in  order  that  they  should  have  the  opportunity  of 


West  Point  57 

seeing  large  bodies  of  troops  in  battle  formation 
during  the  manoeuvres,  so  that  their  imaginations 
should  be  stimulated  to  a  conception  of  the 
relationship  of  large  bodies  of  troops  to  the  terrain 
in  which  they  are  operating,  and  to  accustom 
them  to  the  sight  of  large  bodies  of  troops  in 
motion,  which  would  reveal  to  them  the  actualities 
of  their  profession. 

In  our  small  army  no  chance  for  such  observa- 
tion is  afforded  except,  to  a  very  limited  degree, 
at  present  upon  the  Mexican  border;  and  before 
the  War  of  the  Rebellion  in  our  then  still  smaller 
army,  a  brigade  was  an  impossible  actuality,  an 
almost  startling  conception  of  the  imagination. 
The  result  was  that  on  the  breaking  out  of  the 
great  war  our  regular  officers  had  almost  as 
much  to  learn  about  armies,  and  their  constitu- 
tion and  being,  as  the  officers  of  the  volunteers. 
Of  course  they  had  studied  and  thought  about 
large  armies,  and  how  they  looked  and  acted  and 
fought,  but  as  to  the  realization  of  their  dreams, 
they  had  to  wait  until  they  were  created  brigadier- 
generals  and  major-generals,  and  put  in  com- 
mand of  brigades  and  divisions  of  the  volunteer 
army,  when  they  learned,  for  the  first  time,  these 
lessons  of  war,  often  at  a  serious  cost  to  the  troops 
under  their  command. 

A  large  brigade  of  cadets  at  West  Point,  a 
brigade  which  for  tactical  purposes  could  be 
expanded  into  a  division,  would  not  only  be  of 


58      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

advantage  to  the  officers  in  command  but  also  of 
great  awakening  influence  upon  the  minds  of  the 
cadets  themselves.  They  would  get  used  to 
military  numbers  in  the  impressionable  period  of 
their  lives,  when  impressions  made  upon  the  mind 
are  ineradicable. 

Also  it  is  thought  that  the  unity  of  command, 
the  unity  of  instruction  and  of  association,  would 
produce  better  results  in  a  single  academy  among 
a  large  body  of  cadets,  than  if  the  same  body  of 
cadets  should  be  broken  up  and  divided  among 
four  or  five  different  schools,  under  different 
commanding  officers,  and  under  different  inspi- 
ration. 

The  only  point  upon  which  objection  to  a  large 
West  Point — a  West  Point  of  thirty-six  hundred 
cadets — could  rest,  is  that  the  broken  character 
of  the  country  surrounding  the  Military  Academy 
would  not  afford  the  necessary  parade  ground. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  this  broken  country  could 
be  made  an  element  of  instruction  of  the  utmost 
value  to  the  future  officers  of  the  army.  Battle- 
fields are  not  usually  level  parade  grounds.  The 
broken  country  in  which  West  Point  lies  could 
serve  admirably  as  a  field  of  manoeuvre  for  the 
cadets.  Of  course  the  government  would  have  to 
increase  the  territory  comprehended  within  the 
area  of  the  Military  Reservation  to  accommodate 
the  corps  of  cadets  with  sufficient  manoeuvre 
ground. 


West  Point  59 

So  far  as  the  requirements  for  admission  to  the 
Academy  are  concerned,  while  the  standard  of 
admission  should  be  maintained  at  the  present 
high  level,  the  range  of  examination  might  be 
limited  to  the  advantage  of  greater  thoroughness 
in  the  examination.  What  the  examination  should 
be  directed  to  produce  is  a  candidate  for  cadetship 
with  a  clear,  strong,  well-disciplined  mind,  ac- 
quainted with  the  studies  introductory  to  those 
to  be  pursued  at  the  Academy,  and  with  a  general 
knowledge  of  the  history  and  geography  of  our 
country,  and  of  the  history  and  geography  of  the 
great  nations  of  the  modern  world.  They  should 
not  be  required  to  familiarize  themselves  with 
ancient  history  nor  with  controversial  subjects 
of  our  own  military  history  before  appearing  for 
examination  for  admission  to  the  Academy.  It  is 
difficult  to  understand  of  what  value  a  knowledge 
of  the  Delian  League  could  be  to  a  candidate  for 
examination  for  a  cadetship  except  to  familiarize 
him  with  the  fact  of  the  influence  of  sea  power  on 
the  development  of  a  nation,  or  why  a  candidate 
for  a  cadetship  should  be  required  to  form  and  ex- 
press an  opinion  as  to  the  effect  of  the  battle  of 
Cold  Harbor  upon  Grant's  campaign  against  Lee. 

As  to  the  effect  of  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor  on 
Grant's  campaign,  a  true  answer  to  the  question 
would  not,  I  fancy,  satisfy  the  mind  of  the  examiner 
who  suggested  it.  The  answer  to  this  question  is 
that  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor  had  no  effect 


60       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

whatsoever  on  the  campaign.  The  battle  of  Cold 
Harbor  was  fought  on  the  3d  of  June,  1864,  and 
on  June  5th  we  find  Grant  writing  from  Cold  Har- 
bor to  Halleck,  that  he  proposed  to  advance  to 
the  James  and  cross  the  river  with  the  whole  of  his 
army,  a  continuation  of  his  advance  against  Lee  by 
the  left  flank,  which  began  on  the  Rappahannock 
and  which  ended  at  Appomattox.  Grant  says  in 
his  Memoirs:  "I  have  always  regretted  that  the  last 
assault  at  Cold  Harbor  was  ever  made."  In  view 
of  this  statement  by  General  Grant  it  may  be  as- 
sumed that  the  assault  at  Cold  Harbor  was  either 
a  mistake,  or  was  badly  conducted.  But  after  all, 
it  was  merely  an  incident  of  the  campaign.  If  it 
was  a  mistake,  it  was  one  of  those  mistakes  which 
might  have  crushed  a  small  man,  but  which,  in  the 
case  of  a  great  man  like  Grant,  was  swallowed  up 
in  victory.  The  only  mistake  that  Grant  made  at 
Cold  Harbor,  in  my  judgment,  was  that  he  did 
not  concentrate  his  artillery,  and  smother  Lee's  in- 
trenchments  with  the  fire  of  his  guns  in  anticipa- 
tion of  the  advance  of  the  infantry  to  the  charge. 

One  might  as  well  ask  what  influence  the  battle 
of  Aspern-Essling  had  upon  the  campaign  of 
Wagram?  Napoleon  was  defeated  at  Aspern- 
Essling  by  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  barely 
escaped  with  his  army  across  the  north  arm  of  the 
Danube.  But  his  intellect  blazed  forth  in  defeat, 
and  he  called  reinforcements  to  his  standard  from 
every  quarter.  One  may  almost  hear  the  tramp 


West  Point  61 

of  the  army  of  Italy,  under  the  command  of  the 
Viceroy,  marching  across  the  Alps  to  the  rescue  of 
the  Emperor. 

After  his  concentration  had  been  completed, 
Napoleon  threw  twenty-four  bridges  across  the 
Danube  and  advanced  upon  the  Archduke  Charles, 
finding  him  at  Wagram.  The  battle  of  Wagram 
was  a  great  triumph  for  French  arms,  and  Napo- 
leon crowned  himself  with  victory. 

Any  practical  plan  for  the  reorganization  of  the 
army  must  consider  first  the  question  of  officers, 
and  having  in  mind  the  lesson  of  the  great  war 
that  it  takes  a  year  to  make  a  soldier,  and  con- 
sequently a  much  longer  time  to  make  a  dependable 
officer,  and  still  longer  to  acquaint  that  officer 
with  the  technique  of  the  profession,  it  may  be 
readily  seen  that  it  is  not  the  part  of  wisdom  to 
fill  the  army  with  officers  direct  from  civil  life 
when  by  increasing  the  capacity  of  West  Point  it 
may  be  possible  to  supply  the  army  with  trained 
officers  from  the  National  Military  Academy. 

I  advocate  a  large  West  Point,  a  West  Point  of 
thirty- six  hundred  cadets,  because  I  believe  that 
such  a  strong  corps  of  cadets  is  needed  to  furnish 
officers  for  the  enlarged  regular  army,  and  also  to 
provide  officers  for  the  reserve  army  which  should 
be  constituted  as  a  part  of  the  regular  army. 

At  present  the  officers  of  the  regular  army  who 
are  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy,  are  but 
about  forty-four  per  cent,  of  the  whole  number  of 


62       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

officers  of  the  army.  Such  a  small  percentage  of 
graduates  in  a  period  of  profound  peace  is  not  only 
wrong  in  theory  but  wrong  in  practice. 

The  demand  for  officers  for  the  enlarged  regular 
army,  should  the  strength  of  the  army  be  brought 
up  to  two  hundred  thousand  men,  would  aggre- 
gate about  four  thousand  officers.  To  admit  at 
once  to  the  army  such  a  large  body  of  civilians  as 
officers  would  be  a  calamity,  and  would  postpone 
the  fitness  of  the  army  for  action  for  at  least  a 
couple  of  years,  if  not  indeed  impair  its  efficiency 
for  many  years  to  come.  How  much  better  it 
would  be  to  delay  the  increase  of  the  army  to  its 
full  proposed  strength  until  there  could  be  created, 
through  graduation  from  the  Military  Academy,  a 
measurably  sufficient  number  of  officers  to  com- 
mand the  enlarged  army;  or  to  increase  the  army 
gradually  as  an  enlarged  West  Point  should  be 
able  to  graduate  officers  for  the  army. 

Nor  do  I  believe  that  anything  would  be  lost  by 
such  delay,  as  I  do  not  think  that  there  is  danger 
of  immediate  war. 

If  the  curse  of  excessive  details  of  officers  for 
special  duty  should  be  stamped  out,  the  Secretary 
of  War  would  find  it  easy  to  restore  immediately 
to  their  commands  several  hundred  officers  now 
on  detached  duty,  without  the  least  bad  effect 
upon  the  service  or  upon  the  business  of  the 
country.  Then,  if  the  present  regiments  and 
batteries  of  the  regular  army  should  be  filled  to 


West  Point  63 

full  war  strength,  and  be  maintained  at  full  war 
strength,  the  apparent  demand  for  new  officers  as 
stated  by  the  Secretary  in  his  last  annual  report, 
would  be  greatly  reduced  if  not  entirely  done 
away  with.  It  is  thought  that  the  demand  for 
officers  for  the  active  regular  army  and  the  reserve 
army,  as  I  shall  outline  these  organizations  in  the 
next  chapter,  will  be  sufficient  for  a  number  of 
years  to  consume  all  of  the  graduates  from  the 
enlarged  West  Point.  The  subject  of  excessive 
details  will  also  be  more  fully  discussed  in  the 
following  chapter. 

The  plan  for  the  enlargement  of  West  Point 
which  I  advocate,  is  based  upon  the  theory  that  the 
general  term  of  instruction  for  all  cadets  shall  be  two 
years,  and  that  thereafter,  those  who  are  found 
upon  examination  to  be  especially  fitted  to  con- 
tinue in  the  army  as  officers  of  the  active  army, 
shall  enter  upon  a  post-graduate  term  of  two 
years'  study  and  instruction  at  the  Military 
Academy.  This  plan  will  give  to  the  army  a 
highly  educated  body  of  officers,  and  will  give  to 
the  reserve  army  and  to  the  country  a  body  of 
officers  who  have  had  two  years'  instruction  at  the 
Academy,  and  who  have  been  regularly  graduated 
therefrom  as  qualified  officers  of  the  army. 

The  corps  of  cadets,  enlarged  to  the  number  of 
thirty-six  hundred  men,  should  receive  the  same 
instruction — military  and  academic — during  their 
term  of  two  years'  service  at  the  Academy,  no 


64      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

distinction,  except  that  of  class  record,  being  made 
between  those  to  be  graduated  at  the  end  of  the 
term  of  two  years,  and  those  to  be  given  the  op- 
portunity of  taking  the  post-graduate  course  for 
service  in  the  active  arnty;  except  that  a  study 
of  the  character  of  the  cadets  should  weigh  in 
the  final  selection  of  cadets  for  the  post-graduate 
course.  But  upon  the  final  examination  at  the  end 
of  the  two-year  term  of  study,  and  based  upon  such 
examination,  and  upon  the  record  of  the  character 
of  the  cadets  proposed  to  be  kept  by  the  officers  of 
the  Academy,  the  selection  should  be  made  of 
those  who  should  be  retained  at  the  Academy  to 
take  the  post-graduate  course  of  two  additional 
years  of  study  for  graduation  as  officers  of  the 
active  army. 

The  War  Department  should  estimate  the 
number  of  officers  needed  for  the  active  army 
during  each  succeeding  term  of  two  years,  and  the 
number  of  cadets  to  be  selected  for  the  post- 
graduate course  should  be  determined  by  this 
estimation  of  the  needs  of  the  army  for  officers. 

Of  course  the  selection  of  the  cadets  to  be 
continued  at  the  Academy  for  the  post-graduate 
term  should  be  made  as  impartially  as  possible, 
the  object  of  the  government  being  to  secure  not 
only  a  sufficient  number  of  officers  to  fully  officer 
the  active  army,  but  also  to  reserve  to  the  active 
army  the  cream  of  the  cadet  corps. 

This  idea  of  reducing  the  general  term  of  study 


West  Point  65 

and  instruction  at  the  Military  Academy  to  two 
years,  with  provision  for  a  special  post-graduate 
course  of  study  and  instruction  for  those  cadets 
who  are  finally  to  be  graduated  as  officers  of  the 
active  army  is  the  soul  of  my  plan  for  the  reorgani- 
zation and  enlargement  of  West  Point.  Classroom 
standing  must  of  course  count  for  much  in  making 
these  selections  for  the  post-graduate  course,  but 
on  the  other  hand,  something  more  must  enter  into 
the  determination  of  the  problem:  That  something 
being  an  estimation  of  character. 

The  determination  of  character,  until  the 
supreme  test  of  opportunity  and  trial  in  war  is 
applied,  is  very  difficult,  and  yet  character  is  the 
heart  and  soul  of  the  soldier.  It  is  the  one  deter- 
mining feature  which  separates  the  efficient  from 
the  inefficient  officer. 

During  the  first  two-year  term,  the  whole  body 
of  cadets  will  be  striving  for  the  honour  of  selection 
for  the  second  or  post-graduate  course  of  study  and 
instruction,  and  for  final  graduation  as  officers  of 
the  active  army. 

The  uncertainty  whether  they  are  to  be  officers 
of  the  active  or  of  the  reserve  army  will  act  as  a 
stimulus  upon  the  whole  school:  and  the  further 
uncertainty  as  to  whether  a  large  or  a  small 
number  of  cadets  will  be  demanded  by  the  exi- 
gencies of  the  service  for  continuance  at  the 
Academy  to  take  the  post-graduate  course  of 
study  and  instruction  will  stimulate  the  cadets,  not 


66      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

only  in  their  studies  but  in  their  military  conduct, 
and  this  stimulus  will  develop  character. 

In  no  profession  is  character  so  imperative  an 
attribute  as  in  the  army.  It  is  the  one  most 
important,  the  one  determinative  personal  in- 
fluence in  developing  the  soldier.  It  differentiates 
with  merciless  accuracy  the  efficient  from  the 
inefficient  officer — and  it  marks  the  wide  differ- 
ence between  the  efficient  few  and  the  two  or  three 
great  soldiers  who  stand  out  in  a  blaze  of  glory 
from  among  the  millions  of  men  under  arms. 

A  man  may  be  a  profound  mathematician,  an 
admirable  tactician;  he  may  know  in  theory  the 
principles  of  the  art  of  war;  he  may  understand 
the  theory  of  strategy;  he  may  be  an  excellent 
engineer  and  a  brave  man,  and  yet  lacking  char- 
acter he  may  be  a  complete  failure  as  a  soldier. 

It  is  the  object  of  the  Military  Academy  to 
train  young  men  to  become  soldiers.  To  train 
young  men  so  that  in  after  military  life  they  may 
be  soldiers,  not  the  mere  semblance  of  soldiers. 
To  equip  them  so  that  when  the  opportunity  offers 
itself  in  war,  they  will  be  equal  to  the  opportunity; 
equal  to  the  efficient  performance  of  the  tasks 
imposed  upon  them  in  war  no  matter  how  great 
those  tasks  may  be. 

The  success  or  failure  of  the  work  of  the  Acad- 
emy is  determined  by  the  character  manifested  by 
its  graduates.  The  ultimate  determination  of  the 
character  of  the  soldier  only  comes,  and  can  only 


West  Point  67 

come  in  war  and  through  the  tests  of  war;  and  it 
is  for  this  reason  that  the  peace  reputations  of 
officers  often  count  for  so  little  when  subjected  to 
the  rude  and  the  severe  tests  of  war. 

Until  these  supreme  tests  are  applied  we  cannot 
know  whether  an  officer  is  deserving  of  the  great 
title  of  soldier  or  not. 

We  may  think  that  we  know,  and  we  may  be 
able  to  judge  to  a  certain  extent,  as  to  the  character 
of  the  cadet  at  the  Military  Academy,  and  after- 
ward of  the  officer  in  the  life  of  the  army,  but  it  is 
after  all  an  approximation. 

And  yet  such  an  approximation  must  be  at- 
tempted to  be  made  at  the  Military  Academy. 
In  determining  who  among  the  corps  of  cadets  are 
to  be  allowed  to  take  the  post-graduate  course  for 
final  graduation  as  officers  of  the  army,  the  ques- 
tion of  character  must  be  considered.  Character 
develops  itself  in  so  many  different  ways  that  it  is 
difficult  to  determine  whether  a  student  possesses 
it  or  not,  and  yet  I  fancy  that  instructors  trained 
to  observation,  may  reach  an  approximation  of 
more  or  less  value  which  should  be  of  use  in 
determining  who  shall  be  selected  for  the  post- 
graduate course. 

A  record  of  the  character  of  each  cadet  should  be 
kept,  and  such  record  should  present  as  clear  an 
estimate  of  the  character  of  each  cadet  as  can  be 
formed  by  the  officers  and  professors  under  whose 
observation  he  may  have  passed.  The  substance 


68       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

of  this  estimate  of  character  should  be  considered, 
side  by  side,  with  the  record  of  the  class  standing 
of  the  cadet  in  determining  whether  he  should  be 
graduated,  and  should  leave  the  Academy  at  the 
end  of  the  two-year  term,  or  whether  he  should  be 
allowed  to  take  the  post-graduate  course  of  two 
additional  years  of  study  at  the  Academy. 

The  history  of  armies  bears  eloquent  testimony 
not  only  to  the  value  of  character,  'but  as  to  the 
lamentable  failure  of  officers  lacking  in  character. 

The  present  Generalissimo  of  the  French  Army, 
General  Joffre,  made  himself  notable  before  the 
war  by  arbitrarily  retiring  a  number  of  general 
officers  who  had  failed  to  display  promptness  and 
efficiency,  or  in  other  words,  character,  on  the 
peaceful  fields  of  the  autumn  manoeuvres.  And 
since  the  opening  of  the  present  war  in  Europe, 
upward  of  fifty  general  officers  of  the  French  army 
have  been  relieved  from  their  commands  and 
placed  on  the  retired  list  for  inefficiency.  They 
may  have  been,  or  some  of  them  may  have  been, 
successful  graduates  of  St.  Cyr,  and  yet  in  the 
supreme  test  of  war  they  failed. 

So  also  was  it  in  our  great  war.  Many  general 
officers,  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy,  were 
found  to  be,  judged  by  the  criterion  of  war,  unfit 
for  service  in  the  field  in  command  of  troops  in 
the  advanced  rank  in  the  volunteer  army  to  which 
they  had  been  appointed.  Many  were  continued 
in  their  commands  longer  than  they  should  have 


West  Point  69 

been  because  of  their  old  army  reputations,  or 
because  of  their  cadet  standing  at  the  Military 
Academy,  and  yet  the  inexorable  judgment  of 
war  condemned  them  as  unfit. 

If  a  closer  estimate  of  character  be  made  at 
West  Point  and  afterward  in  the  army,  it  may  be 
predicted  that  fewer  failures  among  our  general 
officers  in  war  will  occur. 

It  may  be  conceded  that  there  is  some  sort  of 
estimate  of  character  sought  to  be  formed  under 
present  conditions  at  West  Point,  but  I  think  it 
may  be  stated  that  in  no  case  is  such  estimation  of 
character  allowed  to  weigh  heavily  against  class- 
room standing  in  determining  graduation. 

It  is  recognized  how  difficult  it  is  to  make  such 
an  estimate  of  character,  and  with  what  watchful 
care  it  must  be  attempted.  And  yet  it  should  be 
seriously  attempted  to  be  made  in  the  interest  of 
the  service,  because  reputation  in  the  army  in  time 
of  peace,  or  until  the  supreme  test  of  war  is  applied, 
guarantees  little,  and  yet  such  reputation  is  neces- 
sarily the  basis  of  the  assignment  of  officers  of  the 
army  to  high  command  on  the  breaking  out  of 
war. 

Our  armies,  during  the  great  war,  were  at  times 
badly  commanded  by  officers  of  high  army  reputa- 
tion in  time  of  peace,  and  the  danger  is  that  our 
armies  of  the  future  may  be  badly  commanded 
by  the  same  class  of  officers,  unless  some  surer 
estimation  of  character  be  formed,  first  at  the 


70       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Military  Academy,  and,  after  graduation,  in  the 
army. 

Who  would  have  predicted  at  the  opening  of  the 
great  war  that  Grant,  Sherman,  Sheridan,  and 
Thomas  would  head  the  list  of  the  army  as  great 
soldiers  in  war? 

We  were  taught  to  put  faith  at  the  breaking  out 
of  the  war,  and  during  the  early  part  of  the  war,  in 
McClellan,  McDowell,  Burnside,  Buell,  Hooker, 
Halleck,  Pope,  and  many  other  officers  of  the 
regular  army,  only  to  find,  in  the  test  of  war,  that 
they  were  broken  reeds,  worthless  for  the  great 
commands  that  they  held.  All  of  these  generals 
lacked  character,  and  lacking  character  they  failed. 
Grant,  Sherman,  Sheridan,  and  Thomas  possessed 
character  and  succeeded,  covering  themselves  and 
the  army  with  glory. 

Yet  as  difficult  as  it  may  be  to  estimate  character 
at  the  Military  Academy  the  effort  to  do  so  should 
be  made,  because  the  country  needs  for  its  army 
the  best  officers  that  the  Military  Academy  can 
furnish.  The  creation  of  an  enlarged  West  Point 
will  give  the  officers  and  professors  of  the  Academy 
a  wide  range  of  selection  among  the  cadets  for  the 
post-graduate  course,  and  consequently  great  care 
and  discrimination  in  selection  should  be  exer- 
cised in  order  that  those  to  take  the  post-graduate 
course  should  excel  not  only  in  the  records  of  the 
classroom,  but  also  in  the  reports  of  the  officers  of 
the  Academy  on  character. 


West  Point  71 

The  increase  in  the~corps  of  cadets  to  thirty-six 
hundred  men,  and  the  reduction  of  the  term  of 
study  and  instruction  at  the  Military  Academy  to 
two  years,  with  a  post-graduate  term  of  study  and 
instruction  of  two  years  additional  for  the  cadets 
designated  for  final  graduation  as  officers  of  the 
army,  will  make  serious  modifications  necessary 
in  the  curriculum  and  in  the  method  of  instruction. 

The  course  of  study  and  instruction  should  be 
simplified  and  yet  broadened  in  the  two-year  term, 
so  that  there  should  be  concentrated  into  this 
period  the  studies  directed  particularly  to  the 
education  and  development  of  soldiers. 

The  course  of  study  during  the  first  year  should 
include  the  following  studies,  the  English  language, 
for  the  development  of  a  direct  and  clear  style  of 
military  expression,  both  in  speech  and  writing, 
and  all  cadets  should  be  required  to  write  a  good 
hand,  so  that  orders  and  reports  may  be  read  easily 
and  without  mistake;  mathematics,  military  engi- 
neering and  surveying,  including  reconnoitring  and 
field  work;  infantry  drill,  including  marches  and 
camp  duties;  machine-gun  drill;  hygiene,  including 
that  of  camps  and  moving  columns  of  troops,  in- 
struction to  be  given  by  medical  officers  of  the 
army;  riding,  and  aviation.  There  should  be  at- 
tached to  the  Academy  a  complete  outfit  of  aero- 
planes and  hydroplanes,  and  cadets  should  be 
required  to  make  two  or  three  ascensions  a  year, 
and  to  prepare  and  submit  reports  of  their  obser- 


72       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

vations  while  in  the  air  as  a  part  of  their  study  of 
reconnoitring.  The  instruction  in  military  engi- 
neering should  be  coupled  with  practical  illustra- 
tions in  the  field,  including  the  construction  of 
field  works. 

Study  marches  of  several  hours'  duration  should 
be  made  at  least  three  times  a  month  under  war 
conditions.  The  column  should  be  stripped  as  for 
battle,  the  men  should  carry  one  day's  cooked 
rations  in  their  haversacks,  and  the  column  should 
be  followed  by  several  auto-ambulances  and  by 
two  or  three  unloaded  auto-ammunition  waggons, 
to  give  the  semblance  of  war  to  the  manoeuvre. 
The  march  should  be  conducted  as  if  in  an  enemy's 
country,  but  without  cavalry  and  artillery,  but 
with  a  corps  of  pioneers,  to  be  organized  from  the 
corps  of  cadets. 

During  the  season  of  the  year  when  troops  can 
camp  out  without  danger  to  the  health  of  the 
cadets,  the  command  should  occasionally  be 
absent  from  the  Academy  during  these  marches 
for  a  period  of  twenty-four  hours,  on  which 
marches  shelter  tents  should  be  carried,  and  the 
cadets  should  go  under  canvas  during  the  night 
of  their  field  manoeuvres.  During  these  marches 
the  column  should  consist  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and 
artillery. 

I  quite  understand  that  it  may  be  said  that  such 
absence  from  the  Academy  would  interfere  with 
the  continuity  of  study  of  the  cadets,  but  in  the 


West  Point  73 

first  place,  I  do  not  believe  that  such  would  be  the 
result,  as  these  marches  should  be  considered  to  be 
the  practical  application  of  the  theories  taught  in 
the  classroom,  and  in  the  second  place,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  object  of  instruction  is  to 
make  practical  soldiers  in  two  years,  good  captains 
and  majors;  and  to  produce  such  soldiers  the 
cadets  should  have  the  opportunity  of  learning 
what  a  regiment  is,  and  how  it  looks  in  the  field; 
how  a  brigade  looks,  how  it  moves,  how  it  goes  into 
action,  how  it  intrenches,  how  it  encamps.  These 
instruction  marches  should  be  preceded  or  fol- 
lowed by  lectures  by  the  officers  in  command  to 
their  respective  regiments,  upon  the  features  of  the 
march  and  of  the  encampment.  In  two  years  the 
Academy,  under  this  system  of  instruction,  should 
be  able  to  make  an  officer  competent  to  take 
command,  on  his  graduation,  of  a  company  or  of  a 
battalion  of  infantry,  or  of  a  battery  of  artillery,  or 
of  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  and  such  field  instruction 
is  deemed  to  be  necessary  to  produce  such  an  of- 
ficer. The  present  course  of  instruction  at  the 
Academy  is  thought  to  be  too  academic ;  too  much 
of  the  nature  of  classroom  and  parade-ground  in- 
struction. 

The  second  year's  course  should  include  in 
addition  to  mathematics,  ordnance  and  gunnery; 
the  art  of  war;  military  chemistry  and  electricity; 
military  surveying,  including  the  construction  of 
light  railways;  military  engineering,  including 


74       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

bridge-building,  work  with  the  pontoons,  con- 
struction of  trenches  and  field  fortifications,  and 
instruction  in  the  manufacture  and  laying  of  mines; 
and  instruction  in  cavalry  and  light  artillery  tac- 
tics, and  the  use  of  machine  guns  in  co-operation 
with  cavalry  and  artillery  as  well  as  in  co-operation 
with  infantry. 

Instruction  should  also  be  given  in  military 
administration,  including  the  service  of  the 
commissary  and  quartermaster's  departments, 
now  consolidated  as  the  General  Supply  Service 
of  the  army. 

So  far  as  machine  guns  are  concerned,  I  have 
come  to  the  deliberate  judgment  that  they  should 
be  organized  into  separate  and  distinct  batteries, 
under  their  own  battery  officers,  and  that  these 
batteries,  where  a  sufficient  number  of  them  are 
associated  together,  should  be  grouped  into 
battalions  under  machine-gun  battalion  officers. 
These  machine-gun  organizations  should  be  dis- 
tinct from  regimental  organizations  whether  of 
infantry  or  cavalry,  but  that  when  associated  with 
infantry  and  cavalry,  batteries  of  machine  guns 
should  be  under  the  command  of  the  brigade 
commander  with  whose  troops  they  should  be 
acting. 

The  only  modification  that  I  .should  make  in  this 
form  of  command  is  in  respect  to  machine  guns 
with  artillery,  in  which  case,  when  the  artillery  is 
in  battalion  formation,  the  machine-gun  batteries 


West  Point  75 

acting  with  the  artillery  should  be  under  the 
command  of  the  artillery  battalion  commander. 
I  believe  in  the  permanent  association,  not  incor- 
poration but  association,  of  machine-gun  batteries 
with  battalions  of  light  artillery,  so  that  the 
artillery  should  have  the  direct  support  of  their 
fire  in  action. 

It  is  quite  true  that  I  have  never  seen  machine 
guns  in  action,  but  in  this  respect  very  few  of  the 
officers  of  the  regular  army  have  the  advantage  of 
me.  It  is  therefore  allowable  for  one  writing  on 
military  subjects  to  theorize  upon  the  subject  of 
the  use,  and  the  organization  for  use,  of  machine 
guns. 

Above  everything,  mobility  should  be  the  aim  of 
army  organization;  mobility  and  the  concentration  of 
fire.  The  system  of  distributing  the  machine  guns 
among  infantry  regiments  to  be  handled  by  ma- 
chine-gun squads  drawn  from  infantry  regiments, 
is,  I  am  convinced,  a  serious  mistake ;  wrong  both  in 
theory  and  in  practice.  If  used  in  such  formation 
in  battle  there  would  be  produced  a  sputtering  fire 
along  a  long  range  of  front,  whereas  if  concentrated 
in  battery  organization,  and  under  the  direct 
command  of  brigade  commanders,  the  fire  of  the 
machine  guns  could  be  concentrated  when  neces- 
sary on  a  limited  front,  and,  so  concentrated, 
produce  a  withering  and  destructive  fire. 

And  I  advocate  the  association  of  machine 
guns  in  battery  formation  with  field  artillery  to  be 


76      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

under  the  command  of  the  artillery  commander, 
because  the  artillery  will  then  have  its  own  support 
among  its  guns ;  the  fire  of  the  machine  guns  being 
much  more  effective  than  the  fire  of  a  correspond- 
ing amount  of  infantry  in  support  of  the  guns. 
The  same  argument  holds  with  reference  to  the 
association  of  machine  guns  with  cavalry.  As 
artillery,  under  my  scheme  of  army  organization, 
is  considered  to  be  army  corps  not  divisional 
troops,  and  under  the  command  of  the  corps  com- 
mander, the  moment  he  should  need  machine  guns 
for  his  firing  line  in  battle,  he  could,  should  the 
machine  guns  associated  with  the  artillery  be  not 
in  action,  order  them  to  the  front. 

The  transportation  of  machine  guns  has  not  yet 
been  worked  out  satisfactorily.  As  to  whether 
machine  guns  should  be  transported  on  auto  trucks 
made  for  the  purpose,  which  should  advance  within 
easy  range  of  the  firing  line,  or  whether  they  should 
be  transported  on  motorcycles,  each  motorcycle 
having  the  capacity  not  only  to  carry  a  gun  but 
also  an  extra  man,  I  hold  my  judgment  in  sus- 
pense, except  that  I  think  the  machine  guns  to  be 
associated  with  infantry  should  be  transported  on 
auto  trucks,  and  the  machine  guns  to  be  associated 
with  artillery  should  be  transported  on  motor- 
cycles, the  motorcycles  being  manned  by  the  men 
of  the  battery,  and,  on  approaching  the  firing  line, 
the  guns  to  be  dismounted  from  the  motorcycles 
and  moved  to  the  front,  every  fifth  man  remaining 


West  Point  77 

in  charge  of  the  motorcycles,  as  was  the  practice 
during  the  great  war  when  cavalry  was  dismounted 
for  action  on  foot,  every  fifth  man  being  left  in 
charge  of  the  horses. 

And  further,  I  think  that  machine  guns  accom- 
panying cavalry  should  be  transported  on  motor- 
cycles, because  motorcycles  can  go  wherever  cav- 
alry can  go,  and  the  fire  of  machine  guns  would 
add  greatly  to  the  power  of  cavalry,  dismounted, 
to  hold  advanced  positions  until  the  infantry  could 
get  up.  In  the  case  of  artillery,  the  fire  of  the  ma- 
chine guns  can  measurably  keep  down  the  fire  of, 
and  drive  back,  infantry  advancing  to  attack  field 
guns  when  in  action  in  the  open.  I  quite  under- 
stand that  in  modern  war  it  is  the  object  to  conceal 
artillery  in  action,  and  that  the  guns  are  placed 
well  to  the  rear  of  the  infantry,  and  yet  it  will 
happen  that  artillery  must  expose  itself  in  beating 
back  an  advance  of  the  enemy,  and  if  it  can  carry 
its  own  supports  into  action,  as  would  be  the  case 
should  batteries  of  machine  guns  be  associated 
with  artillery,  the  danger  of  its  occupation  of 
exposed  positions  would  be  greatly  reduced ;  mean- 
while the  machine  guns  associated  with  the  artillery 
would  be  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  corps  com- 
mander for  use  upon  any  part  of  the  line  of  battle 
when  not  in  action  with  the  artillery. 

The  graduation  at  the  end  of  the  two-year  course 
of  study  at  the  Military  Academy  should  be  post- 
poned until  the  1st  of  September  of  each  year,  and 


78       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

the  month  of  August  of  each  year  should  be  spent 
in  the  field  under  actual  war  conditions.  The  in- 
structional work  of  the  command  should  consist  of 
drills  and  manoeuvres  with  the  three  arms  of  the 
service,  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  and  with 
machine  guns;  and  it  should  also  include  service 
with  the  pontoons,  the  repair  and  construction 
of  roads  and  bridges,  and  the  formation  of  en- 
campments. 

As  this  month's  service  is  to  be  the  last  work  of 
the  two-year  men  the  corps  of  cadets  should  be 
handled  as  in  war.  The  transportation  should  be 
cut  to  war  limits,  the  men  should  make  and  break 
camp,  should  march  and  go  into  battle  formation, 
should  ford  shallow  streams  and  lay  pontoon 
bridges  across  broader  and  deeper  streams  under 
cover  of  artillery  fire,  and  on  crossing  streams  their 
advance  should  throw  up  bridge  heads  to  cover  the 
crossing  of  the  balance  of  the  troops. 

During  this  month  of  manoeuvres  the  cadets 
should  be  in  brigade  and  tactical  divisional  forma- 
tion, and  they  should  march  and  manoeuvre  as  a 
brigade  and  as  a  division.  There  should  be  at 
least  one  battery  of  artillery  and  at  least  one 
squadron  of  cavalry  attached  to  the  corps,  and  the 
corps  should  have  its  pioneer  corps,  its  pontoon 
train,  and  its  auto-supply  train.  The  service 
troops  with  the  corps  of  cadets  should  be  supplied 
by  the  army. 

Any  assembly  of  the  three  arms  of  the  service, 


West  Point  79 

infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  with  pioneers  and  a 
pontoon  train,  and  with  service  troops,  forming  an 
independent  command  under  the  flag  of  one 
commanding  officer,  no  matter  how  large  or  how 
small  the  command  may  be,  is  an  army. 

Consequently  for  all  the  purposes  of  the  ma- 
noeuvres during  the  month  of  August,  so  long  as  the 
command  shall  be  an  independent  command,  the 
corps  of  cadets  with  cavalry  and  artillery  may  be 
regarded  as  an  army,  and  the  lessons  of  an  army 
may  be  learned  from  its  marches  and  manoeuvres. 

The  command  of  the  corps  of  cadets,  constitut- 
ing a  brigade,  should  be  held  by  a  brigadier-genera^ 
or  by  an  officer  holding  that  rank  during  assign- 
ment, who  should  select  all  of  his  staff  officers 
from  among  the  cadets.  Should  it  be  possible  for 
the  concluding  period  of  fifteen  days  of  the  August 
manoeuvres  to  associate  the  corps  of  cadets  with 
large  bodies  of  the  regular  army,  the  corps  should 
at  once  be  converted  into  a  brigade  of  two  regi- 
ments of  cavalry  and  into  a  regiment  of  artillery, 
regular  troops  being  dismounted  to  supply  horses 
and  battery  mounts  for  the  corps,  and  during 
these  latter  days  of  August  the  corps  of  cadets 
should  manoeuvre  with  the  body  of  regular  troops 
with  whom  they  should  be  associated  as  cavalry 
and  artillery. 

It  is  believed  that  if  these  changes  be  carried 
out  at  West  Point  the  government  will  have  at 
the  end  of  the  two  years,  roughly  speaking,  thirty- 


8o      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

six  hundred  enthusiastic  young  men  fit  to  officer  its 
army.  But  assuming  for  sake  of  argument  that 
half  of  the  proposed  corps  of  thirty-six  hundred 
young  men  should  be  held  at  the  Academy  to 
take  the  post-graduate  course  of  instruction,  there 
would  still  be  left  eighteen  hundred  young  officers 
for  the  active  and  the  reserve  army. 

But  until  the  reorganized  army  should  be  filled 
up  with  officers  I  should  suspend  the  post-graduate 
course,  and  graduate  at  the  end  of  each  year  for 
immediate  entry  into  the  army,  every  cadet  who 
should  have  taken  the  full  two-year  course  and 
who  should  pass  the  final  examinations.  When, 
however,  the  active  army  should  be  full  of  officers, 
then  the  post-graduate  course  should  be  instituted, 
and  the  number  of  post-graduate  students  required 
for  the  army  should  be  determined  by  the  War 
Office  in  advance  of  the  annual  graduation,  and  the 
selections  for  the  post-graduate  course  should  be 
made  to  conform  to  the  requirements  of  the  army. 

The  balance  of  the  corps  should  then  be 
graduated  as  officers  of  the  reserve  army  until  the 
complement  of  reserve  officers  should  be  full,  when 
the  surplus  every  year  thereafter  should  be  honour- 
ably mustered  out  of  the  service  with  a  year's  pay 
of  a  second  lieutenant  of  infantry,  passing  from 
the  Academy  into  the  current  of  everyday  life, 
but  registered  to  serve  the  country  as  officers  on  a 
call  to  the  colours  at  any  time  within  ten  years 
from  their  date  of  graduation. 


West  Point  81 

Fifty  years  ago,  when  I  first  thought  out  this 
plan  for  the  reorganization  of  the  Military  Acad- 
emy, our  army  was  a  small  army,  and  the  number 
of  annual  vacancies  among  the  officers  of  the  army 
to  be  filled  by  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy 
was  small.  Nevertheless  I  then  advocated  a 
Military  Academy  of  from  twelve  hundred  to 
fifteen  hundred  men,  because  I  knew  that  the 
military  education  and  service  of  a  two-year  course 
at  the  Academy  would,  in  time,  give  the  country  a 
vast  number  of  men  trained  for  the  army,  from 
among  whom  the  government  could  draw  its 
officers  in  time  of  war  to  command  the  volunteers, 
and  so  be  saved  the  risk  and  danger  of  the  long 
period  of  preparation  for  war,  after  war  should 
have  begun. 

And  then,  I  confess,  there  was  fixed  in  my  mind 
the  thought  that  the  occupations,  the  struggles, 
the  uncertainties,  and  the  triumphs  of  civil  life 
would  in  many  instances  broaden  and  keep  in 
fine  condition  the  minds,  and  develop  the  charac- 
ters, of  many  of  these  two-year  graduates  of  the 
Academy,  so  that  should  war  break  out,  the 
nation  would  not  only  have  officers  for  its  army  of 
volunteers,  but  possible  generals  of  high  capacity 
for  its  commanding  officers.  The  control  of  great 
resources,  the  conduct  of  great  affairs,  with  the 
ever  present  weight  of  responsibility  in  civil  life, 
develops  character  as  no  length  of  service  in  the 
army  in  time  of  peace  can  possibly  do,  because  of 

6 


82      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

the  lack  of  the  stimulus  of  responsibility  for  results 
demanded  in  civil  life. 

Assuming  a  military  education  of  two  years  at 
the  Military  Academy  as  the  basis,  and  such  a 
life  as  that  led  by  many  of  those  who  during  the 
past  fifty  years  have  conquered  the  wilderness, 
carrying  our  railway  lines  from  the  valley  of  the 
Mississippi  across  the  Rocky  Mountains  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  who  have  founded  and  developed 
our  vast  manufacturing  power,  and  have  created 
our  vast  system  of  finance,  was  it  unreasonable  to 
suppose  that  when  called  to  the  colours  these  men 
would  have  brought  to  the  service  of  the  nation  in 
war  all  the  wealth  of  genius  and  of  character  which 
had  been  developed  and  had  been  displayed  by 
them  in  the  activities  of  civil  life? 

It  would  be  a  most  interesting  psychological 
study  to  investigate  the  influence  of  the  failures  of 
Grant  and  Sherman  in  civil  life  upon  their  military 
characters.  Upon  Grant  manifestly  the  influence 
was  a  broadening  one.  Upon  Sherman  the  in- 
fluence was  also  broadening,  but  unconsciously  so, 
owing  to  the  intense  personal  consciousness  of  the 
man.  Sherman  was  far  from  being  so  great  a  man 
as  Grant,  and  consequently  this  influence  was  not 
so  marked  in  his  case.  The  inferiority  of  Sherman 
to  Grant  is  manifested  in  many  ways,  but  especially 
in  their  battles. 

i    Such  was  my  dream  of  fifty  years  ago,  as  to  the 
enlargement  and  reorganization  of  the  Military 


West  Point  83 

Academy,  and  such  is  the  conviction  of  my  old  age. 
Had  this  dream  been  realized  in  the  past  the  utterly 
unnecessary  spectacle  of  the  introduction  of  so 
large  a  number  of  civilians  into  the  regular  army 
at  the  time  of  the  creation  of  our  coast  artillery 
corps,  and  upon  the  breaking  out  of  the  war  with 
Spain,  would  have  been  avoided.  Indeed  there 
was  little  excuse  for  such  appointments  on  account 
of  the  Spanish  War,  because  the  government  had 
it  in  its  power  arbitrarily  to  have  graduated  the 
First,  Second,  and  Third  Classes  at  West  Point 
into  the  army  as  second  lieutenants,  which  would 
measurably  have  supplied  the  then  demand  for 
officers.  The  bulk  of  these  young  men  would  have 
served  at  West  Point  at  least  two  years  before 
entering  the  army  as  second  lieutenants,  and 
would  have  made  better  officers  on  that  account 
than  the  young  men  appointed  to  the  army  from 
civil  life  who,  as  a  class,  knew  nothing  of  the  army 
or  of  their  duties  as  army  officers. 

It  may  be  noted  here  that  I  have  made  a  dis- 
tinction between  the  volunteers  of  the  great  war 
and  appointees  from  civil  life  to  the  army  since 
the  war.  The  distinction  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
volunteers  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  learned 
their  trade  of  war  in  war;  that  the  best  school  of 
instruction  for  war  is  war;  that  three  or  four  years' 
service  in  the  army  in  time  of  war  furnishes  a 
much  better  education  for  war  than  three  or  four 
years  spent  on  the  banks  of  the  Hudson  in  time  of 


84      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

peace.  I  have  said  elsewhere  that  the  I5th,  i6th, 
and  1 7th  Army  Corps,  composed  of  volunteers, 
toward  the  end  of  1862  and  thenceforward  to  the 
end  of  the  war,  were  as  good  soldiers  as  the 
soldiers  of  the  regular  army,  and  yet  I  now  ad- 
vocate the  appointment  only  of  graduates  of  the 
Military  Academy  as  officers  of  the  regular  army. 
The  reason  for  this  discrimination  in  favour  of 
graduates  of  the  Military  Academy  is  that  we 
have,  fortunately,  no  war  in  which  to  educate 
officers  for  the  army,  and  that  without  such 
education  in  the  school  of  experience  in  actual  war, 
there  is  no  school  in  which  it  is  so  likely  that  good 
officers  can  be  trained  for  the  army  as  at  the  Mili- 
tary Academy  at  West  Point.  The  Spanish  War 
was  too  brief  a  war  to  serve  as  a  school  for  officers. 
Indeed  it  was  only  toward  the  end  of  that  war  that 
the  regular  army  began  "to  find  itself."  The 
dulling  influence  of  so  many  years  of  peace  prior 
to  the  war  with  Spain  had  gotten  the  army 
entirely  out  of  touch  with  the  conditions  of  actual 
war. 

Apropos  of  the  proposed  two-year  course  of 
instruction  at  the  Military  Academy,  I  cannot 
forget  that  one  of  the  best  division  commanders 
of  the  Western  Army,  Major-General  J.  M.  Corse, 
whom  I  knew  personally,  had  served  two  years  at 
the  Military  Academy.  Why  he  left  West  Point 
I  never  knew;  I  never  took  the  trouble  to  inquire. 
It  was  sufficient  to  know  that  he  was  a  fine  soldier, 


West  Point  85 

an  infinitely  finer  soldier  than  many  general  officers 
who  were  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy. 
Removing  to  the  West  before  the  war,  where  he 
was  subject  to  the  developing  influences  of  the 
demands  of  civil  life,  the  war  found  him  in  Iowa. 
He  volunteered,  and  his  West  Point  service  of  two 
years  secured  for  him  command  rank.  His  own 
merit  did  the  rest. 

The  post-graduate  course  is  intended  to  com- 
plete the  military  education  of  the  selected  cadets 
who  are  to  receive  final  graduation  into  the  army 
as  officers.  Although  the  introduction  of  the  two- 
year  course  would  dislocate  some  of  the  studies  of 
the  present  curriculum,  advancing,  let  us  say,  the 
study  of  the  art  of  war  to  the  second  year  from  the 
fourth  year  in  the  present  course,  it  is  not  thought 
that  any  unhappy  effect  on  the  students  need  be 
apprehended,  since  the  cadets  with  one,  or  one 
year  and  a  half  of  service  and  instruction  at  the 
Academy,  are  quite  as  ready  to  take  up  the  study 
of  the  art  of  war  as  they  would  be  in  their  fourth 
year  of  instruction  at  the  Academy. 

It  is  not  intended,  however,  to  devote  any  time 
to  the  consideration  of  the  course  of  study  for  the 
term  of  post-graduate  instruction.  If  the  plan  of 
increasing  the  number  of  cadets  and  breaking  the 
present  course  of  instruction  into  two  distinct 
periods  be  adopted,  First,  a  two-year  period  of 
study,  carrying  graduation  from  the  Academy,  and 
Second,  a  post-graduate  course  for  the  further 


86       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

instruction  of  cadets  selected  for  final  graduation  as 
officers  of  the  army;  the  arrangement  of  the  studies 
of  the  post-graduate  course  of  instruction  may 
safely  be  left  to  the  Academic  Board.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  nothing  is  to  be  done  in  reference  to  the 
suggestions  of  this  book,  it  is  not  worth  while  to 
waste  time  or  thought  in  the  preparation  of  a  plan 
of  post-graduate  studies. 

But  as  to  the  organization  of  the  Academy  I 
deem  it  advisable  that  certain  changes  should  be 
made  whether  the  present  system  be  maintained  or 
not. 

Making  an  argument  in  favour  of  longer  tours 
of  duty  for  officer  instructors  at  the  Academy, 
Colonel  Townsley,  Superintendent  of  the  Military 
Academy,  says  in  his  Annual  Report  dated  June 
30,  1914: 

While  I  do  not  claim  that  these  figures  are  mathe- 
matically exact,  they  are  very  close  to  it,  and  give  an 
honest  representation  of  the  difficulties  we  encounter 
in  the  selection  of  desirable  officers  as  instructors  under 
this  detached  service  law.  The  result  is  that  we  are 
compelled  to  ask  for  officers  as  instructors  who  with- 
out this  detached  service  law  would  not  have  been 
considered  for  such  duty.  These  officers  when  de- 
tailed have  done  their  very  best,  and  yet  the  results 
have  not  been  up  to  the  standard  heretofore  attained, 
and  an  exhaustive  amount  of  work  in  instructing  these 
instructors,  that  is  beyond  all  reason,  has  been  put 
upon  the  heads  of  the  Academic  Departments.  The 


West  Point  87 

ill  effect  upon  discipline  of  having  instructors  not 
naturally  well  equipped  cannot  even  be  estimated, 
and  in  this  lies  a  most  serious  and  bad  effect  of  the 
detached  service  law  upon  the  cadets  at  the  Academy. 
Instructors  who  graduated  low  in  their  classes  and 
who  are  not  temperamentally  constituted  to  be  good 
instructors  are  now  necessarily  required  to  instruct 
the  keen  cadets  standing  high  in  their  studies,  and 
who  are  ready  to  take  every  advantage  of  an  instruc- 
tor's errors  or  peculiarities.  The  result  is  unsatisfac- 
tory not  only  as  regards  instruction  but  in  its  effect 
upon  discipline. 

This  natural  protest  as  Superintendent  against 
the  injustice  of  compelling  the  Academy  to  accept 
the  services  of  instructors  not  qualified  for  the 
duty  of  instruction,  is,  in  reality,  a  remarkably 
strong  argument  against  the  selection  of  officers 
of  the  army  for  such  duties. 

The  practice  of  drawing  instructors  for  service 
at  the  Military  Academy  from  among  the  officers 
of  the  army  grew  up  when  the  army  was  much 
smaller  than  it  is  now,  and  when  its  responsibilities 
were  much  less  than  they  have  since  become,  and 
also  when  the  temptations  of  detached  service 
were  not  so  great  as  they  now  are. 

The  curse  of  the  army  today  is  "detached 
service."  The  Secretary  of  War  at  the  last 
session  of  Congress  asked  for  an  addition  of  one 
thousand  officers  to  the  service,  such  increase  in  the 
corps  of  officers  being  largely  rendered  necessary, 


88       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

in  the  judgment  of  the  Secretary,  by  the  great 
number  of  officers  on  detached  service. 

I  think  that  the  system  of  instruction  at  the 
Military  Academy,  except  in  purely  military 
matters,  should  be  changed  so  that  the  instructors 
should  be  civilians. 

The  officers  of  the  army  detailed  for  military 
duty  at  the  Academy  should  comprehend  the 
Superintendent,  who  should  rank  as  brigadier- 
general  during  his  residence,  and  who  should  be 
the  superior  and  commanding  officer  at  the 
Academy,  a  commandant  of  cadets  who  should 
rank  as  brigadier-general  while  holding  that 
assignment,  and  three  officers  with  the  assigned 
rank  of  colonel  to  command  the  three  regiments  of 
cadets,  the  Adjutant  of  the  Academy,  the  Quarter- 
master, the  Chief  Medical  Officer,  the  instructors 
in  field  work,  engineering,  in  ordnance  and 
gunnery,  in  aviation  and  in  signalling,  and  such 
other  officers  as  shall  be  found  to  be  absolutely 
necessary  for  purely  military  work  and  instruction. 

The  commanding  officers  of  battalions  of 
infantry,  batteries  of  artillery,  and  squadrons  of 
cavalry  should  be  drawn  from  cadets  pursuing  the 
post-graduate  course  of  studies;  the  theory  being 
that  all  graduates  of  the  first,  or  two-year  term, 
are  fitted,  or  at  least  should  be  fitted,  to  command 
at  once  on  graduation  a  battalion  of  infantry,  a 
battery  of  artillery,  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry.  If 
they  are  not  so  fitted  there  will  then  be  found  to 


West  Point  89 

have  been  some  error  in  the  plan  of  their  instruc- 
tion, because,  if  a  good  regimental  commander  of 
volunteers  can  be  created  in  two  years'  service  in 
the  field,  surely  a  graduate  of  the  Military  Acad- 
emy, with  all  the  advantages  of  two  years'  study 
and  instruction  at  the  Academy,  and  with  the 
chance  of  command  which  should  be  given  to  him 
for  purposes  of  experience,  should  be  competent 
to  command  a  battalion  of  infantry,  a  battery  of 
artillery,  or  a  squadron  of  cavalry.  All  staff  officers 
of  the  Superintendent  except  the  Adjutant  of  the 
Academy,  and  all  staff  officers  of  the  Commandant 
of  Cadets  should  be  drawn  from  the  post-graduate 
corps  of  cadets,  their  service  as  staff  officers  being 
considered  to  be  a  material  part  of  their  military 
education.  But  all  company  officers  should  be 
selected  from  the  whole  corps  of  cadets  according 
to  merit,  and  I  have  sufficient  confidence  in  the 
high  class  of  the  cadets  produced  by  competitive 
examination  to  believe  that  the  corps,  as  a  whole, 
will  be  found  able  to  furnish  all  officers  below  the 
grade  of  battalion  commanders  needed  to  officer  the 
corps  of  cadets. 

So  far  as  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel  is 
concerned,  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  fill  that 
rank,  as  I  regard  the  office  as  of  little  use  in  a  regi- 
ment of  infantry  or  a  regiment  of  cavalry  since  the 
introduction  of  the  three-battalion  system,  or  its 
equivalent.  It  is  possible  that  it  might  be  well  to 
retain  the  rank  in  a  regiment  of  artillery  so  as  to 


90      West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

furnish  officers  of  command  rank  to  serve  as 
chiefs  of  artillery;  either  the  lieutenant-colonel 
commanding  the  regiment  in  absence  of  the  colonel 
on  staff  duty,  or  vice  versa. 

If  a  semblance  of  military  rank  and  authority 
be  deemed  to  be  necessary  in  the  classrooms,  the 
instructors  at  the  Academy  could  be  organized 
into  a  corps  to  be  designated  as  the  Instructional 
Corps  of  the  Army,  with  assimilated  rank,  and 
with  the  right  to  wear  a  uniform  and  to  carry  a 
sword.  But  these  gentlemen  should  not  be  drawn 
from  the  army  but  from  civil  life.  Should  any 
officer  of  the  army,  however,  wish  to  enter  this 
corps  he  should  be  compelled  to  resign  his  com- 
mission in  the  army.  It  is  unreasonable  that 
officers  educated  to  be  soldiers  should  be  required 
to  serve,  or  should  seek  details  from  their  com- 
mands to  serve  as  instructors  at  the  Military 
Academy.  The  craze  for  detached  service  is 
sapping  the  vitality  of  the  army,  and  wherever  it 
can  be  shown  that  detached  service  is  unnecessary, 
steps  should  be  taken  to  do  away  with  the  abuse. 
It  may  be  said  that  qualified  officer  instructors 
make  the  best  instructors,  but  this  may  be  doubted 
when  it  is  considered  that  no  officer  could  expect 
to  be  detailed  for  a  longer  period  than  four  years, 
and  when  it  is  further  considered  that  the  country 
is  full  of  colleges  and  universities  whose  professors 
rank  high  as  instructors. 

I  think  a  permanent  corps  of  instructors,  drawn 


West  Point  91 

from  civil  life,  could  be  organized  for  the  Military 
Academy  against  whom  the  charge  of  inefficiency 
made  by  Colonel  Townsley  against  some  of  the 
military  instructors  at  the  Academy  could  not  lie. 

The  instruction  of  the  young  men  of  the  country 
has  called  into  existence  a  special  class  of  men  who 
have  devoted  their  lives  to  the  cause  of  education. 
The  bulk  of  these  gentlemen  have  deliberately 
chosen  their  profession  from  a  love  of  teaching.  I 
asked  recently  one  of  the  professors  of  the  George 
Washington  University,  himself  an  authority  on 
explosives,  why  he  had  chosen  his  profession? 
He  replied  with  a  smile  which  illumined  his 
whole  face,  "  Because  I  love  teaching.  I  love  my 
profession." 

There  is  not  a  shadow  of  doubt  on  my  mind  that 
both  the  army  and  the  Military  Academy  would 
be  benefited  by  the  substitution  of  a  corps  of  civil- 
ian instructors  in  place  of  the  military  instructors 
now  assigned  to  duty  at  the  Academy.  The 
army  would  receive  back  its  officers  whom  it  needs 
in  its  ranks,  and  the  Academy  would  have  a 
permanent  corps  of  selected  instructors  entirely 
competent  to  perform  the  duties  of  the  classroom. 

The  detail  of  officers  of  the  army  as  instructors 
is  the  most  expensive  system  of  instruction  in  the 
country  when  the  pay  and  allowances  of  the  offi- 
cers are  taken  into  consideration,  but  this  objec- 
tion would  not  be  urged  against  the  system  were 
there  no  other  objection  to  it.  But  the  need  of  the 


92       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

army  for  officers  with  the  colours,  and  the  need  of 
the  Academy  for  competent  instructors,  speak 
eloquently  against  the  system.  The  system  of 
officer  instructors  should  be  superseded,  as  out  of 
date,  by  a  corps  of  civilian  instructors  to  be  chosen 
after  full  and  thorough  examination  for  fitness. 

The  same  remarks  apply  to  the  Naval  Academy 
at  Annapolis.  Here  also  we  find  officers  of  the 
navy  on  duty,  text -book  in  hand,  working  in  the 
classroom  while  the  navy  is  clamouring  for  more 
sea  officers.  I  do  not  think  that  detached  service 
is  so  much  of  an  abuse  in  the  navy  as  it  is  in  the 
army,  and  yet  it  would  not  be  matter  of  surprise  if 
it  should  be  found  that  there  are  officers  of  the 
navy  on  duty  in  the  Navy  Department,  doing 
work  which  could  be  better  done  by  some  of  the 
old  clerks  of  the  Department. 

There  should  be  assigned  to  duty  at  the  Military 
Academy  a  certain  number  of  sergeants  from  the 
army  as  drill  masters,  whose  duty  it  should  be  to 
take  the  cadets  in  hand  the  moment  of  their 
arrival  at  the  Academy,  and  put  them  through  a 
course  of  drill  in  the  school  of  the  soldier,  squad 
drill,  etc.  These  sergeants  should  be  allowed  to 
demonstrate  their  fitness  for  this  work,  and  if 
found  fit,  they  should  be  given  the  opportunity 
to  transfer  from  their  regiments  to  permanent  duty 
at  the  Military  Academy  to  serve  there  as  drill 
masters,  retaining  their  grade  in  the  service,  but 
to  be  dropped  from  the  line  of  the  army  and  to  be 


West  Point  93 

designated  as  drill  masters  at  the  Military  Acad- 
emy, their  places  in  their  regiments  to  be  filled  by 
promotion  from  the  ranks. 

It  has  been  recommended  that  the  date  of 
graduation  should  be  advanced  to  the  first  of 
September,  and  that  the  month  of  August  be  spent 
in  the  field  in  brigade  and  tactical  divisional  forma- 
tion. But  it  is  recognized  that  the  cadets  just 
arriving  at  the  Academy  would  be  too  green  for 
such  work,  and  therefore  it  is  recommended  that 
all  cadets  entering  the  Academy  should  be  required 
to  report  June  I5th  of  each  year,  and  be  at  once 
put  in  camp.  The  drill  sergeants  should  then 
take  them  in  hand  for  fifteen  days,  and  on  the  first 
of  July  they  should  be  organized  into  companies 
and  be  drilled  in  such  formation  throughout  the 
month  of  July.  By  the  first  of  August  they  would 
be  ready  to  be  incorporated  in  battalions.  It  is 
roughly  estimated  that  each  year's  quota  of  new 
cadets  would  be  about  one  thousand  men,  or  the 
equivalent  of  about  three  battalions  of  infantry. 
These  new  cadets  should  be  distributed  among  the 
three  regiments  of  the  corps  according  to  the 
judgment  of  the  commandant  of  cadets,  either  in 
squads  or  companies.  I  think,  however,  it  would 
be  better  for  them  to  be  incorporated  directly  and 
personally  with  the  existing  battalions,  so  as  to 
become,  from  the  outset  of  their  career,  thoroughly 
assimilated  with  the  corps. 

Nothing  is  said  upon  the  subject  of  discipline 


94       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

because  it  is  believed  that  the  discipline  of  the 
Military  Academy  is  excellent;  and  nothing  is 
said  as  to  the  spirit  of  the  Military  Academy 
because  that  is  believed  to  be  admirable. 

Given  two  men  of  equal  ability,  equal  character, 
and  equal  attainments  one  of  whom  is  a  graduate 
of  the  Military  Academy  and  the  other  a  civilian 
appointee  in  the  army,  and  it  should  be  possible  to 
assume  that  the  graduate  of  the  Military  Academy 
will  be  the  better  soldier. 

But  the  impossible  should  not  be  expected.  The 
Academy  cannot  make  a  soldier  unless  the  military 
quality  be  in  the  cadet.  He  may  have  capacity 
enough  to  graduate  and  yet  not  be  a  soldier.  In 
the  army  he  may  prove  a  fairly  good  subaltern, 
a  fairly  good  captain,  or  a  fairly  good  major,  and 
yet  not  be  a  soldier  in  the  large  sense  of  the  term. 
He  may  even  know  what  should  be  done,  but  at  the 
crisis  not  have  the  character  to  do  what  should  be 
done,  in  which  case  he  would  not  be  a  soldier, 
v  But  with  all  these  reservations  I  favour  an  army 
officered  by  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy. 
I  believe  that  the  best  results  may  be  expected 
from  an  army  so  officered.  I  believe,  generally 
speaking,  that  prompter  action  in  an  emergency 
may  be  expected  from  an  army  so  officered. 

I  have  no  illusions,  however,  as  to  West  Point 
or  West  Pointers.  I  have  known  personally  a 
number  of  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy,  and 
have  served  in  the  army  with  graduates  of  the 


West  Point  95 

Academy,  and  I  have  a  high  regard  for  the  Acad- 
emy and  for  her  graduates.  That  we  should, 
however,  accept  every  graduate  as  a  good  soldier 
simply  because  he  had  spent  four  years  of  his  life 
at  school  at  West  Point,  is  an  absurdity;  an  ab- 
surdity in  which  West  Pointers,  however,  have 
too  often  fallen  into  the  habit  of  demanding  belief 
by  the  country.  In  making  this  demand  West 
Point  is  injuring  her  cause,  because  the  history  of 
the  great  war  is  full  of  the  blunders  and  failures  of 
regular  officers,  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy. 
General  Carter  in  his  book,  The  American  Army, 
gives  a  list  of  graduates  of  the  Academy  who 
commanded  armies,  army  corps,  and  divisions, 
during  the  great  war,  concluding  his  list  with  the 
remark:  "Of  their  non-graduates  brothers-in- 
arms of  the  old  regular  army  none  were  in  com- 
mand of  armies,  only  Sumner  commanded  a  corps 
and  Kearney  and  Mower  commanded  divisions." 

Does  not  the  gallant  General  know  that  it  would 
have  been  almost  an  impossibility  for  a  non- 
graduate  officer  of  the  army,  under  the  West  Point 
influence  which  controlled  the  War  Department 
throughout  the  great  war,  to  have  reached  the 
command  of  an  army  corps  or  an  army? 

Analyse  this  list,  given  by  General  Carter,  and  it 
becomes  painfully  apparent  that  many  of  these 
gentlemen  were  given  commands  for  which  they 
were  utterly  unfit.  Does  any  one  doubt  that  Kear- 
ney and  Mower  were  infinitely  better  soldiers  than 


96       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

some  of  the  army  commanders  and  half  of  the 
corps  commanders  given  in  General  Carter's  list  as 
graduates  of  the  Academy? 

I  did  not  know  Kearney,  but  it  was  the  general 
belief  of  the  army  at  the  period  of  his  untimely 
death,  that  on  account  of  his  ability  as  a  soldier 
he  was  destined  to  achieve  high  command; 
possibly  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac; 
so  keen  were  his  military  perceptions  and  so  firm 
his  character.  Mower  I  knew  personally.  He  was 
the  incarnation  of  military  vigour.  He  was  a 
soldier  who  inspired  his  men;  a  leader  whom  his 
men  followed  with  the  devotion  of  admiration. 

Does  not  the  gallant  General  know  that  but  few 
of  Napoleon's  marshals  were  educated  soldiers, 
except  that  they  were  graduates  of  that  best  of  all 
schools  for  the  making  of  soldiers,  the  school  of 
war? 

In  many  instances  volunteer  officers,  seasoned 
and  developed  by  several  years  of  war,  were  better 
soldiers,  and  showed  a  keener  sense  of  the  spirit 
of  discipline,  than  some  of  their  West  Point 
associates  in  the  army,  even  where  the  latter  had 
had  the  same  advantage  of  service  in  the  field 
in  war. 

As  to  the  higher  qualities  of  the  soldier,  those 
qualities  which  reach  to  the  height  of  generalship, 
I  say  without  the  slightest  shadow  of  doubt  in  my 
judgment  that  Major-General  John  A.  Logan  of 
the  volunteers,  as  a  battle  commander,  outranked 


West  Point  97 

the  whole  Regular  Army  except  Grant,  Sherman, 
Sheridan,  Thomas,  and  Meade,  after  whom  I  place 
him — sixth  in  the  list  of  officers  of  the  American 
army  in  the  great  war. 

Logan's  battle  of  Atlanta — for  it  was  his  battle, 
fought  by  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  under  his 
command — stamps  him  as  a  great  soldier. 

Had  Logan  fought  the  battle  of  Atlanta  under 
the  eye  of  the  great  Napoleon  the  sun  of  another 
day  could  not  have  arisen  before  he  would  have 
been  a  Marshal  of  France. 

There  was  not  an  officer  or  a  man  in  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  who  did  not  expect  that  Logan 
would  be  retained  in  command  of  the  army  after 
the  battle  of  Atlanta,  which  command  came  to 
him  on  the  field  of  battle,  upon  the  death  of 
McPherson  at  the  very  opening  of  the  engage- 
ment; but  General  Sherman  decided  otherwise. 
I  think  this  judgment  of  Sherman,  denying  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  to  Logan 
after  the  battle  of  Atlanta,  was  due  to  the  narrow- 
ing influence  of  the  West  Point  training  on  his 
mind;  and  a  narrowing  influence  undoubtedly  it 
has  upon  a  certain  character  of  mind.  He  could 
not  realize  that  a  man  could  learn  as  much  of  war 
from  three  or  four  years'  training  in  war  as  from 
three  or  four  years'  schooling  in  boyhood  on  the 
banks  of  the  Hudson,  during  a  period  of  peace. 
And  yet  no  one  grew  more  rapidly  than  Sherman 
during  the  great  war.  The  Sherman  of  Bull  Run 


98       West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

was  a  neophyte;  the  Sherman  of  the  South  Caro- 
lina campaign  was  a  great  soldier. 

It  is  greatly  to  General  Howard's  credit  that  he 
recognized  the  right  of  Logan,  won  on  the  field 
of  battle,  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  calling  General  Sherman's  attention 
to  the  fact,  and  only  on  an  impatient  exclama- 
tion from  Sherman,  consenting  himself,  to  accept 
the  command  of  the  army. 

I  have  read  pretty  much  all  that  Sherman  has 
written  about  the  supersession  of  Logan,  and 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  what  he  has 
written  upon  the  subject  is  a  painful  and  unsatis- 
factory excuse  for  an  indefensible  act. 

For  both  General  Howard  and  General  Logan, 
as  gallant  soldiers  as  ever  wore  swords,  and  with 
whom  I  had  the  honour  to  serve  in  the  field,  I 
have  the  utmost  respect.  I  owe  to  General 
Howard  the  opportunity  of  my  military  life 
through  his  recommendation  of  me  to  General 
Osterhaus  as  Adjutant-General  of  the  I5th  Army 
Corps.  I  hold  their  memories  in  the  tenderest 
recollection,  and  it  is  the  pride  of  my  life  that  they 
honoured  me  with  their  confidence.  In  placing 
Logan  in  the  highest  class  of  soldiers  I  disclaim 
any  reflection  upon  the  soldierly  qualities  of 
General  Howard.  I  speak  of  Logan  as  I  should 
speak  of  Grant  or  Sherman  or  Sheridan  or  Thomas, 
as  a  man  apart,  without  any  personal  or  professional 
reflection  upon  any  other  officer  of  the  army, 


West  Point  99 

merely  assigning  to  him  his  place  in  history  ac- 
cording to  my  appreciation  of  his  merits  and  his 
services  to  the  army  and  to  the  nation. 

General  Logan  was  offered  a  brigadier-general- 
ship in  the  Regular  Army  at  the  close  of  the  great 
war,  which  he  wisely  declined.  His  temperament 
was  unsuited  to  the  detail  work  of  the  army  in 
time  of  peace.  His  sphere  of  activity  was  the 
army  in  time  of  war.  He  had  the  true  sense  of 
command.  He  exacted  obedience  and  action 
from  his  subordinates,  but  was  absolutely  free 
from  fussiness,  that  fault  of  some  general  officers 
which  makes  them  meddle  with  the  conduct  of 
affairs  by  their  subordinates.  He  never  interfered 
in  the  execution  of  his  orders,  but  allowing  his  sub- 
ordinates a  free  hand,  demanded  strict  compliance 
with  the  orders  given.  He  always  expected  and 
demanded  success.  He  had  an  almost  unerring 
judgment  for  position.  He  knew  by  instinct  what 
soldiers  could  do.  He  had  character,  which  made 
him  a  soldier  in  the  fullest  acceptation  of  the  term. 
He  had  many  of  the  qualities  of  Massena,  Marshal 
of  France,  Duke  of  Rivoli,  and  Prince  of  Essling, 
one  of  Napoleon's  greatest  marshals.  Logan's 
genius  for  war  blazed  forth  the  brightest  when 
everything  seemed  to  be  going  wrong  and  success 
depended  upon  him  personally.  Then  his  un- 
daunted spirit  filled  the  whole  field,  and  he  tore 
victory  from  approaching  defeat. 

No  one  has  a  higher  appreciation  of  the  volun- 


ioo     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

teer  soldier,  seasoned  by  service  in  war,  than  I 
have.  No  one  glories  more  than  I  do  in  the  valour, 
the  unfailing  readiness  for  duty,  the  steadiness  in 
battle,  the  brilliant  feats  of  arms  of  the  volunteers, 
and  no  pride  should  be  higher  in  life  than  the  pride 
in  having  been  an  officer  of  volunteers  in  the  great 
war. 

When  they  were  well  commanded  these  volun- 
teer troops  proved  themselves  to  be  invincible 
soldiers.  But  it  is  the  saddest  commentary  upon 
the  great  war  that  they  were  so  often  badly, 
inefficiently,  ignorantly  commanded,  and  that 
such  failures  in  high  command  were  too  often  the 
failures  of  regular  officers,  graduates  of  the  Mili- 
tary Academy,  who  were  utterly  unfit  for  the 
command  of  armies,  or  divisions,  or  even  brigades, 
to  which  they  were  assigned  largely  because  of 
their  reputation  in  the  old  army. 

This  is  not  an  indictment  of  the  Regular  Army  or 
of  the  Military  Academy,  but  is  simply  a  protest 
against  the  inferences  created  by  such  remarks  as 
those  quoted  above  from  General  Carter's  .book, 
The  American  Army.  The  same  unfitness  of  reg- 
ular officers  for  command  often  presents  itself  in 
all  wars.  It  is  today  making  itself  felt  in  the 
French  army,  as  is  manifested  by  the  arbitrary 
retirement  from  their  commands  for  incapacity  of 
a  number  of  French  general  officers.  Doubtless 
the  same  unfitness  is  making  itself  apparent  in  all 
the  armies  engaged  in  the  war,  although  we  know 


West  Point  Vdi 

little  or  nothing  of  such  manifestations.  We  do 
know,  however,  that  after  the  battle  of  the  Marne, 
General  Count  von  Moltke  was  relieved  from  duty 
as  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  German  army,  and  that 
other  general  officers  of  that  army  subsided  into 
obscurity. 

But  notwithstanding  my  high  appreciation  of 
volunteers  when  they  have  become  soldiers  by  train- 
ing in  war,  I  am  satisfied  that  the  best  results  are 
to  be  obtained  by  the  employment  of  educated 
soldiers,  and  especially  do  I  advocate  their  educa- 
tion to  the  highest  point,  and  as  a  part  of  that 
education,  the  application  of  all  possible  tests  to 
determine  and  develop  character  as  far  as  charac- 
ter can  be  determined  in  time  of  peace.  No 
matter  how  patriotic,  how  earnest,  how  loyal 
volunteers  may  be,  they  have  to  learn  their  business 
after  war  breaks  out,  which  handicaps  them  so 
seriously,  that  the  nation  should  no  longer  incur 
the  risk  of  dependence  upon  them  in  the  first 
line  of  battle. 

The  conditions  of  war  have  so  strikingly  changed 
in  the  past  fifty  years,  as  I  have  heretofore  shown ; 
that,  as  we  are  unlikely  to  find  an  enemy  so  un- 
prepared as  we  were  at  the  breaking  out  of  the 
great  war,  and  are  today,  I  consider  it  our  duty 
to  change  our  methods  of  creating  and  maintaining 
armies  to  meet  the  changed  conditions  of  war. 

Now  war  bursts  upon  the  world  as  from  a 
thunder-cloud  which  has  been  rolled  up  by  the 


ro2     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

great  south  wind.  It  comes  with  the  suddenness 
of  lightning  accompanying  the  thunderings  of 
heaven. 

A  nation  unprepared  for  war  must  bow  its  head 
to  the  storm  and  offer  its  neck  for  the  yoke  of  conquest. 

I  would  have  my  country  fully  prepared  to  meet 
the  first  burst  of  war  when  it  shall  come.  Ready 
not  only  with  men  and  munitions,  but  with  officers 
who  shall  have  received  the  fittest  possible  educa- 
tion and  preparation  for  war. 

It  is  because  I  am  convinced  that  the  best 
preparation  which  can  be  made  by  any  country 
for  war  is  the  creation  of  a  great  body  of  officers 
who  shall  have  received  in  youth  the  best  military 
education  and  instruction  which  can  be  given  to 
them,  that  I  advocate  the  enlargement  of  the 
Military  Academy,  and  the  breaking  into  two 
great  divisions  of  the  course  of  study  and  instruc- 
tion of  the  cadets  at  the  Academy;  one  term  of  two 
years  leading  to  graduation  and  to  positions  as  of- 
ficers of  the  reserve  army,  and  the  second  term  of 
two  years  given  to  post-graduate  study  and  in- 
struction, with  final  graduation  as  officers  of  the 
active  army. 

There  is  need  for  immediate  action  to  insure  the 
prompt  inauguration  of  the  system  which  I 
propose,  and  to  allow  it  to  become  operative  for 
some  years  before  the  graduates  of  the  Military 
Academy,  under  it,  shall  be  called  upon  to  face 
the  test  of  war. 


West  Point  103 

I  can  see  no  reason  why  we  should  allow  our- 
selves to  be  drawn  into  the  present  war  which  is 
devastating  Europe.  Nor  do  I  think  that  there  is 
any  immediate  danger  of  embroilment  with  Mex- 
ico; but  even  should  we  find  it  necessary  to  in- 
tervene in  Mexico,  I  should  regard  it  as  a  great 
mistake,  almost  rising  to  the  magnitude  of  a  crime, 
to  increase  the  regular  army  merely  to  meet  the 
contingency  of  intervention.  The  estimates  of 
the  military  requirements  for  intervention  which 
have  been  given  to  the  press  are  dreams.  To  meet 
any  Mexican  demand  upon  our  army  I  should 
advocate  the  filling  of  the  regular  army  to  full  war 
strength,  and  the  calling  to  the  colours,  as  volun- 
teers, of  a  sufficient  number  of  the  organized 
National  Guard.  If  the  army  should  be  filled  to 
full  war  strength  and  the  National  Guard  should 
furnish  from  fifty  thousand  to  sixty  thousand 
volunteers,  the  army  would  be  fully  strong  enough 
to  meet  and  suppress  any  opposition  to  interven- 
tion that  the  disaffected  elements  in  Mexico  should 
be  able  to  offer,  and  to  restore  and  to  maintain 
peace  in  that  distracted  country. 

I  think  that  we  may  count  upon  six  or  eight 
years  of  peace  after  the  conclusion  of  the  present 
war  in  Europe,  in  which  period  we  shall  be  amply 
able  to  inaugurate  the  system  of  an  enlarged  Mili- 
tary Academy  at  West  Point,  and  the  creation  of 
the  reserve  army,  which  will  be  the  subject  dis- 
cussed in  the  next  chapter. 


104     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Should  my  judgment  be  correct  in  this  prevision, 
it  will  readily  be  perceived  that  by  the  time  war 
shall  come  the  Military  Academy  will  have 
graduated  a  sufficient  number  of  officers  to  officer 
not  only  our  regular  army,  which  should  be  in- 
creased to  about  two  hundred  or  two  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  men,  pari  passu  with  the  gradua- 
tion of  officers  from  the  Military  Academy,  but 
also  measurably  to  officer  the  reserve  army;  so 
that  when  war  shall  come  the  army  would  be  sub- 
stantially officered  by  graduates  of  West  Point. 

The  responsibility  of  conducting  the  war  would 
then  rest  upon  the  shoulders  of  the  graduates  of 
the  Military  Academy,  and  the  glory  of  victory 
would  be  theirs. 

Preparation  for  the  next  war  should  be  under- 
taken upon  a  well-developed  plan,  deliberately, 
and  without  flurry  or  emotion.  We,  as  a  people, 
should  look  the  future  calmly  in  the  face.  We 
should  see  clearly  the  reasons  for  preparation  for 
war,  and  comprehend,  with  equal  clearness  and 
calmness  of  mind,  the  steps  to  be  taken  to  prepare 
the  country  for  war. 

I  think  that  war  will  come  from  the  territorial 
and  commercial  ambitions  of  one  or  the  other  of 
the  combinations  of  warring  nations  of  Europe  and 
Asia. 

Should  the  war  end  in  the  defeat  of  Germany  she 
will  be  stripped  of  her  colonies,  and  after  the 
passage  of  a  few  years  of  recuperation  from  the 


West  Point  105 

effects  of  the  war,  she  will  look  about  the  world 
for  colonies  to  replace  those  lost  in  the  war. 

In  South  America  she  has  already  a  thriving 
commercial  colony  under  the  Brazilian  flag.  This 
colony  has  been  fostered  in  ways  essentially 
German,  even  to  the  sending  of  school-books  by  the 
German  Government  to  the  Germans  in  south- 
ern Brazil  for  use  in  their  schools.  Uruguay  and 
Paraguay  adjoin  southern  Brazil,  and  should  this 
region  be  annexed  by  Germany  she  would  be  amply 
compensated  for  the  loss  of  her  African  colonies. 

There  is  but  one  nation  to  stand  across  the 
pathway  of  such  aggression  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many: the  United  States. 

Are  we  prepared  to  say  to  Germany  that  she 
shall  not  annex  southern  Brazil  and  Uruguay  and 
Paraguay? 

If  so,  we  must  be  prepared  for  war  with  Ger- 
many, and  prepared  to  fight  Germany,  without 
allies,  to  a  finish. 

Such  a  war  will  require  not  only  a  large  navy 
but  a  large  army,  because,  should  our  navy  be 
overcome,  Germany  would  proceed  at  once  to  the 
invasion  of  the  United  States  as  the  speediest 
method  of  ending  the  war  by  the  triumph  of  her 
arms.  The  United  States  defeated  in  such  a  war, 
would  mean  not  only  that  German  ambitions  in 
South  America  would  be  completely  gratified,  but 
that  we  should  be  forced  to  pay  a  war  indemnity 
to  Germany  of  many  thousand  million  dollars. 


io6     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Unless  we  are  prepared  to  surrender,  on  chal- 
lenge, the  Philippine  Islands  to  Japan,  we  may 
find  ourselves  some  years  in  the  future  at  war  with 
that  Power.  I  have  said  that  Japan  looks  upon  us 
as  her  locum  tenens  in  the  islands,  but  this  period 
of  peaceful  possession  will  undoubtedly  come  to  an 
end  sometime  within  the  next  ten  or  twelve  years, 
should  we  then  be,  as  we  now  are,  a  weak  military 
and  naval  power. 

I  doubt  very  much  that  Great  Britain  could  be 
induced  by  Japan  to  join  her  in  an  attack  upon  the 
United  States,  even  with  the  possession  of  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  held  before  her  eyes  as  the  prize  of  vic- 
tory, and  consequently  I  disagree  with  those  who 
think  that  we  shall  find  Great  Britain  among  our 
future  enemies.  We  lie  between  three  and  four 
thousand  miles  on  her  flank,  and  England  should 
know  that  a  war  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  can  end  in  but  one  way,  in  the  tri- 
umph of  the  United  States  and  in  the  disintegration 
of  the  British  Empire. 

Because,  however,  I  do  not  think  that  we  shall 
be  exposed  to  the  horrors  of  war  for  eight  or  ten 
years,  is  no  reason  that  we  should  not  prepare  for 
war  now. 

I  think  it  very  fortunate  that  we  may  look 
forward  to  at  least  eight  years  of  peace,  because 
in  that  time  we  may  so  well  and  so  strongly 
prepare  the  country  for  war  that  war  may  not 
then  come. 


West  Point  107 

If  we  should  be  prepared,  nations  with  ambi- 
tions to  gratify  will  then  count  the  cost.  They 
will  set  down  in  the  account  the  possible  gains  and 
the  probable  losses,  and  if  they  think  that  the 
United  States  is  strong  enough  to  defend  herself, 
and  also  to  defend  her  ideas,  they  will  refrain  from 
attacking  her.  If,  however,  when  the  time  comes 
for  the  gratification  of  their  ambitions,  the  United 
States  is  as  weak  a  naval  and  a  military  power  as 
she  is  today,  she  will  be  attacked,  and  the  result 
of  the  war  need  not  be  in  doubt. 

I  would  have  my  country  fully  prepared  for 
war  not  only  because  I  believe  that  fit  preparation 
is  an  assurance  against  war,  but  also  because, 
should  war  come,  that  it  will  be  the  surest  way  to 
victory;  and  victory  should  be  the  only  termina- 
tion of  war  that  the  United  States  should  allow 
herself  to  contemplate. 

In  these  eight  or  ten  years  of  prospective  peace 
which  I  see  before  the  United  States,  we  should 
inaugurate  the  changes  in  the  organization  and 
system  of  the  Military  Academy  which  I  have 
recommended,  and  gradually  increase  the  regular 
army  as  the  Military  Academy  should  be  able  to 
graduate  officers  for  the  command  of  the  new 
troops,  and  after  the  active  army  shall  have  been 
increased  to  the  proposed  strength,  the  creation  of 
the  reserve  army  should  be  undertaken,  as  I  point 
out  in  the  next  chapter,  with  the  end  in  view  that 
we  should  be  ready  to  put  into  the  field,  the  mo- 


io8     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

ment  war  breaks  out,  an  army  of  one  million  men 
officered,  as  far  as  possible,  by  graduates  of  the 
Military  Academy. 

Herein  lies  the  significance  of  the  title  of  this 
book,  West  Point  in  Our  Next  War. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ONLY  WAY  TO  CREATE  AND  TO  MAINTAIN  AN 
ARMY 

THE  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Garrison,  deserves 
the  respect  and  thanks  of  the  country  for 
his  earnest  efforts  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the 
people  the  necessity  for  "reasonable  preparation 
for  war"  on  the  part  of  the  United  States.  And 
in  his  official  report  to  the  President,  to  which  I 
have  already  referred,  he  shows  that  he  knows 
the  situation  of  utter  unreadiness  of  the  country 
for  war  should  war,  unhappily,  be  forced  upon  the 
nation. 

Knowing  so  well  as  he  does  how  utterly  unready 
the  United  States  is  for  war,  it  is  to  be  regretted 
that  he  should  have  allowed  his  judgment  to  be 
warped  to  the  advocacy  of  measures  ineffective 
to  produce  the  result  which  he  sees  so  clearly 
should  be  produced,  the  preparation  of  the  United 
States  to  meet  war  from  whatever  quarter  it  may 
come. 

In  The  Independent,  of  August  1 6,  1915,  Mr. 
Garrison  says : 

109 


no     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

And  at  the  most,  a  comparatively  small  increase  in 
that  permanent  force  (the  regular  army)  is  all  that  is 
necessary  to  enable  it  to  perform  its  all-important 
function — that  of  training  a  citizen  soldiery.  For  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  one  great  lesson  of  all 
our  wars  is  that  they  must  be  carried  to  a  conclusion 
by  citizen  soldiers  and  those  citizens  must  be  trained. 
To  thrust  untrained  citizens  into  the  field  is  nothing 
short  of  death  by  government  order. 

Men  who  have  studied  this  subject  with  care  think 
that  a  well  trained  body  of  four  or  five  hundred 
thousand  citizen  soldiers,  immediately  available, 
together  with  our  permanent  force  in  the  regular  and 
militia  establishments,  will  give  us  reasonable  guaran- 
tees against  hostile  invasion  of  our  territory.  In 
reaching  this  conclusion  due  weight  must  be  given  to 
the  co-operation  of  our  navy  and  our  land  coast  defences. 
The  latter — with  the  reasonable  improvements  neces- 
sary to  keep  up  with  the  progress  of  invention — will 
amply  protect  all  important  harbours,  all  exposed 
centres  of  population  and  industry,  all  terminals  of 
railroads  giving  access  to  the  interior.  The  former 
will  make  it  very  difficult  but  not  impossible  to  land 
on  other  parts  of  the  coast.  But  it  is  fairly  safe  to 
say  that  no  enemy  is  likely  to  attempt  to  land  unless 
our  fleet  should  be  driven  from  the  sea.  Reasonable 
preparation  practically  consists  in  being  ready  to  meet 
this  latter  contingency,  and  to  meet  it  a  force  of  this 
size  is  believed  to  be  necessary. 

There  is  much  to  commend  in  this  language  but 
it  will  not  do  to  trust  to  it  as  a  program  for 


Conscription  in 

national  defence.  There  is  far  too  much  of  the 
non  seguitur  in  the  argument  to  warrant  its  confi- 
dent acceptance. 

What  does  the  Honourable  Secretary  mean  by 
saying, 

a  well  trained  body  of  four  or  five  hundred  thousand 
citizen  soldiers,  immediately  available,  together  with 
our  permanent  force  in  the  regular  and  militia  estab- 
lishments, will  give  us  reasonable  guarantee  against 
hostile  invasion  of  our  territory? 

Does  he  mean  a  volunteer  army  enlisted  and 
maintained  in  time  of  peace,  and  kept  under  arms 
in  time  of  peace,  or  at  least  ready  to  answer  the 
call  to  arms  when  the  nation  shall  be  forced  into 
war?  Or  does  he  mean  by  "a  well  trained  body 
of  four  or  five  hundred  thousand  citizen  soldiers'* 
some  other  kind  of  soldiers,  a  kind  known  possibly 
to  the  esoteric  consciousness  of  the  General  Staff 
but  utterly  unknown  in  the  history  of  our  wars? 

Nor  is  it  possible  to  agree  with  the  Secretary 
that  "at  the  most  a  comparatively  small  increase 
in  that  permanent  force  [the  regular  army]  is  all 
that  is  necessary  to  enable  it  to  perform  its  all- 
important  function — that  of  training  a  citizen 
soldiery." 

Indeed,  I  do  not  think  even  he,  upon  close 
thought  upon  the  subject,  will  be  prepared  to  hold 
that  it  is  the  "all-important  function"  of  the 
permanent  force  to  train  a  citizen  soldiery. 


ii2    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Nor  is  it  quite  clear  exactly  what  the  Secretary 
means  by  the  remark : 

In  reaching  this  conclusion  due  weight  must  be  given 
to  the  co-operation  of  our  navy  and  our  land  coast  de- 
fences. The  latter — with  the  reasonable  improve- 
ments necessary  to  keep  up  with  the  progress  of 
invention — will  amply  protect  all  important  harbours, 
all  exposed  centres  of  population  and  industry,  all 
terminals  of  railroads  giving  access  to  the  interior. 

So  long  as  our  navy  holds  command  of  the  seas 
fronting  our  shores,  invasion  of  the  United  States 
is  impossible  except  across  our  northern  or  Cana- 
dian border,  Great  Britain  then  being  our  enemy, 
or  across  our  southern  or  Mexican  border.  Should 
our  navy,  however,  be  driven  from  the  sea,  the 
invasion  of  our  country  is  one  of  the  simplest  of 
military  problems  in  which  our  land  coast  defences 
would  count  for  little  or  nothing  as  a  defence 
against  such  invasion.  Conceding  that  our  "land 
coast  defences"  are  strong  on  their  sea  fronts, 
they  are  weak  and  open  at  the  rear,  or  practically 
so,  and  need,  in  every  case,  a  mobile  army  for  their 
defence.  There  is  not  the  slightest  necessity  that 
an  invading  army,  whose  fleet  holds  the  sea,  should 
attack  one  of  our  fortified  harbours  to  effect  a 
landing  on  our  coast;  and  once  firmly  established 
on  our  coast,  of  what  earthly  use  would  our  "land 
coast  defences"  be  in  protecting  the  "exposed 
centres  of  population"  and  in  protecting  "all  ter- 


Conscription  113 

minals  of  railroads  giving  access  to  the  interior" 
from  attack  by  the  army  of  the  enemy?  As  to  the 
present  terminals  of  the  railroads  giving  access  to 
the  interior,  they  would  be  useless  to  an  enemy, 
because  he  would  make  the  point  which  he  might 
hold  upon  any  one  of  these  railroads  his  terminal, 
serving  as  such  so  much  of  the  line  of  railroad  to- 
ward the  interior  of  the  country  as  he  might  con- 
trol. But  should  he  need  possession  of  one  of  the 
existing  coast  terminals  of  such  railroad,  being 
once  safely  ashore,  he  would  simply  seize  such 
terminal  by  an  attack  in  the  rear  unless  his  advance 
against  such  port  should  be  defeated  by  our  mobile 
army. 

In  concluding  this  branch  of  the  subject  let  us 
hear  Major-General  Carter  upon  the  subject  of 
our  land  coast  defences.  The  gallant  General 
says  in  his  book,  The  American  Army: 

In  fixing  upon  the  proportions  of  cavalry  to  infantry 
it  should  be  remembered  that  in  any  war  of  magnitude, 
invoking  invasion,  a  considerable  part  of  the  infantry 
would  not  be  embraced  in  the  mobile  army,  but  assigned 
to  the  land  defence  of  seacoast  fortifications. 

Here  we  have  a  confutation  of  the  Honourable 
Secretary's  supposition  of  the  part  which  "our 
land  coast  defences"  would  play  in  protecting 
"all  harbours,  all  exposed  centres  of  population  and 
industry,  all  terminals  of  railroads  giving  access 
to  the  interior." 


ii4     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

According  to  General  Carter  these  seacoast 
fortifications,  or  our  "land  coast  defences"  as 
the  Secretary  calls  them,  will  need  the  protection 
of  infantry  to  defend  them  from  land  attack  by 
an  invading  enemy,  instead  of  being  able,  as  the 
Secretary  says,  to  extend  protection  to  "all  ex- 
posed centres  of  population  and  industry  and  all 
terminals  of  railroads  giving  access  to  the  interior." 

While  agreeing  with  General  Carter  as  to  the 
vulnerability  of  our  seacoast  fortifications  to  land 
attack,  I  do  not  agree  with  him,  on  military  grounds, 
that  "a  considerable  part  of  the  infantry  would 
not  be  embraced  in  the  mobile  army,  but  assigned 
to  the  land  defence  of  the  seacoast  fortifications.11 

If  war  has  demonstrated  anything,  it  has  de- 
monstrated the  folly  of  shutting  up  troops  behind 
stationary  fortifications  with  the  object  of  holding 
such  fortified  positions  against  attack  by  a  superior 
mobile  enemy,  and  the  converse  of  this  proposition 
may  be  taken  as  having  been  also  demonstrated  by 
war,  that  the  best  possible  means  of  defence  of 
strategic  positions  is  a  mobile  army,  and  conse- 
quently, the  best  possible  means  of  defending  our 
"land  coast  defences"  from  land  attack  is  a  mobile 
army  acting  against  the  enemy. 

I  have  therefore  always  held  that  an  open  fron- 
tier, protected  by  a  mobile  army  of  sufficient  size, 
is  a  safer  frontier  than  one  defended  by  great  per- 
manent fortifications  requiring  large  bodies  of 
troops  for  their  defence,  and  I  make  this  statement 


Conscription  115 

notwithstanding  the  heavily  fortified  eastern  fron- 
^  tier  of  France,  because  it  is  not  these  fortifications 
which  are  holding  in  check  the  German  army  but 
the  mobile  army  of  France  about,  and  even  beyond 
them,  in  close  touch  with  the  Germans. 

But  not  to  be  hypercritical,  what  the  Honour- 
able Secretary  probably  means  is  that  he  advocates 
the  creation,  in  time  of  peace,  of  a  volunteer  army 
of  between  four  hundred  thousand  and  five  hun- 
dred thousand  men  in  addition  to  the  regular 
army  and  the  National  Guard,  which  army  should 
be  thoroughly  trained  so  that  the  men  might  be 
considered  to  be  soldiers;  and  the  maintenance 
of  this  volunteer  army  of  between  four  hundred 
thousand  and  five  hundred  thousand  men  through- 
out the  long  years  of  peace,  ready  to  be  called 
to  the  colours  the  moment  war  should  break  out. 

This  is  probably  the  conception  of  the  General 
Staff;  it  is  certainly  the  conception  of  Major- 
General  Carter,  and  is  the  argument  of  his  recent 
book  The  American  Army,  which  I  have  read  with 
interest  and  pleasure.  But  it  is  the  idea  of  vision- 
aries, of  those  who  have  lived  their  lives  in  the 
side  eddies  of  life,  far  from  the  sweeping  currents 
of  activity  and  endeavour  in  which  civilians  live 
and  struggle,  and  in  which  they  often  go  down, 
but  in  which  they  are  forced,  by  circumstances, 
to  look  at  things  as  they  are,  not  as  they  would 
have  them  to  be. 

It  is  singular  that  I,  a  former  officer  of  volun- 


n6     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

teers,  should  say  that  this  idea  of  creating  and 
maintaining,  in  time  of  peace,  a  volunteer  army  of 
between  four  hundred  thousand  and  five  hundred 
thousand  men  is  impossible  of  realization,  whereas 
General  Carter,  an  officer  of  the  regular  army, 
maintains  not  only  that  it  is  possible,  but  presents 
the  suggestion  as  the  very  heart  of  his  plan  for 
creating  and  maintaining  a  defensive  force  in  the 
United  States,  in  time  of  peace,  equipped  and 
ready  for  war  whenever  war  shall  break  out. 

It  would  be  quite  as  easy  to  establish  and  main- 
tain a  rose  garden  at  the  North  Pole  as  to  create 
and  maintain  such  a  volunteer  army  in  time  of 
peace. 

The  failure  of  the  recruiting  service  of  the  Regular 
Army  in  time  of  peace  to  do  much  more  than  sup- 
ply the  army  with  recruits  to  take  the  places  of 
the  men  who  are  discharged  from  the  service,  or 
who  desert,  should  not  only  be  a  warning  to  the 
officers  of  the  regular  army  to  refrain  from  dreams 
as  to  the  creation  of  paper  armies  in  peace  with 
which  to  defend  the  country  in  war,  but  also 
should  carry  proof  to  so  clear  and  trained  an 
intellect  as  that  of  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the 
utter  impossibility,  either  of  creating  and  main- 
taining in  time  of  peace  a  volunteer  army  of 
between  four  hundred  thousand  and  five  hundred 
thousand  men,  or  of  instructing  such  a  force  of  men 
under  the  conditions  of  organization  of  a  volunteer 
army,  so  that  they  should  become  well  trained 


Conscription  117 

soldiers  ready  for  the  field  on  the  breaking  out  of 
war. 

The  element  of  training  must  be  considered  in 
the  discussion  of  volunteer  armies.  One  of  the 
chief  lessons  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  is  that 
it  takes  a  year  to  create  a  dependable  army.  I 
do  not  mean  to  say  that  men  gathered  together 
in  regiments  and  brigades  almost  directly  from 
their  homes  have  not  made  a  gallant  fight  when 
thrust  into  battle.  But  notwithstanding  their 
gallantry  and  their  success  they  were  not  soldiers : 
they  had  not  developed  that  coherency  of  organi- 
zation; that  calmness  under  relentless  fire;  that 
readiness  to  obey  intelligently  any  order  given  to 
them;  in  a  word,  they  had  not  developed  morale, 
which  is  the  soul  of  soldiers,  and  which  makes  them 
almost  as  dangerous  in  defeat  as  in  victory. 

Should  we  be  called  upon  to  resist  invasion  we 
shall  not  meet  volunteers  of  the  same  amount  of 
training  as  our  own  volunteer  troops,  but  the 
veteran  troops  of  a  great  military  power:  soldiers, 
many  of  whom  had  been  tried  by  battle,  led  by 
officers  who  had  received  their  education  in  the 
school  of  actual  war.  Facing  such  an  enemy, 
patriotism,  no  doubt,  will  animate  our  soldiers, 
but  we  should  not  forget  that  a  foreign  flag  has 
once  already  flown  over  the  capital  of  our  country 
after  the  defeat  of  our  army  of  "citizen  soldiers," 
who  could  not  stand  the  shock  of  the  enemy's 
attack,  and  who  left  the  field  to  be  maintained  by 


ii8     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

the  meagre  force  of  sailors  and  marines  under  the 
command  of  the  gallant  Barney. 

If  our  enemy,  should  it  unhappily  occur  that 
we  should  have  an  enemy,  will  graciously  give  us 
a  year  after  he  declares  war  upon  us  in  which  to 
prepare  for  the  conflict,  and  in  which  period  of 
time  to  create  and  discipline  our  volunteer  army, 
before  he  opens  his  attack,  I  should  agree  with  the 
Honourable  Secretary  of  War  that  we  might  rely 
upon  a  volunteer  army  for  our  defence.  But 
outside  of  opera  bouffe,  no  such  gracious  enemy 
could  be  found  within  the  broad  confines  of  the 
world. 

Time  is  the  essence  of  opportunity  in  war,  and 
the  opportunity  to  strike  as  soon  after  the  declara- 
tion of  war  as  possible  is  seized  upon  by  all  sensible 
Powers.  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  even 
before  the  declaration  of  war  against  Russia  the 
Japanese  attacked  and  captured  several  Russian 
men-of-war. 

As  to  the  value  of  time  in  war  the  present  conflict 
in  Europe  is  eloquent. 

The  war  opened  August  I,  1914,  by  the  declara- 
tion of  war  by  Germany  against  Russia,  Austria 
having  declared  war  against  Serbia  on  July  28, 
three  days  earlier.  On  August  2d  Germany  vio- 
lated the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.  On  August 
3d  she  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  on 
August  4th  the  German  troops  attempted  to  take 
Liege  by  storm. 


Conscription  119 

England  declared  herself  at  war  with  Germany 
from  the  night  of  August  4th. 

August  8th  German  troops  penetrated  between 
some  of  the  encircling  forts,  taking  possession  of 
the  city  of  Liege;  and  bringing  up  their  heaviest 
artillery,  they  concentrated  their  fire  upon  the 
forts  which  still  held  out,  crumbling  their  steel 
and  concrete  turrets  and  casemates  into  dust  and 
distorted  masses  of  iron.  Then  pouring  vast 
masses  of  troops  into  Belgium,  the  Germans 
brushed  aside  the  gallant  little  Belgian  army  of 
about  400,000  men,  taking  possession  of  Brussels 
on  August  20th,  and  receiving  the  surrender  of  the 
army  of  Namur  on  August  22d,  after  destroying 
its  fortifications  by  concentrated  artillery  fire; 
Huy,  the  third  defensive  fortification  on  the  line 
of  the  Meuse,  having  previously  surrendered. 
Twenty  days  after  the  Germans  appeared  before 
Liege  the  north-eastern  frontier  of  France  was 
open  to  them. 

Tardy  England,  clinging  to  the  system  of  volun- 
tary enlistment  in  raising  armies,  sent  her  small 
regular  army  to  the  continent  in  August,  1914, 
and  set  to  work  to  raise  a  great  volunteer  army, 
Lord  Kitchener  publicly  stating  that  the  war 
would  not  begin  until  May,  1915,  when  he  hoped 
to  put  his  volunteers,  trained  and  disciplined 
meanwhile,  into  the  field.  May  has  come  and 
gone,  and  we  are  now,  as  I  write  these  lines,  in  the 
middle  of  September,  1915,  over  one  year  from 


120     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

the  date  of  England's  declaration  of  war,  and  her 
new  army,  apparently,  is  scarcely  yet  ready  to 
join  her  allies  on  the  continent;  or,  according  to 
some  accounts,  is  just  now  being  sent  across  the 
Channel.  The  army  which  England  sent  to  France 
in  August  and  September,  1914,  has  practically 
ceased  to  exist.  The  English  army  in  France  has 
been  re-enforced  by  troops  withdrawn  from  garri- 
sons and  by  Indian  troops,  and  by  Colonial  con- 
tingents from  Canada  and  from  the  Antipodes. 

On  the  27th  of  July,  1915,  the  Premier,  Mr. 
Asquith,  announced  to  Parliament  that  the  total 
losses  of  the  English  army  to  date  were  321,889 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 

A  telegram  from  London  dated  September  14, 
1915,  gives  the  losses  of  the  British  army  up  to 
August  21,  1915,  as  381,983  men.  The  dispatch 
is  as  follows : 

London,  Sept.  14. — Official  announcement  was 
made  today  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  the  total 
of  British  war  casualties  up  to  August  21  was  381,983 
officers  and  men  killed,  wounded,  or  missing. 

Detailed  figures  of  the  casualties  are  announced 
as  follows: 

Killed  and  died  of  wounds:  Officers,  4965;  other 
ranks,  70,992. 

Wounded:     Officers,  9973;  other  ranks,  241,086. 

Missing:  Officers,  1501;  other  ranks,  53,466. 

These  figures  refer  to  the  army  alone. 

The  last  previous  statement  of  the  total  of  British 


Conscription  121 

casualties  was  made  by  Premier  Asquith  on  June  9. 
It  gave  a  total  of  258,069  up  to  May  31.  The  losses 
from  that  time'  up  to  August  21  are  therefore  shown 
to  have  been  123,914,  a  daily  average  of  about  1500. 
In  the  two  months  before  the  end  of  May,  the  period 
covered  in  the  preceding  announcement,  the  losses 
averaged  roughly  about  2000  a  day. 

In  other  words,  the  British  army  has  lost  in 
killed  and  wounded  up  to  August  21,  1915,  almost 
the  full  number  of  officers  and  men  deemed  by 
the  Honourable  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  presum- 
ably by  the  General  Staff,  to  be  a  sufficient  force 
to  assure  the  United  States  a  "reasonable  guaran- 
tee" of  safety  from  war  and  invasion!  And  this 
loss  is  but  the  beginning  of  the  toll  of  death  which 
the  war  will  demand  from  England  before  it  comes 
to  an  end. 

I  have  made  this  reference  to  England  because 
she  still  holds  to  the  antiquated  system  of  raising 
and  maintaining  an  army  by  voluntary  enlistment. 
We  have  seen  how  inadequate  it  has  proved  in 
her  case,  and  the  inference  is  a  natural  one  that 
had  it  not  been  for  the  protection  of  her  allies  and 
the  supposed  superiority  of  her  fleet,  she  would 
have  been  invaded  by  Germany,  with  all  that 
that  implies. 

It  may  be  considered  to  be  one  of  the  sources  of 
delight  of  the  War  Department  to  draw  up  plans 
for  paper  armies.  Such  plans  are  always  interest- 


122     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

ing,  and  are  worked  out  in  a  thoroughly  theoretic 
fashion,  but  they  lack  the  possibility  of  success 
because  they  start  with  a  wrong  premise. 

They  assume  that  in  time  of  peace  there  are 
four,  five,  or  six  hundred  thousand  men  ready  to 
enlist  at  a  moment's  notice  in  a  volunteer  army, 
to  be  commanded  by  regular  officers,  for  a  term 
of  service  ranging  from  two  to  five  years.  These 
plans  usually  call  for  the  organization  of  the  volun- 
teer army  on  the  battalion  system,  three  battalions 
with  the  colours,  and  a  skeleton  battalion,  to 
serve  as  the  depot  battalion,  in  which  recruits 
should  be  continuously  enlisted  and  prepared  for 
service,  and  when  needed,  be  transferred  to  the 
active  battalions  to  make  good  the  wear  and  tear 
of  the  service. 

Major-General  Carter's  plan  is  substantially 
to  territorialize  both  the  regular  army  and  the 
suggested  volunteer  army,  the  regiments  of  each 
army  to  maintain  depots  within  the  limits  of  their 
territorial  divisions,  which  depots  shall  become 
the  regimental  homes  of  the  regiments.  It  is  the 
theory  of  his  plan  that  at  these  depots  recruits 
shall  constantly  present  themselves,  in  time  of 
peace  as  well  as  in  time  of  war,  for  enlistment  and 
instruction,  and  that  when  so  enlisted  they  shall 
constitute  a  skeleton,  or  recruiting  company  or 
battalion,  from  which  source  the  troops  with  the 
colours  shall  be  receiving  a  constant  stream  of 
recruits,  well  drilled  and  ready  to  take  their  places 


Conscription  123 

in  the  ranks  of  the  active  or  field  battalions  of  the 
regiment.  Or  should  the  depot  company  or  bat- 
talion prove  to  have  been  very  successful  in  secur- 
ing and  drilling  recruits,  that  it  should  exchange 
places  with  one  of  the  service  battalions,  which  in 
turn  should  become  the  depot  battalion. 

The  territorial  divisions  of  General  Carter's 
proposed  volunteer  army  are  to  conform  to  the 
boundaries  of  the  Congressional  districts  in  each 
State,  each  Congressional  district  to  furnish  one 
regiment  to  the  volunteer  army. 

To  state  this  plan  in  General  Carter's  own  words 
the  following  extract  is  taken  from  his  book  The 
American  Army. 

With  the  reorganization  of  the  regular  regiments 
provided  for,  we  may  then  consider  the  greater  army 
of  federal  volunteers.  There  are  435  Congressional 
districts,  to  each  of  which  it  is  proposed  to  assign  one 
ten-company  infantry  regiment  of  federal  volunteers, 
comprising  nine  companies  of  150  men  each,  which, 
with  the  machine-gun  platoon,  regimental  detachment, 
and  depot  company,  will  aggregate  about  1500  men. 
This  would  give  theoretically  a  body  of  652,500  volunteer 
infantry  enlisted  in  peace,  with  an  enlistment  contract, 
providing  for  two  years1  service  in  peace,  and,  in  the 
event  of  war,  its  automatic  extension  for  three  years 
or  during  the  war,  if  less  than  three  years,  and  be  it 
understood,  this  is  not  a  standing  army,  for  it  is  not  con- 
templated  to  withdraw  the  federal  volunteers  from  their 
customary  vocations  any  more  than  the  organized  militia 


124     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

is-  now  withdrawn  but  to  systematize  their  training  and 
provide  officers  of  approved  merit  to  lead  them  in  active 
service. 

I  object  to  General  Carter's  plan  broadly  on 
the  ground  that  it  is  visionary  in  the  extreme  and 
utterly  impracticable  of  successful  accomplish- 
ment; and  I  object  specifically  to  so  much  of  his 
plan  as  proposes  the  territorialization  of  the  regular 
army  and  of  the  volunteer  peace  army  on  the 
ground  of  public  policy;  and  also  I  object  to  the 
name  he  has  invented,  "  Federal  Volunteers,"  for 
the  volunteer  peace  army  which  he  proposes  shall 
be  created. 

The  War  of  the  Rebellion  was  fought  to  a  finish 
on  one  principal  issue — viz.,  Is  the  United  States 
a  nation  or  a  confederacy  ?  And  the  result  of  the 
war  established  the  fact  that  the  United  States  is  a 
nation. 

Why  then  abandon  the  term  "National"  for 
"Federal"  in  reference  to  the  proposed  Peace 
Army  of  Volunteers? 

Nothing  should  be  done,  even  by  choice  of 
words,  to  cast  a  shadow  of  doubt  upon  the  fact 
that  the  United  States  is  a  nation  indivisible  and 
indissoluble  except  by  a  successful  rebellion. 

The  great  war  in  this  country  between  1861- 
1865  was  a  rebellion  undertaken  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  nation.  Had  it  been  successful  it 
would  have  become  a  revolution,  and  would  so  be 


Conscription  125 

regarded  in  history.  It  failed,  and  it  was,  and  is 
in  history,  a  rebellion.  This  historical  statement 
is  necessary  to  the  further  objection  to  General 
Carter's  plan  for  the  territorialization  of  the  regu- 
lar, and  the  proposed  volunteer  peace  army,  on 
the  ground  of  public  policy. 

I  regard  this  plan  of  territorializing  the  army, 
regular  and  volunteer,  as  opposed  to  public  policy 
because  it  proposes  the  sectionalization  of  the 
army,  and  the  creation  of  a  Massachusetts  Army, 
a  South  Carolina  Army,  a  New  York  Army,  a 
Mississippi  Army,  an  Ohio  Army,  instead  of  an 
Army  of  the  United  States. 

In  a  word,  this  plan  proposes  the  creation  of  a 
military  force  with  local  instead  of  national  senti- 
ments and  associations.  Such  an  army,  drawing 
its  forces  directly  and  by  distinct  organization 
from  the  Congressional  districts  into  which  the 
several  States  are  organized,  would  carry  local 
prejudices  and  local  ambitions  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States  where  they  do  not  belong.  Such 
local  and  sectional  interests  and  sentiments  might 
lead  to  disagreement  among  the  constituent  ele- 
ments of  the  army,  which  in  turn  might  lead  to 
disorganization  under  the  influence  of  demagogues 
and  evil-wishers  of  the  United  States,  should  any 
such  plot  hereafter  the  destruction  of  the  nation 
by  force  of  arms. 

Fancy  the  influence  of  such  a  system  of  terri- 
torialization upon  the  army  in  1861.  Not  only 


126     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

would  there  have  been,  as  there  was,  a  secession 
of  officers  from  the  army,  but  the  army  itself 
would  have  been  divided  by  regiments  and  batter- 
ies into  loyal  and  disloyal  sections ;  whereas  under 
the  national  system  of  recruitment  of  the  army 
in  1861  the  disloyalty  was  personal  and  individual, 
being  confined  to  the  officers  almost  exclusively, 
whereas  the  rank  and  file  of  the  army  were  loyal 
to  the  national  colours. 

This  objection  on  the  ground  of  public  policy 
to  General  Carter's  plan  of  territorialization  should 
be  sufficient  to  condemn  it.  But  there  is  even 
another  and  practical  objection  to  it  to  be  found 
in  the  habit  of  gerrymandering  Congressional 
districts  into  purely  political  districts,  which  may 
be  relied  upon  to  return  representatives  to  Con- 
gress in  defiance  of  general  public  sentiment,  by 
the  grouping  of  counties  or  parts  of  counties  into 
Congressional  districts  politically  true  to  the 
party  in  power  in  the  State.  It  is  conceivable 
that  either  the  territorial  home  or  depot  of  regi- 
ments of  the  army  would  have  to  be  movable, 
almost  on  wheels,  so  as  "to  go  with  their  Congres- 
sional districts,"  or  else  that  some  districts  would 
be  found  to  be  without  a  regiment  or  a  regimental 
depot,  whereas  some  other  districts  would  be 
found  to  have  the  depots  of  several  regiments 
within  their  borders. 

This  plan  of  raising  in  peace  a  great  volunteer 
army  of  652,500  men,  and  of  holding  together 


Conscription  127 

such  a  volunteer  army  throughout  years  of  peace, 
I  consider  to  be  absolutely  impossible  of  accom- 
plishment because  it  is  based  upon  a  false  pre- 
mise: upon  the  false  premise  that  there  are  652,500 
men  in  the  country  ready  to  enlist  in  the  army, 
regular  or  volunteer,  in  time  of  peace. 

I  think  the  history  of  the  country  demonstrates, 
and  the  labour  and  scant  success  in  recruiting  the 
present  regular  army  especially  demonstrates, 
that  only  in  times  of  national  crisis  can  citizens 
be  relied  upon  to  volunteer  for  service  in  the  army 
with  any  degree  of  freedom.  Their  patriotism 
and  love  of  country  must  be  appealed  to,  and  they 
must  be  made  to  see  that  their  services  are  neces- 
sary to  the  protection  of  the  life  of  the  nation. 
And  the  method  of  raising  volunteer  armies  is  also 
opposed  to  the  success  of  General  Carter's  plan, 
because  the  history  of  volunteer  enlistment  de- 
monstrates that  the  young  men  of  communities 
follow  the  lead  of  those  to  whom  they  have  been 
accustomed  to  look  for  advice  and  counsel  in  the 
varying  phases  of  life.  These  leading  men  of 
communities  constitute  the  real  volunteer  recruit- 
ing agents  for  the  army,  and  they  expect  to  receive 
and  usually  do  receive  the  highest  rank  in  the 
volunteer  companies  and  regiments  which  they 
raise.  It  is  no  part  of  the  argument  to  say  that 
they  are  not  fitted  for  these  positions  of  rank  which 
come  to  them  as  the  result  of  their  successful 
recruiting  endeavours.  Nor  do  I  contend  that 


128     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

they  are  fitted  for  the  commands  that  are  given 
to  them.  As  a  matter  of  argument  I  quite  agree 
with  General  Carter  when  he  says : 

It  is  recognized  by  all  military  men  that  the  creation 
of  any  force  worthy  of  the  name  of  army  demands 
trained  officers. 

And  further: 

As  the  Federal  volunteer  regiments  are  organized 
the  number  of  field  officers  and  captains  and  non- 
commissioned staff  officers  of  the  corresponding 
branches  of  the  Regular  Service  should  be  increased  in 
order  to  supply  the  skeleton  personnel  of  regulars 
necessary  with  each  volunteer  regiment, 

if  it  be  granted  that  the  superior  officers  of  volun- 
teers are  to  be  drawn  from  the  regular  army. 

But  as  a  practical  proposition,  however,  the 
gallant  General's  suggestion  of  officering  the  peace 
volunteers  with  officers  of  the  regular  army,  if 
attempted  to  be  carried  out,  would  entirely  defeat 
the  plan  of  raising  in  time  of  peace  a  large  volun- 
teer army.  These  colonels,  lieutenant-colonels, 
majors,  and  captains,  to  be  drawn  from  the  regular 
army,  whom  it  is  proposed  to  place  at  the  head 
of  the  volunteers,  will  have  no  relationship  with 
the  people  from  among  whom  it  is  proposed  that 
the  volunteer  regiments  shall  be  recruited,  and  as 
recruiting  officers  they  would  prove  dismal  failures. 


Conscription  129 

The  argument  is  often  made  by  officers  of  the 
army  against  the  maintenance  of  the  separate 
military  posts  of  no  strategic  value  which  are  still 
occupied  by  the  army  throughout  the  country, 
on  the  ground  that  they  greatly  increase  the  ex- 
pense of  the  army.  Secretaries  of  war  have 
become  eloquent  in  denouncing  the  maintenance 
of  such  detached  posts  at  the  instance  of  members 
of  Congress  in  the  interest  of  their  constituents. 
But  how,  after  such  statements,  would  it  be  pos- 
sible for  a  secretary  of  war  to  face  Congress  and 
demand  the  creation  of  435  additional  independent 
posts  or  regimental  depots,  to  accommodate  the 
volunteer  army  proposed  by  General  Carter, 
together  with  the  necessary  number  of  separate 
posts  or  depots  for  the  accommodation  of  the 
regiments  of  the  regular  army  under  the  Carter 
plan? 

The  expense  of  these  regimental  depots  with 
their  grounds,  their  quarters  for  the  regimental 
and  company  officers  necessarily  stationed  with 
the  depot  companies  or  battalions,  their  barracks 
for  the  men,  etc.,  would  puff  out  the  army  budget 
to  such  Falstaffian  proportions  that  it  would  re- 
quire all  the  good  nature  of  Prince  Hal  to  make 
the  proposition  acceptable  to  the  Congress. 

I  believe  that  General  Carter's  plan,  the  plan 
of  the  War  Department  as  indicated  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  or  any  plan  from  any  other  source 
which  calls  for  the  creation  of  a  great  volunteer 

9 


i3<>~    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

army  in  peace  to  be  illogical,  impracticable,  wrong 
in  theory,  and  impossible  of  accomplishment.  In 
time  of  peace  utterly  impossible  of  accomplish- 
ment, and  in  time  of  war  utterly  impracticable 
so  far  as  the  creation  of  a  dependable  army  is  con- 
cerned, for  want  of  time  in  which  to  convert  the 
volunteers  into  soldiers,  with  which  to  meet  the 
armies  of  any  one  of  the  great  Powers  landed  on 
our  coasts  within  a  month  or  two  after  the  decla- 
ration of  war. 

That  is  the  condition  of  war  which  we  must  face: 
The  landing  of  an  enemy  on  our  coast  within  one 
or  two  months  after  the  declaration  of  war.  Of 
course  if  our  navy  can  hold  the  seas  and  defeat 
the  navy  of  our  enemy,  and  that  enemy  is  not 
Great  Britain,  our  country  will  be  spared  the 
danger  of  invasion.  But  with  the  vast  stretches 
of  coasts  to  observe  and  protect ;  with  the  demand 
upon  our  navy  that  it  shall  hold  control  of  not 
only  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the 
Caribbean  Sea,  but  also  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  to 
guarantee  the  possession  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
and  of  the  Northern  Pacific  to  cover  Alaska ;  with 
all  these  demands  upon  our  fleet,  how  is  it  to  be 
expected,  unless  our  navy  shall  be  so  vastly  in- 
creased in  strength  as  to  make  it  superior  on  the 
eastern  and  on  the  western  oceans  to  the  navies 
of  our  probable  enemies,  that  the  navy  can  defeat 
the  fleets  of  our  enemies?  How  can  it  be  ex- 
pected that  our  navy  anyway  near  its  present 


Conscription  131 

strength  can  hold  command  of  the  Atlantic  and 
the  Pacific  Oceans,  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the 
Caribbean  Sea? 

If  the  navy  loses  control  of  those  seas  and  oceans, 
the  invasion  of  our  country  will  follow  as  surely 
as  day  follows  night. 

Convinced  as  I  am  upon  this  subject,  believing 
with  the  whole  strength  of  my  mind  that  the  plan 
which  I  submit  is  the  only  plan  for  the  creation 
and  the  maintenance  of  an  army  which  shall  be 
of  immediate  use  on  the  breaking  out  of  war,  I 
submit  it  to  my  countrymen  with  the  prayer  that 
they  may  give  it  due  consideration. 

The  proper  valuation  of  time  is  the  essential  con- 
dition of  success  in  modern  war.  The  proper  esti- 
mation of  the  value  of  time  in  warfare  is  one  of 
the  secrets  of  the  successes  of  Napoleon.  The 
campaign  of  Ulm  beautifully  illustrates  this  proper 
valuation  of  time  in  military  movements. 

But  the  valuation  of  time  finds  expression  in 
respect  to  modern  wars,  before  war  begins,  through 
the  perfection  of  preparation  for  war;  and  when 
war  is  declared,  in  the  prompt  mobilization  of 
armies,  and  the  rapid  advance  upon  the  frontier, 
or  upon  the  selected  objective  of  the  predetermined 
plan  of  operations  by  the  army  first  ready  for 
action. 

In  the  war  of  1870  France  was  taken  unaware 
and  consequently  was  unready.  But  Germany, 
foreseeing  the  war,  had  been  preparing  for  its 


132     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

outbreak  for  years,  and  was  ready  for  mobiliza- 
tion the  moment  war  should  be  declared.  The 
war  of  1870  between  France  and  Germany  we  now 
see  to  have  been  inevitable.  The  succession  to 
the  Spanish  crown  was  merely  the  provocative 
of  the  war,  as  the  Serbian  attack  upon  the  Austrian 
Archduke  was  merely  the  provocative  of  the  pre- 
sent war  in  Europe.  Had  these  incidents  been 
lacking,  some  other  incidents,  equally  unimportant, 
would  have  arisen,  or  have  been  created,  to  sus- 
tain the  declaration  of  war. 

The  war  of  1870  was  practically  settled  in  the 
first  six  weeks  of  the  war. 

The  present  war  in  Europe  presents  many  of 
the  same  characteristics.  Whether  the  Allies 
will  be  able  to  overcome  the  advantages  already 
gained  by  Germany  is  something  which  the  future 
can  alone  decide.  But  up  to  the  present  moment 
the  success  of  the  war  has  been  with  the  Germans, 
owing  almost  entirely  to  their  appreciation  of  the 
value  of  time  in  war.  They  prepared  for  the  war 
thoroughly,  patiently,  and  most  intelligently. 
Russia  was  approximately  ready,  but  not  nearly 
so  ready  for  war  as  Germany.  France  was  par- 
tially prepared  for  war — but  England  was  wholly 
unprepared  for  war  except  on  the  side  of  her  diplo- 
macy. But  England  usually  wars  through  her 
diplomacy,  which  gains  her  allies  to  do  the  most 
of  the  early  righting. 

Not  only  is  time  an  essential  condition  of  success 


Conscription  133 

in  modern  war,  but  it  is  the  essential  condition  of 
success  in  preparation  for  war.     It  takes  years  of 
•    work  and  the  utmost  care  and  thought  adequately 
to  prepare  a  nation  for  war. 

I  To  be  prepared  for  war  is  to  be  ready  for  war 
(the  moment  war  breaks  out;  not  two  months,  or 
teix  months,  or  a  year  after  war  breaks  out. 

Judged  by  this  standard  the  United  States  is 
utterly  unprepared  for  war.  Its  army  "is  essen- 
tially a  peace  army."  Nor  will  any  of  the  plans 
of  the  War  Department  of  which  we  have  any 
knowledge,  nor  any  of  the  plans  submitted  un- 
officially by  officers  of  the  army,  put  the  United 
States  into  a  condition  of  preparation  for  war. 

The  chief  reason  that  the  plans  of  the  War 
Department,  and  of  the  officers  of  the  army  who 
have  outlined  plans  of  preparation  for  war,  will 
not  put  the  nation  into  a  condition  of  preparation 
for  war  is,  that  in  all  of  these  plans  the  chief 
dependence  is  placed  on  a  volunteer  army  to  be 
created  either  in  time  of  peace,  which  is  utterly 
impracticable,  or  after  war  has  broken  out,  which 
is  utterly  absurd. 

As  I  have  said  before,  if  our  enemy  will  gra- 
ciously grant  us  a  year  from  the  date  of  the  decla- 
S  ration  of  war  in  which  to  prepare  our  army  for 
war,  we  can,  in  that  period  of  time,  create  a  vol- 
unteer army  which  can  be  depended  on. 

But  all  modern  wars  open  with  a  burst  of  activ- 
ity by  one  or  the  other  of  the  combatants,  usually 


134     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

on  the  part  of  both  of  the  combatants,  success 
going  to  the  army  which  is  readiest  to  assume  the 
offensive. 

The  unreadiness  of  the  British  army,  and  the 
dependence  by  Great  Britain  on  volunteers,  should 
be  a  warning  to  us.  A  year  has  rolled  round  since 
the  present  war  broke  out  and  the  British  army 
is  not  yet  ready  for  the  field.  Nor,  judging  from 
the  reports  which  are  allowed  to  reach  us,  has  the 
British  army  reached  the  numbers  deemed  to  be 
necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  her  position  as  a 
great  Power  in  war. 

What  then  should  we  do  to  prepare  our  country 
to  meet  the  eventualities  of  war? 

Let  us  bravely  face  the  truth  that  the  time  has 
passed  for  the  employment  of  volunteers  in  war. 
Let  us  put  aside  frankly  all  thought  of  raising  a 
volunteer  army  either  in  peace  or  war,  and  place 
our  reliance  upon  a  standing  army  to  be  divided 
between  an  active  army  and  a  reserve  army; 
both  constituting  the  regular  army  of  the  United 
States. 

Let  us  give  up  the  present  fruitless  method  of 
recruitment  of  the  regular  army,  and  accept  the 
necessary  and  the  inevitable  policy  of  conscription, 
which  rests  upon  the  principle  of  the  natural 
obligation  of  every  citizen  to  serve  his  coun- 
try in  peace  or  in  war,  for  the  creation  and 
the  maintenance  of  our  active  and  our  reserve 
armies. 


Conscription  '  135 

Conscription  is  the  most  democratic,  the  fairest, 
the  most  equal,  and  the  only  logical  method  of  raising 
and  maintaining  modern  armies.  Our  experience, 
and  the  experience  of  England,  with  the  voluntary 
system  of  recruitment  of  armies  bears  out  this 
statement  conclusively. 

It  is  not  only  the  best  way  of  maintaining  an 
army  in  time  of  war,  through  a  steady  stream  of 
recruits  passing  from  the  great  central  depots  to 
the  colours,  but  it  is  the  only,  absolutely  the  only, 
way  to  create  and  to  maintain  an  army  in  time  of 
peace,  ready  to  take  the  field  the  moment  war  shall 
break  out. 

Of  course,  in  saying  that  it  is  the  only  way  of 
raising  and  maintaining  an  army  in  time  of  peace, 
ready  to  take  the  field  when  war  shall  break  out, 
I  do  not  refer  to  our  present  army,  because  in  no 
large,  or  true,  or  modern  war  sense  have  we  an 
army.  We  have  a  group  of  highly  honourable 
gentlemen  at  the  head  of  a  handful  of  troops,  but 
when  it  is  recalled  that  the  losses  of  the  British 
army  in  the  present  war  up  to  August  21,  1915, 
have  been  381,983  officers  and  men  as  stated  offi- 
cially in  the  House  of  Commons  on  September  14, 
191 5,  or  considerably  over  twelve  times  the  strength 
of  the  mobile  army  of  the  United  States  within 
the  continental  area  of  the  United  States,  it  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  not  only  have  we  not 
even  an  army  suited  to  the  requirements  of  peace, 
but  judged  by  the  standards  of  modern  war,  we 


136     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

are  absolutely  without  an  army,  an  offensive  or 
defensive  army,  in  the  true  war  sense  of  the 
term. 

I  have  spoken  only  of  the  losses  of  the  British 
army  because  the  British  Government,  at  this 
moment,  still  holds  to  the  system  of  creating  and 
maintaining  an  army  by  voluntary  enlistment. 
Should  the  relationship  of  our  army  to  the  losses 
in  this  war  sustained  by  the  armies  of  the  great 
continental  Powers  be  considered,  the  absurdity 
of  our  army  as  a  fighting  force  would  be  even  more 
apparent.  In  battles  of  the  present  war  which 
have  scarcely  commanded  a  larger  space  than  a 
few  headlines  and  a  few  lines  of  text  in  the  press, 
more  men  have  been  killed  and  wounded  and 
taken  prisoners  than  constitute  our  whole  mobile 
army  within  the  continental  area  of  the  United 
States. 

Comparison  presupposes  a  condition  of  measur- 
able equality,  or  a  condition  at  least  approaching 
equality.  But  there  is  no  basis  of  equality  be- 
tween the  army  of  the  United  States  and  the 
armies  of  the  great  continental  Powers  engaged 
in  the  present  war,  and  consequently  a  comparison 
of  the  strength  of  the  mobile  army  of  the  United 
States  with  the  losses  sustained  by  these  great 
armies  is  an  impossibility.  A  contrast  is  all  that 
may  be  allowed  us. 

Conscription  is  the  only  method  of  creating  and 
maintaining  an  army  at  all  times  ready  for  war, 


Conscription  137 

because  it  is  the  only  method  which  recognizes  the 
element  of  time. 

The  argument  in  favour  of  conscription  rests 
upon  prevision,  upon  the  acknowledgment  by  the 
government  of  the  element  of  uncertainty  in  the 
future,  and  upon  the  recognition  by  the  govern- 
ment of  the  relationship  of  our  foreign  interests 
and  obligations  to  the  interests,  ambitions,  and 
obligations  of  the  other  great  Powers.  No  modern 
nation  can  shut  herself  up  within  herself,  and 
remain  aloof  from  the  activities  of  the  world. 
The  contests  of  ambition  and  of  selfish  interest  are 
as  keen  among  nations  as  among  individuals. 
The  activities  of  the  world  lead  to  conflict,  some- 
times peaceful  conflict,  often  to  the  conflict  of 
arms. 

Conscription  provides  the  way  for  the  creation  of 
an  army  in  time  of  peace  of  ample  proportions  to 
meet  the  conditions  of  modern  war. 

Conscription  draws  its  allotment  of  recruits 
from  the  people  at  large  without  favour,  and  with- 
out the  consideration  of  personal  interest.  Every 
man,  be  he  rich,  or  be  he  poor,  be  he  cultured  or 
uncultured,  owes  the  same  allegiance  to  the  nation, 
and  should  take  his  chances  in  reference  to  mili- 
tary service,  those  chances  being  determined  by 
the  impartial  drawings  of  the  conscription. 

Conscription  draws  more  equally  and  more  evenly 
upon  the  manhood  of  the  nation  than  the  system  of 
voluntary  enlistment. 


138     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  under  voluntary  enlist- 
ment, and  under  the  stimulus  of  patriotism,  the 
best  of  the  youth  of  the  nation  offer  themselves 
voluntarily  to  the  service  of  their  country.  This 
puts  an  unequal  and  unjust  burden  upon  the 
higher  and  the  better  element  of  the  country;  a 
burden  which  should  be  spread  generally  over 
the  young  manhood  of  the  nation. 

Conscription,  acting  with  the  calmness  of  blind- 
ness, takes  by  chance  those  it  needs  for  the  service 
of  the  country.  Rich  and  poor,  the  highly  edu- 
cated and  the  most  ignorant,  stand  upon  the  same 
broad  plane  of  duty  and  citizenship,  and  under 
conscription  are  liable  to  be  drawn  for  the  service  of 
their  country  in  the  army  and  navy  of  the  nation. 

The  preparatory  training  in  the  army  for  all 
recruits  should  be  the  same.  Merit  alone  should 
differentiate  between  the  representatives  of  the 
classes  called  by  conscription  to  the  colours.  There 
should  always  be  held  open  the  opportunity  for 
advancement  to  the  deserving  in  the  ranks.  It 
should  not  be  forgotten  that  it  was  said  that  every 
recruit  who  joined  the  army  of  the  Great  Emperor 
carried  the  baton  of  a  Field  Marshal  of  France  in 
his  knapsack. 

What  system  of  creating  an  army  could  be  more 
democratic?  What  system  of  supplying  the  losses 
occurring  in  the  army  in  time  of  war  could  be  more 
equal  in  its  application  to  the  citizenship  of  the 
country? 


Conscription  139 

Do  we  wish  to  see  our  country  open  to  attack 
which  we  have  no  power  to  resist,  or  do  we  wish 
our  country  to  be  ready  and  prepared  to  resist 
attack  whenever  and  from  whatever  quarter  it 
may  come? 

In  a  New  York  paper  of  August  25,  1915,  a  New 
York  lawyer,  who  is  reported  to  have  been  born  in 
the  United  States,  and  who  is  represented  to  be 
an  officer  in  one  of  the  anti-American  organiza- 
tions of  German  sympathizers,  is  reported  to 
have  said,  that  he  would  not  volunteer  for  service 
in  a  war  between  Germany  and  the  United  States, 
adding: 

I  think  Germany's  submarine  policy  is  absolutely 
justified.  I  think  Germany  has  a  right  to  sink  every 
vessel,  neutral  or  otherwise,  which  carries  ammunition 
to  the  Allies.  If  the  vessel  carries  neutral  non-com- 
batants, not  without  warning,  of  course,  but  after  the 
warning,  blow  them  to  hell,  every  damn  ship  of  them. 

International  law,  bosh!  Who  gives  a  rap  about 
international  law?  Germany  doesn't.  Germany  is 
making  international  law. 

Such  utterances  show  unfaithfulness  and  poten- 
tial treason  to  the  country  of  his  birth.  We  had 
the  same  kind  of  people  as  this  man  to  deal  with 
during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  and  we  put 
them  in  Fort  Lafayette,  and  sometimes  we  shot 
them. 

Should  this  man  be  conscripted,  one  of  two 


140     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

things  would  surely  happen  should  the  nation  be 
unhappily  at  war  with  Germany :  he  would  either 
be  compelled  to  fight  Germany  or  else  he  would  be 
shot.  My  own  impression  is  that  he  would  decide 
to  fight  Germany  rather  than  be  shot  in  the  back 
with  his  face  to  the  wall. 

Conscription  would  be  an  excellent  thing  to 
discipline  such  people  who  disown  their  own  coun- 
try in  favour  of  a  foreign  and  possibly  hostile 
Power. 

I  believe  firmly  in  the  unifying  influence  of  con- 
scription upon  the  country  at  large,  both  section- 
ally  considered,  and  in  reference  to  the  large 
immigration  into  the  country  of  people  antago- 
nistic to  each  other  and  to  ourselves  in  blood,  in 
customs,  and  in  standards  of  belief. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  United  States  is  the 
melting  pot  of  the  world.  That  as  we  receive  into 
our  citizenship  the  Slav,  the  Greek,  the  German, 
the  Italian,  the  Englishman,  the  Irishman,  the 
Scotchman,  the  Scandinavian,  the  man  from  the 
East  both  far  and  near,  so  must  we  assimilate 
the  representatives  of  those  races  to  ourselves, 
to  our  thought,  and  to  our  theory  and  system  of 
government.  We  must  completely  change  the  di- 
rection of  their  feelings  and  hopes  from  their  old- 
world  relationships  to  an  assimilation  with  our  hopes 
and  our  aspirations.  Without  in  the  least  dis- 
turbing their  old-world  memories,  we  must  control 
the  sweep  and  current  of  their  present  thought  so 


Conscription  141 

that  the  new  allegiance  which  they  have  assumed 
shall  be  a  real  allegiance  of  heart,  of  mind,  and  of 
body;  an  allegiance  which  shall  displace  all  other 
ideas  of  allegiance,  and  which  shall  supplant  all 
other  national  influences  and  obligations. 

If  the  representatives  of  these  various  races  who 
have  come  to  this  country  voluntarily  and  to 
better  their  condition,  and  with  the  idea  of  making 
it  their  home,  and  the  home  of  their  children, 
should  be  compelled  to  go  before  the  conscription 
officers  on  the  chance  of  being  drawn  for  service 
in  the  army  and  the  navy,  they  would  be  forced 
to  realize  the  existence  and  the  presence  of  the 
power  of  the  United  States,  something  that  they 
do  not  now  clearly  comprehend ;  and  those  of  them 
who  should  be  drawn  for  service  in  the  army  or  the 
navy,  finding  alongside  of  them  in  the  ranks  Ameri- 
cans of  the  old  lineage,  would  insensibly,  as  they 
learn  to  salute  the  flag  of  the  country,  endeavour 
to  become  as  American  as  their  comrades  by  their 
side. 

Instead  of  promoting  sectionalism  in  the  country 
as  General  Carter's  plan  of  territorializing  the 
regular  army,  and  of  raising  an  army  of  territori- 
alized volunteers  would  undoubtedly  do,  con- 
scription would  work  along  the  lines  of  association 
in  destroying  what  is  left  of  sectionalism  in  the 
country.  The  men  of  the  North  and  of  the  South, 
of  the  East  and  the  West,  would  find  themselves 
serving  shoulder  to  shoulder  under  the  flag  of  their 


142     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

country,  and  while  learning  to  know  and  to  appre- 
ciate each  other,  they  would  at  last  apprehend  how 
utterly  provincial  and  absurd  are  the  vanities  of 
sectionalism,  how  broad  and  grand  is  the  idea 
of  nationalism,  how  pure  and  holy  is  the  love  of 
country. 

/  have  refrained  from  discussing  the  Australian 
and  the  Swiss  military  systems  because  they  propose 
the  creation  of  something  in  the  nature  of  volunteer 
armies,  and  I  have  come  deliberately  to  the  conclusion 
that  volunteer  armies  have  no  longer  a  place  in  modern 
warfare. 

In  reference  to  the  Australian  system,  it  is  not 
seen  how  it  could  be  inaugurated  in  our  country 
without  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  giving 
to  the  national  government  a  certain  but  definite 
control  over  the  school  systems  of  the  respective 
States,  because  this  system  would  come  into  opera- 
tion in  respect  to  all  of  the  school  children  of 
twelve  years  of  age  in  the  country.  As  to  the 
Swiss  system  it  amounts  to  a  levy  en  masse  within 
certain  age  limits,  and  such  an  extreme  measure 
is  utterly  unnecessary  in  our  vast  country.  In  a 
small  country  like  Switzerland,  surrounded  by  pos- 
sible enemies,  such  a  system  of  universal  military 
service  is  not  only  commendable  but  necessary. 
But  in  the  United  States,  under  conscription,  the 
army  and  the  navy  could  readily  be  supplied 
with  recruits,  and  the  reserve  army  be  created 
as  a  part  of  the  regular  army,  with  so  small  a  tax 


Conscription  143 

on  the  manhood  of  the  nation  as  scarcely  to  be 
appreciable. 

Nor  have  I  deemed  it  necessary  to  discuss  at 
length  the  plan  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  War 
in  his  report  of  November  15,  1914,  as  to  the 
creation  of  a  reserve. 

The  Secretary  says : 

I  am  firmly  convinced  that  if  we  can  use  the  stand- 
ing army  as  a  school  through  which  to  pass  men  who 
come  into  it,  with  the  knowledge  that  if  they  are 
proficient  they  can  be  discharged  at  any  time  after  a 
year  or  eighteen  months,  we  will  begin  at  once  to  build 
up  the  necessary  reserve,  and  will,  for  the  first  time  in 
the  military  history  of  this  country,  have  something 
approximating  a  balanced  organization. 

I  am  as  firmly  convinced  of  the  error  of  this 
plan  as  the  Secretary  appears  to  be  convinced  in 
its  favour.  The  mistake  which  the  Secretary 
makes  is  in  considering  the  army  a  school.  It 
is  not  a  school,  and  should  not  be  so  considered, 
but  is,  or  at  least  should  be,  a  living,  coherent 
force,  highly  drilled  and  disciplined,  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  definite  objects  and  purposes,  the 
defence  of  the  country  in  war  being  the  chief  one 
of  these  objects  of  its  organization.  To  attempt 
to  make  it  a  school  for  the  graduation  of  reservists, 
is  to  divert  it  from  its  main  and  original  purpose 
and  to  convert  it  into  a  dumping  ground  for  crude 
material  out  of  which  possible  soldiers  may  be 


144     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

made  at  some  future  time.  Nothing  will  tend  so 
readily  and  so  completely  to  disorganize  the  army 
as  to  constitute  it  a  school  for  reservists. 

No  officer,  under  the  Secretary's  plan,  would 
ever  know  how  dependable  the  troops  under  his 
command  were.  His  time  and  thought  would 
be  taken  up  with  the  constant  and  ever-recurring 
duty  of  licking  new  men  into  shape  for  service; 
then  to  see  them,  the  moment  they  should  ap- 
proach the  condition  of  being  soldiers,  removed 
from  his  command  and  transferred  to  that,  under 
the  Secretary's  plan,  intangible  body,  the  reserves. 

The  army,  under  this  idea  that  it  is  a  school  for 
the  training  of  reserves,  would  never  be  able  to 
feel  itself  to  be  the  real  thing.  The  new  recruit  in 
the  ranks  would  be  alongside  of  the  one-year  or 
one-year-and-a-half  man,  just  about  to  be  trans- 
ferred to  the  reserves.  There  would  be  no  system 
or  order  in  the  ranks;  no  solidity  in  the  troops.  A 
regiment  is  only  so  strong  as  its  weakest  part. 
Instead  of  the  one-year  men  stiffening  up  the  re- 
cruits, the  recruits  would  tend  to  weaken  the 
older  men  in  the  ranks.  The  effectiveness  of  the 
one-year  men  would  be  lessened  by  the  ignorance 
of  the  recruits.  The  tone  of  the  army  would  be 
lowered  toward  the  plane  of  the  most  ignorant  in 
the  ranks. 

The  plan  of  the  honourable  Secretary  of  War 
would  sacrifice  the  army  to  the  reserves;  with  the 
result  that  he  would  in  the  end  have  neither  a  good 


Conscription  145 

army  nor  a  good  reserve.  Expediency  is  very 
well  in  its  place,  but  in  the  creation  of  an  army 
it  is  manifestly  out  of  place.  What  the  country 
needs  is  not  an  army  which  shall  be  a  school  for 
the  graduation  of  reservists,  but  a  coherent,  well 
disciplined,  compact,  and  dependable  army;  an 
army  ready  for  any  military  service  whatsoever 
that  it  may  be  called  upon  to  perform. 

I  am  entirely  opposed  to  short  enlistments  for 
the  army,  and  I  am  opposed  to  the  transfer  of 
men  from  the  active  army  to  the  reserves  under 
any  circumstances  whatsoever  during  the  period 
of  their  enlistment,  as  subversive  of  the  efficiency 
of  the  army.  The  men  in  the  ranks  should  be 
offered  every  reasonable  inducement  to  re-enlist 
on  the  expiration  of  their  term  of  service,  instead 
of  being  turned  loose  into  the  reserves  after  a  year 
or  two  of  service  in  the  army,  as  the  Secretary  of 
War  recommends. 

Nor  have  I  allowed  myself  to  discuss  the  militia, 
or  the  military  camps  which  are  now  so  fashion- 
able. Naturally  I  do  not  regard  the  militia  as 
possessing  the  steadiness  to  be  considered  to  be  a 
part  of  the  first  line  of  defence,  and  as  to  the  mili- 
tary camps,  instead  of  attempting  to  make  sol- 
diers their  chief  work  should  be  to  show  the  young 
men  in  training  that  no  soldier  can  be  made  in  a 
month.  If  the  young  men  who  shall  attend  these 
encampments  shall  come  away  with  a  knowledge 
of  how  little  they  know  of  military  matters,  and 

10 


146     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

how  much  less  they  really  know  than  they  thought 
they  knew  when  they  reported  for  instruction, 
the  camps  will  have  served  a  useful  purpose.  In 
exciting  a  more  general  interest  in  the  army  than 
has  previously  existed  the  military  camps  will  un- 
doubtedly be  useful.  But  I  foresee  an  end  to 
them  when  the  present  war  excitement  subsides, 
as  subside  it  must  in  the  next  year  or  two,  unless 
we  should  be  unhappily  and  unnecessarily  drawn 
into  the  circle  of  the  present  European  war. 

The  active  regular  army  should  be  considered 
to  be  the  right  arm  of  the  nation.  How  strong 
that  right  arm  should  be  is,  perhaps,  matter  for 
discussion,  but  I  think  the  judgment  of  those  en- 
titled to  express  an  opinion  upon  the  subject  may 
be  narrowed  down  to  an  army  of  two  hundred 
thousand  or  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men. 

If  the  principle  of  conscription  be  adopted,  I 
do  not  think  it  matters  very  much  whether  the 
size  of  the  active  army  be  two  hundred  thousand 
men  or  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  as 
should  the  former  number  be  assumed,  the  extra 
fifty  thousand  men,  not  in  the  active  army,  could 
easily  be  taken  up  by  the  reserve  army,  which 
reserve  army  should  be  a  constituent  part  of  the 
regular  army,  and  should  be  so  organized  that  on 
the  breaking  out  of  war  it  could  be  mobilized 
at  once,  and  take  its  place  in  the  first  line  of 
defence. 


Conscription  147 

The  object  to  be  accomplished  should  be  the  creation 
of  a  military  strength  for  the  first  line  of  defence  of 
one  million  men;  the  active  army  to  consist  of  two 
hundred  thousand  men,  and  the  reserve  army  to 
consist  of  eight  hundred  thousand  men;  the  active 
army  and  the  reserve  army  constituting  the  regu- 
lar army  of  the  United  States. 

The  men  of  the  active  army  should  be  con- 
scripted for  a  term  of  five  years'  continuous  service 
with  the  colours. 

The  men  of  the  reserve  army  should  be  con- 
scripted for  a  term  of  five  years,  one  year  with  the 
colours  and  four  years  at  their  homes,  with  two 
weeks*  service  each  year  with  the  colours  for 
training. 

The  conscription  for  the  year  should  be  required 
to  supply: 

1.  The  demand  of  the  navy  and  the  marine 
corps. 

2.  The  demand  of  the  active  army. 

3.  The  demand  of  the  reserve  army. 

There  should  be  two  hundred  thousand  men  always 
with  the  colours  of  the  active  army,  and  the  regi- 
ments of  the  active  army  should  always  be  kept  at  full 
war  strength. 

For  the  same  reason  that  I  do  not  believe  in  con- 
stituting the  army  a  school  for  the  reserves,  I  do 
not  believe  in  having  a  stated  peace  strength  and  a 
stated  war  strength  for  the  active  army.  The 
strength  of  the  active  army  should  be  always  full  war 


148     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

strength.  The  army  will  then  be  always  at  its  best. 
The  proportion  of  full-term  men  will  be  so  pre- 
ponderant that  the  year's  recruits  to  take  the 
place  of  the  men  to  be  discharged  at  the  end  of 
their  five  years'  term  of  service  will  be  sub- 
merged in  the  mass  of  full-term  men.  And  at  the 
end  of  the  term  of  service  of  all  men  of  the  active 
army,  they  should  be  encouraged  to  re-enlist  for 
another  term  of  five  years,  reducing  by  so  many 
re-enlistments  the  demand  of  the  active  army  upon 
the  drawings  for  conscripts  for  the  year.  I  believe 
in  the  vieille  moustache. 

Assuming  the  strength  of  the  active  army  to  be 
two  hundred  thousand  men,  and  the  term  of 
service  five  years,  there  will  be  required,  the- 
oretically, each  year  forty  thousand  conscripts 
to  supply  the  places  in  the  ranks  of  one  fifth  of 
the  enlisted  men  of  the  active  army  whose  term 
of  service  would  then  expire.  But  it  is  not 
likely  that  this  number  of  conscripts  will  be  re- 
quired, because  the  re-enlistment  of  men  whose 
terms  then  expire  will  reduce  the  number  of  con- 
scripts required  to  keep  the  army  at  full  war 
strength,  unless  the  desertions  during  the  year 
should  outnumber  the  re-enlistments. 

But  whatever  the  demand  of  the  active  army, 
the  navy,  and  the  marine  corps  for  men  to  keep 
them  at  full  war  strength  may  be,  it  must  be  sup- 
plied by  the  conscription  for  the  year,  because,  not 
only  is  it  relatively  more  economical  to  maintain 


Conscription  149 

these  services  at  full  war  strength,  but  it  is  also 
more  desirable,  because  it  affords  the  best  oppor- 
tunity for  the  maintenance  of  the  army,  the  navy, 
and  the  marine  corps  at  their  highest  condition  of 
efficiency :  efficiency  in  the  two  services  being  the 
aim,  or  at  least  it  should  be  the  aim,  of  the  mili- 
tary authorities  of  the  nation. 

The  annual  demand  upon  the  drawings  of  the 
conscription  for  men  for  the  army,  the  navy,  and 
the  marine  corps  should  be  determined  by  the 
government  before  the  drawings  take  place,  and 
the  proclamation  ordering  the  drawings  should 
state  the  number  of  men  to  be  taken  by  the  govern- 
ment from  the  year's  allotment. 

The  drawings  should  be  held  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  but  by 
a  regularly  constituted  staff  of  civilians.  The 
government  cannot  afford  to  increase  the  propor- 
tion of  absentee  officers  of  the  army  and  navy  in 
number  sufficient  to  administer  the  conscription. 

Officers  educated  for  the  army  should  not  be 
allowed  to  perform  duties  outside  of  the  army,  or 
within  the  War  Department,  which  can  just  as 
well  be  performed  by  civilians.  This  is  a  propo- 
sition as  broad  as  the  army  itself,  because  it  bears 
upon  the  efficiency  of  the  army,  and  if  it  be  ac- 
cepted as  the  principle  regulating  details,  it  would 
restore  a  number  of  officers,  now  absentees,  to 
their  commands. 

Assuming  the  requirement  of  the  army  to  be 


150     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

about  110,000  men  to  complete  its  strength  to 
200,000  men,  and  the  requirement  of  the  navy  and 
the  marine  corps  to  be  25,000  men,  we  find  that 
the  two  services  would  require  to  fill  them  to  full 
war  strength  about  135,000  men. 

To  officer  the  new  regiments  of  the  active  army 
will  require  about  4000  additional  officers.  The 
difficulty  will  be  to  provide  all  at  once  these  new 
officers.  Of  course  a  great  many  officers  now  on 
detached  duty  should  at  once  be  relieved  and 
ordered  to  their  regiments,  and  as  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  regiments  of  the  army  for  full  war 
strength  is  complete  in  officers,  it  will  only  be 
necessary  to  return  the  officers  now  on  detached 
service  to  their  commands  to  make  it  possible  to 
fill  up  the  existing  regiments  with  enlisted  men  to 
full  war  strength. 

According  to  the  report  of  the  Adjutant-General 
August  22,  1914, 

there  were  4701  commissioned  officers  on  the  active 
list  of  the  army,  of  whom  1220,  including  64 
chaplains,  were  general  officers  or  officers  of  the  staff 
corps  and  departments,  810  belonged  to  the  cavalry, 
266  to  the  field  artillery,  758  to  the  coast  artillery 
corps,  and  1647  to  the  infantry. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  1220  officers,  or  over 
25  per  cent,  of  the  officers  of  the  army,  were  mem- 
bers of  the  staff  corps,  or  were  serving  on  staff 
duty,  in  August,  1914,  which  would  seem  to  be  a 


Conscription  151 

sufficient  number  of  "staff  officers"  for  an  active 
army  of  200,000  men,  as  detached  and  unimport- 
ant posts  should  be  abolished,  and  the  army  in 
the  United  States  be  concentrated  in  great  train- 
ing camps  like  that  of  Aldershot,  England. 

The  Adjutant-General  of  the  army  further  says: 
"Of  the  3431  line  officers,  2770  were  present  for 
duty,  86  on  leave,  45  sick,  578  on  detached  duty, 
and  2  in  arrest." 

In  addition  to  1220  staff  officers,  578  line  officers 
were  on  detached  duty,  or  a  total  of  1798  officers 
of  the  army  out  of  a  total  of  4701  officers  were 
serving  in  various  capacities  other  than  directly 
in  command  of  or  with  troops.  A  bewildering 
proportion  having  regard  to  the  size  of  the  army, 
and  proving  that  the  craze  for  detached  service 
is  the  curse  of  the  army. 

To  correct  this  disproportion  of  officers  on  de- 
tached service  the  army  war  college,  the  army 
service  schools  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  the  school 
of  musketry  at  Fort  Sill,  should  be  closed  tem- 
porarily, or  until  West  Point  can  graduate  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  officers  for  the  army,  and  the 
officers  on  duty  at  these  schools,  together  with  all 
of  the  student  officers,  should  be  sent  to  their 
regiments.  All  officers  on  the  active  list  of  the 
army  serving  as  instructors  at  civil  educa- 
tional institutions,  or  serving  with  the  militia,  or 
as  the  superintendent  of  the  State,  War,  and 
Navy  Department  building,  and  the  officer  serv- 


152     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

ing  with  the  Red  Cross,  if  on  the  active  list, 
should  be  relieved  from  such  duty  and  ordered 
to  their  commands.  Should  any  of  these  offi- 
cers be  staff  officers,  such  as  the  engineer  officer 
in  charge  of  the  War  Department  building,  their 
relief  from  such  duty  would  re-enforce  their  corps 
for  the  performance  of  its  regular  duty  with  the 
increased  army.  As  the  new  system  would  do 
away  with  the  recruiting  service,  officers  on  recruit- 
ing service  could  in  time  be  relieved  and  returned 
to  their  regiments. 

It  would  seem  to  be  the  case  that  there  are  more 
officers  serving  in  the  War  Department  today  than 
were  on  duty  in  the  War  Department  in  1864  with 
an  army  of  over  a  million  of  men,  when,  for  about 
six  weeks,  I  was  on  duty  in  the  office  of  the  Inspec- 
tor-General of  the  army.  I  do  not  speak  confidently 
on  this  point,  but  I  think  I  may  say,  that  relatively 
to  the  size  of  the  army,  there  are  more  officers  on 
duty  today  in  the  War  Department  than  were 
on  duty  in  the  Department  in  1864,  with  a  great 
deal  less  work  for  the  officers  to  do  now  than 
then. 

As  to  the  General  Staff,  I  think  that  all  of  the 
officers  on  duty  in  this  new  staff  organization, 
serving  as  chiefs  of  staff  at  the  headquarters  of 
military  divisions,  and  with  commanding  generals 
in  the  field,  should  be  relieved  and  ordered  to 
their  commands,  and  the  adjutant-generals  of  such 
military  divisions,  and  commands  in  the  field,  by 


Conscription  153 

orders  from  the  War  Department,  should  be 
assigned  to  duty  as  chiefs  of  staff. 

As  Adjutant-General  of  the  I5th  Army  Corps 
in  the  field  during  the  great  war,  I  think  I  may 
speak  with  some  right  to  be  heard  upon  this  sub- 
ject. I  had  seen  something  of  chiefs  of  staff,  and 
consequently  held  the  opinion,  before  joining  the 
1 5th  Army  Corps,  that  the  adjutant-general  of 
every  command  should  be  the  chief  of  staff  of  that 
command,  because  he,  from  his  position  at  head- 
quarters, was  naturally  the  centre  of  information 
and  the  source  from  which  all  orders  should  eman- 
ate; and  also  because  it  tends  to  promote  con- 
fusion at  headquarters  should  any  officer  of  higher 
rank  than  he  on  the  staff  be  intervened  between 
himself  and  the  general  commanding,  who,  under 
all  circumstances,  should  receive  information  at 
first  hand  from  his  adjutant-general,  and  not  have 
it  filtered  through  another  officer  standing  be- 
tween the  general  commanding  and  the  adjutant- 
general,  interfering,  unintentionally  of  course,  with 
the  confidential  relations  which  should  exist  be- 
tween these  two  officers. 

My  experience  as  Adjutant-General  of  the  I5th 
Army  Corps  confirmed  me  in  this  judgment,  and 
further,  I  became  convinced  that  either  the  chief 
of  staff  or  the  adjutant-general  was  out  of  place, 
or  rather,  that  they  were  in  each  other's  way  at 
headquarters. 

On  reporting  for  duty  as  Adjutant-General  of 


154     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

the  1 5th  Army  Corps  I  found  that  a  gallant  gen- 
tleman, an  officer  of  the  army,  the  Inspector-Gen- 
eral of  the  Corps,  had  been  announced  in  orders 
as  chief  of  staff  of  the  Corps.  But  I  also  found, 
I  must  say  with  a  certain  measure  of  relief,  that 
this  gentleman  was  far  too  ill  a  man  to  attend  to 
the  duties  of  his  office  as  chief  of  staff  except  in  an 
entirely  perfunctory  manner.  Therefore,  treating 
him  with  the  utmost  courtesy,  because  I  learned 
to  have  the  fullest  respect  for  him  personally,  I 
gradually  assumed  the  duties  of  chief  of  staff  of 
the  Corps,  and  established  extra-official  relations 
with  the  chief  quartermaster,  chief  commissary, 
medical  director,  chief  of  artillery,  and  the  other 
heads  of  the  staff  departments,  who  gave  me 
cheerfully  all  the  information  concerning  their  de- 
partments which  it  was  necessary  and  desirable 
that  I  should  have.  The  utmost  harmony  pre- 
vailed at  headquarters.  The  General's  orders 
were  promptly  issued  and  cheerfully  obeyed.  I 
held  in  my  possession  the  orders  for  the  campaign 
from  Military  Division  and  Army  headquarters, 
and  drew  all  the  orders  for  the  movement  of  the 
Corps  in  accordance  with  the  command  of  the 
General. 

I  really  do  not  see,  in  looking  back  over  fifty 
years,  how  it  would  have  been  possible  for  me  to 
have  conducted  the  affairs  of  the  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral's department  had  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  Corps 
been  well  enough  to  attend  properly  to  his  duties. 


Conscription  155 

I  feel  confident  that  there  would  have  been 
friction,  had  he  been  able  to  attend  to  the  duties 
of  his  office,  and  that  the  public  service  would 
have  suffered  in  consequence.  There  is  not 
enough  work  at  headquarters  for  a  chief  of  staff 
and  an  adjutant-general,  assuming  both  to  be 
intelligent,  active,  energetic  officers.  One  must 
twirl  his  thumbs  to  the  north  in  the  morning  and 
to  the  south  in  the  afternoon  to  keep  himself  oc- 
cupied, if  the  other  be  earnest  in  the  performance 
of  his  duties.  Wherefore,  I  am  convinced  as 
there  is  not  enough  work  or  occupation  for  these 
two  officers  if  both  attempt  to  do  the  work  that  is 
to  be  done,  that  the  two  offices  should  be  centred 
in  the  one  person  at  headquarters  who,  by  pre- 
scription, is  best  fitted  to  perform  the  functions 
of  the  two  offices,  the  adjutant-general  of  the 
command.  If  the  rush  of  detail  work  should  at 
any  time  become  too  pressing  on  the  adjutant- 
general  he  can  always  order  an  officer  of  junior 
rank  to  his  assistance.  When  I  became  Adjutant- 
General  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  I  had  three 
officers,  on  duty  in  my  office,  whose  work  I  super- 
vised and  directed,  but  who  were  my  subordinates. 
Nothing  will  illustrate  more  thoroughly  what  I 
mean  by  saying  that  there  is  not  room  enough  nor 
work  enough  at  headquarters  for  an  adjutant-gen- 
eral and  a  chief  of  staff,  than  a  copy  of  an  order 
given  by  Major-General  Carter  in  his  book  The 
American  Army,  on  the  sanitation  of  the  camps  of 


156     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

his  Manoeuvre  Division,  under  date,  San  Antonio, 
Texas,  March  II,  1911.  This  order  is  signed  by 
the  chief  of  staff  by  command  of  Major-General 
Carter. 

It  is  an  important,  well-drawn,  and  interesting- 
order,  but  it  belongs  exclusively  to  that  class  of  orders 
which  should  be  issued  by  the  adjutant- general,  by 
the  order  of  the  general  commanding,  and  this 
order  should  not  have  been  issued  by  the  chief  of 
staff.  To  find  something  to  do,  the  chief  of  staff 
had  to  invade  the  field  of  work  which  by  prescrip- 
tion belonged,  and  belongs,  to  the  adjutant-general. 

Therefore,  I  think  that  a  certain  number  of 
gentlemen  on  duty  with  the  General  Staff  could 
be  relieved  from  such  duty,  and  ordered  to  their 
commands,  without  detriment  to  the  efficient  con- 
duct of  the  affairs  of  the  army. 

It  is  quite  as  unfortunate  to  over-officer  as  it  is 
to  under-officer  a  command.  The  over-officering 
of  a  command  leads  inevitably  to  laziness  and 
slothfulness  in  the  performance  of  duty. 

I  do  not  propose  to  discuss  the  question  whether 
the  command  of  the  army  should  be  held  by  an 
officer  designated  as  the  commanding  general  of 
the  army  or  as  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  army. 
It  is  sufficient  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
chief  of  staff  of  the  army  actually  exercises  more 
of  the  powers  of  command  than  the  former  com- 
manding generals  of  the  army  ever  dreamt  of  ask- 
ing for,  although  he  issues  his  orders  by  command 


Conscription  157 

of  the  Secretary  of  War,  a  civilian.  This  is  the 
European  system  put  in  practice,  with  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  in  titular  command  of  the  army  in  the 
place  of  the  sovereign.  The  system  probably 
works  well  in  practice  because  the  chief  of  staff  is 
practically,  as  he  was  intended  to  be  by  those 
officers  who  designed  the  new  system,  the  com- 
manding general  of  the  army,  with  all  the  powers 
of  a  general-in-chief,  cloak  the  same  as  he  may 
by  apparent  deference  to  the  orders  of  his  civilian 
chief. 

By  recalling  to  the  active  list  all  officers  who  were 
allowed  to  retire  voluntarily  after  a  certain  length 
of  service,  provided  they  be  physically  fit  for 
active  service  and  have  not  reached  the  retiring 
age,  the  law  under  which  such  retirements  take 
place  to  be  repealed;  and  by  assigning  surplus 
staff  officers  to  duties  now  performed  by  line 
officers,  such  as  those  with  the  Isthmian  Commis- 
sion, if  there  be  such  now  on  duty  with  the  Com- 
mission; and  by  recalling  all  military  attaches 
except  those  serving  with  the  warring  armies  in 
Europe,  together  with  compliance  with  the  above 
recommendations,  it  is  believed  that  nearly  all  of 
the  officers  from  the  line  now  on  detached  service 
may  be  restored  to  their  commands. 

West  Point  can  be  called  upon  for  about  450 
young  officers  by  the  arbitrary  graduation  of  the 
first,  second,  and  third  classes  at  the  Academy. 
This  would  at  once  add  to  the  army  a  group  of 


158     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

young  officers,  all  of  whom  had  received  at  least 
one  year's  instruction  at  the  Military  Academy, 
and  many  of  whom  had  served  two  and  three  years 
at  the  Academy. 

Under  my  theory  of  appointment  of  officers  of 
the  army,  I  say  without  hesitation,  that  the  young 
man  who  has  had  one  year's  instruction  at  the 
Military  Academy  is  better  fitted  for  appointment 
to  a  second  lieutenancy  in  the  army  than  a  young 
man  from  civil  life,  or  from  one  of  the  so-called 
military  schools  of  the  country.  Therefore  I 
think  that  every  cadet  who  has  had  the  advantage 
of  one  year's  instruction  at  the  Military  Academy 
should  be  graduated  for  service  as  an  officer  of 
the  enlarged  army,  until  the  quota  of  officers  of 
the  line  shall  be  filled.  But  such  arbitrary  gradu- 
ation of  cadets  into  the  army  should  not  excuse 
them  from  study.  A  course  in  study  and  reading 
should  be  prescribed  by  the  Academic  Board  to 
be  followed  by  the  cadets  who  may  be  arbitrarily 
graduated  into  the  army,  which  they  should 
agree  upon  honour  to  pursue,  and  a  species  of 
examinations  through  correspondence  should  be 
instituted  by  the  Academic  Board  to  keep  the 
young  men,  so  advanced  to  be  officers  of  the  army, 
up  to  their  work. 

Since  the  adoption  of  the  three  battalion  system 
of  organization  for  the  army  lieutenant-colonelcies 
of  the  line  have  become  obsolete.  Therefore  the 
rank  of  lieutenant-colonel  should  be  abolished 


Conscription  159 

throughout  the  line  of  the  army  except  in  the 
case  of  the  artillery,  and  the  present  lieutenant- 
colonels  should  be  promoted  to  be  the  colonels 
of  the  new  regiments  required  to  be  organized  to 
bring  the  active  army  up  to  the  proposed  standard 
of  two  hundred  thousand  men,  and  also  of  the 
regiments  of  the  proposed  reserve  army. 

From  all  of  these  sources  I  think  it  will  be  pos- 
sible for  the  War  Department  to  reclaim  or  secure 
at  least  six  or  seven  hundred  officers  already  in  the 
army  or  serving  as  cadets  at  West  Point,  to  officer 
the  recruits  and  the  new  troops  to  be  added  to 
the  active  army. 

My  book  is  written  at  the  present  time  in  the 
hope  of  assisting  in  awakening  the  mind  of  the 
country  to  the  danger  of  unreadiness  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  in  respect  to  the  present  war 
in  Europe,  and  to  the  not  improbable  war  which 
may  be  forced  upon  us  within  a  few  years  after 
the  conclusion  of  this  war,  as  a  result  of  the  rest- 
less ambition  and  the  pressing  demand  for  com- 
pensation, by  one  or  more  of  the  nations  at  present 
at  war,  on  account  of  the  vast  losses  incurred  by 
them  in  the  war. 

But  frankly,  I  do  not  apprehend  immediate 
war,  and  I  am  writing  toward  the  end  of  the  month 
of  September,  1915. 

All  of  our  apparent  disagreements  with  Germany 
in  respect  to  the  operations  of  her  submarine  fleet 
are  susceptible  of  settlement  by  diplomacy,  and 


160     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

should  be  so  settled.  Neither  Germany  nor  the 
United  States  wants  to  go  to  war  with  the  other 
at  the  present  time.  Neither  nation  has  anything 
to  gain  by  war  and  everything  to  lose.  A  calm, 
strong,  and  honourable  diplomacy  can  find  a  way 
for  the  preservation  of  peace  through  the  main- 
tenance of  the  principle  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas 
for  neutral  commerce,  a  principle  which  Great 
Britain  has  offended  against  through  her  Orders 
in  Council  in  quite  as  marked  a  manner,  although 
not  in  so  spectacular  a  manner,  as  Germany  with 
her  submarines,  and  the  necessity  for  the  recog- 
nition of  this  principle  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas 
for  neutral  commerce  should  be  urged  upon  Great 
Britain  quite  as  firmly  as  upon  Germany. 

Believing  in  the  maintenance  of  peace,  I  should 
be  glad  to  have  the  country  move  slowly  in  carry- 
ing out  this  plan  for  the  reorganization  of  the 
army  and  its  increase  to  200,000  men,  with  the 
additional  provision  for  the  creation  of  a  reserve 
army  of  800,000  men,  by  first  increasing  West 
Point  to  the  proposed  strength  of  3600  cadets,  so 
as  to  enable  the  Military  Academy  to  graduate 
officers  for  both  the  active  and  the  reserve  army. 
Nor  do  I  think  the  country  would  lose  anything 
by  such  thoughtful  delay,  because  the  necessary 
laws  could  be  carefully  drawn  covering  the  whole 
field  of  reorganization,  the  various  steps  in  pro- 
gress being  duly  provided  for  in  the  enactment. 

But  I  realize  that  such  a  methodical  progress  in 


Conscription  161 

the  reorganization  of  the  army  is  almost  beyond 
the  hope  of  realization.  When  Congress  shall 
come  together  in  session  the  clamour  will  be  for 
immediate  action,  and  I  confess  frankly  that  I 
fear  that  the  army  will  be  deluged  with  new  officers 
fresh  from  civil  life. 

Therefore,  while  earnestly  recommending  legis- 
lation covering  the  whole  scope  of  the  plan  for 
the  expansion  of  the  Military  Academy  at  West 
Point  to  accommodate  3600  cadets,  and  for  the 
gradual  reorganization  of  the  active  army  to  the 
strength  of  200,000  men,  I  feel  that  steps  should 
be  taken  to  guard,  as  far  as  possible,  against  the 
bad  effect  of  hurried  legislation  in  respect  to  reorg- 
anization, and  the  consequent  lowering  effect,  pro- 
fessionally, upon  the  officer  class  of  the  army  by 
the  appointment  of  a  vast  number  of  civilians  to 
command  the  new  levies. 

To  meet  this  danger,  of  a  hurried  reorganization 
of  the  army,  especially  as  I  can  see  no  reason  why  we 
should  be  drawn  into  the  present  European  war,  I 
should  suggest  the  gradual  increase  of  the  active 
army  by  ten  regiments  of  infantry  a  year,  for  the 
period  of  five  years,  thus  increasing  the  army  in 
the  period  of  five  years  by  fifty  new  regiments  of 
infantry,  and  by  the  immediate  filling  up  of  the 
coast  artillery  to  its  full  war  strength. 

Believing  as  I  do  that  the  supply  of  machine 
guns  for  the  army  is  absurdly  inadequate,  and 
that  the  method  of  drawing  the  machine-gun  squads 


1 62     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

from  regiments  already  in  service,  while  retaining 
these  squads  as  a  part  of  such  regiments,  is  wrong 
in  theory  and  utterly  inefficient  in  practice,  I  re- 
commend the  immediate  organization  of  seventy 
machine-gun  batteries,  each  battery  to  consist  of 
sixteen  machine  guns,  and  to  be  commanded  by 
a  captain  and  two  lieutenants  and  to  be  manned 
by  1 60  men.  The  organization  of  seventy  bat- 
teries of  machine  guns  will  allow  a  battery  to  each 
regiment  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  and  two  bat- 
teries to  each  regiment  of  artillery.  This  assign- 
ment of  batteries  of  machine  guns  is  purely 
arbitrary,  and  in  actual  war  the  number  of  machine 
guns  would  have  to  be  materially  increased.  The 
system  of  machine-gun  batteries,  with  sixteen  guns 
to  each  battery,  is  so  much  better  than  the  present 
army  system  that  it  may  be  considered  to  be 
almost  revolutionary  in  effect. 

By  divorcing  the  machine  guns  entirely  from 
the  regiments  to  which  they  are  now  attached, 
the  mobility  of  the  regiments  will  be  greatly 
increased.  By  grouping  the  machine  guns  into 
batteries,  and  by  organizing  the  batteries  into 
demi-brigades  consisting  of  two  or  three  batteries 
for  service  with  an  infantry  brigade,  as  such  brigade 
shall  consist  of  two  or  three  regiments  of  infantry, 
and  of  two  batteries  for  service  with  a  cavalry 
brigade,  and  their  association  with  the  infantry 
and  cavalry  brigades  of  the  army  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  brigade  commanders,  the  best  organ- 


Conscription  163 

ization  of  machine-gun  fire  will  be  obtained,  and 
the  greatest  mobility  of  the  machine  guns  will  be 
secured.  The  batteries  of  machine  guns  to  serve 
with  the  field  artillery  should  be  organized  into 
demi-brigades  of  two  batteries  to  each  regiment 
of  field  artillery,  each  battery  of  machine  guns 
to  be  associated  with  a  battalion  of  field  artillery, 
and  to  be  under  the  command  of  the  artillery 
battalion  commander. 

It  is  believed,  as  has  been  heretofore  stated  in 
this  book,  that  the  association  of  a  demi-brigade 
of  two  batteries  of  machine  guns  with  each  regi- 
ment of  field  artillery  will  furnish  greater  support 
to  the  guns  when  in  action,  so  far  as  fire  support  is 
concerned,  than  infantry  can  give,  because  of  the 
concentration,  the  rapidity,  and  the  scope  of  fire 
of  the  machine  guns;  and  this  remark  is  made  in 
the  full  consciousness  that  modern  tactics  provide 
for  the  concealment  of  artillery  in  action  wherever 
possible. 

In  addition  to  the  above  conservative  recom- 
mendations for  the  reorganization  of  West  Point 
and  of  the  army,  the  establishment  of  the  reserve 
army  should  be  begun  by  the  conscription  of 
200,000  men  the  first  year,  to  be  followed  each 
year  thereafter  by  a  similar  call  for  conscripts  of 
200,000  men  until  there  should  be  created  a  re- 
serve army  of  800,000  men,  and  then  to  be  fol- 
lowed each  year  thereafter  by  the  conscription  of 
160,000  men,  or  of  such  number  of  men  as  may 


164     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

be  required  to  meet  the  discharge  from  the  army 
of  one  fifth  of  the  reserve  army  at  the  end  of  its 
five-year  term  of  service,  and  to  fill  the  places  in 
the  army  left  vacant  by  desertion,  death,  and  other 
casualties  of  the  service.  Full  allowance  should 
be  made  for  these  casualties  of  the  service  such  as 
desertion,  death,  etc.,  and  for  this  purpose  it  is 
recommended  that  10,000  men  be  specifically 
drafted  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  ranks  so  created; 
and  that  each  year  in  preparing  the  proclamation 
for  the  conscription  allowance  should  be  made  for 
such  casualties.  In  war  the  reserves  will  be  called 
to  the  colours,  and  will  themselves  furnish  the 
recruits  to  take  the  place  in  the  ranks  of  the  active 
army  of  the  killed,  wounded,  and  captured,  which 
should,  however,  be  estimated  for  in  the  call  or- 
dering the  conscription.  The  number  of  men 
needed  for  the  army  in  time  of  war  should  be  de- 
termined by  the  government,  on  the  breaking  out 
of  war,  and  the  call  should  be  based  upon  such 
demand  so  determined,  whether  that  demand 
shall  seem  to  be  for  the  full  reserve  of  800,000 
men  or  for  a  much  larger  number  of  men  than  the 
reserve  army  can  at  once  furnish.  The  object  of 
conscription  being  to  supply  the  army  with  the 
necessary  number  of  men,  the  call  for  troops  to  be 
raised  by  conscription  should  be  for  the  number  of 
men  believed  to  be  necessary  to  fill  the  army,  both 
active  and  reserve,  to  the  needed  strength  for 
war. 


Conscription  165 

These  requirements  will  probably  call  for  a  con- 
scription the  first  year  under  the  new  system  of 
310,000  men  as  follows: 

A.  To  bring  the   regiments    of   the 

army   now   in    service    to   war 

strength 31,500  men 

B.  To  provide  the  ten  new  regiments 

of  infantry,  the  year's  allotment       18,360  men 

C.  To  fill  the  corps  of  coast  artillery 

to  full  strength 13,108  men 

D.  To  man  70  batteries  of  machine 

guns,  1 6  machine  guns  to  a  bat- 
tery and  10  men  to  a  gun,  160 
men  and  3  officers  to  a  battery . .       1 1,200  men 

E.  To  make  allowance  for  casualties 

in  the  army 10,000  men 

The  year's  demand  for  the  active 

army 84,168  men 

F.  To  furnish  recruits  for  the  navy 

and  the  marine  corps 25,000  men 

109,168  men 

G.  To  effect  the  organization  of  the 

reserve  army 200,000  men 

309,168  men 

Or  a  proposed  draft  the  first  year  of  conscrip- 
tion of  310,000  men. 

These  estimates  are  submitted  for  the  purpose 
of  showing  the  operation  of  the  plan  of  conscrip- 
tion. Should  conscription  be  adopted  by  the 


1 66     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

government  as  the  means  of  recruiting  and  main- 
taining the  army  and  navy,  it  will  be  the  duty  of 
the  General  Staff  to  work  out  detailed  estimates 
for  the  conscription.  This  remark  applies  to  all 
of  the  estimates  submitted  in  this  book. 

The  demand  for  officers  for  the  ten  new  regi- 
ments of  infantry  should  be  supplied  as  follows : 

Ten  lieutenant-colonels  of  the  present  army  to 
be  promoted  to  be  colonels  of  the  ten  new  regi- 
ments, and  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel  to  be 
abolished  throughout  the  line  of  the  army  as  ob- 
solete, except  in  the  case  of  the  field  artillery, 
after  provision  shall  have  been  made  for  the  present 
incumbents. 

The  other  officers  of  the  ten  new  regiments  to 
the  number  of  390  to  be  drawn,  30  majors  and 
1 20  captains,  from  the  line  of  the  present  army, 
and  the  240  lieutenants  to  be  furnished  by  the  im- 
mediate and  arbitrary  graduation  of  a  sufficient 
number  of  cadets  from  the  first,  second,  and  third 
classes  at  the  Military  Academy. 

The  566  officers  required  to  bring  the  coast  artil- 
lery corps  to  full  war  strength  should  be  drawn  from 
the  officers  of  the  army,  those  now  on  detached 
service  supplying  the  place  of  those  drawn  from 
the  line  of  the  army  for  the  coast  artillery,  and 
from  the  surplus  cadets  of  the  Military  Acad- 
emy, to  be  arbitrarily  graduated  from  the  first, 
second,  and  third  classes;  and  from  the  non- 
commissioned officers  of  the  army.  These  sources 


Conscription  167 

of  supply  will,  it  is  believed,  be  found  to  be 
sufficient  to  officer  this  branch  of  the  army. 
But  should  it  occur  that  these  sources  of  sup- 
ply of  officers  should  be  insufficient,  then  re- 
course must  be  had  to  the  graduates  of  the  various 
military  schools  of  the  country,  to  the  colleges 
maintaining  military  instruction,  and  to  the  offi- 
cers of  the  National  Guard,  selections  to  be  made 
by  competitive  examination;  full  consideration  to 
be  given,  however,  in  making  appointments  to 
the  records  of  the  officers  of  the  National  Guard. 

Notification  of  such  appointments,  by  com- 
petitive examination  to  be  given  broadly  to  the 
country. 

It  may  be  safely  estimated  that  the  three  classes 
which  it  is  proposed  shall  be  arbitrarily  graduated 
from  the  Military  Academy  under  its  present  orga- 
nization, will  aggregate  450  young  men,  which  will 
provide  for  the  240  lieutenants  required  by  the 
ten  new  regiments  of  infantry,  and  will  furnish 
210  young  officers  to  take  the  place  numerically 
of  a  similar  number  of  officers  drawn  from  the 
army  to  supply  officers  for  the  ten  new  regiments 
of  infantry  above  the  rank  of  lieutenant,  and 
certain  of  the  officers  of  the  machine-gun  bat- 
teries to  be  mobilized  for  service  with  the  active 
army. 

This  arrangement  of  officers  will  tend  to  carry 
out  the  conditions  of  this  plan,  as  far  as  possible, 
for  supplying  the  active  army  with  officers  who 


1 68     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

shall  have  been  graduated  at  theMilitary  Academy, 
and  will  result  in  all  of  the  officers  of  the  ten  new 
regiments  of  infantry  being  drawn  from  the  army 
and  the  Military  Academy. 

The  non-commissioned  officers  for  the  ten  new 
regiments  of  infantry  should  be  drawn  from  the 
present  army,  a  corresponding  number  of  con- 
scripts drawn  for  those  new  regiments  being  turned 
over  to  the  old  regiments  to  fill  the  vacancies  so 
made  in  the  ranks. 

If  the  small  and  unnecessary  posts  throughout 
the  country  be  abandoned,  and  so  much  of  the 
army  as  may  not  be  required  for  frontier  duty, 
together  with  the  reserve  army,  be  distributed  in 
camps  of  instruction  like  that  of  Aldershot,  it  is 
believed  that  the  present  allotment  of  staff  officers 
will  be  entirely  able  to  take  care  of  the  needs  of  the 
increased  army,  active  and  reserve,  although  it 
is  quite  probable  that  they  will  have  to  work 
much  harder  than  they  find  it  necessary  to  do  at 
present. 

The  colonels  of  regiments  and  the  adjutants  of 
regiments  of  the  reserve  army  should  be  drawn 
from  the  officers  of  the  regular  or  active  army  or 
from  the  Military  Academy. 

The  balance  of  the  officers  of  the  reserve  army, 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  four  thousand,  should  be 
drawn  as  far  as  possible  from  the  non-commissioned 
officers  of  the  army,  and  from  the  country  at  large, 
until  the  Military  Academy  shall  be  able  to  supply 


Conscription  169 

the  reserve  army  with  officers  from  the  two-year 
graduates.  Competitive  examinations,  and  re- 
course to  the  army,  the  military  schools,  the  col- 
leges maintaining  military  instruction,  the  National 
Guard,  and  to  the  bright  young  men  of  the  country 
should  bring  to  the  colours  a  class  next  best  to 
that  produced  by  the  Military  Academy.  From 
these  young  men  the  officers  of  the  reserve  army 
should  be  selected. 

As  the  reserve  army  should  be  primarily  an  army 
under  instruction,  but  notwithstanding  this  fact  in- 
tended to  be  an  integral  part  of  the  regular  army, 
there  is  no  need  of  cumbering  the  army  with  a  large 
number  of  general  officers  and  their  staffs.  The 
colonels  of  the  reserve  army  can  act  as  brigade 
commanders.  When  the  brigades  are  grouped  in 
divisions  for  tactical  instruction,  colonels  can  also 
act  as  division  commanders  if  necessary,  although 
in  respect  to  the  command  of  the  divisions  of  the 
reserve  army,  it  may  be  well  to  have  them  com- 
manded by  brigadier-generals  of  the  army. 

As  instruction  is  primarily  the  duty  of  the  offi- 
cers of  the  reserve  army,  when  the  troops  are 
sufficiently  advanced  for  brigade  and  division 
manoeuvres,  these  should  be  held  under  the  orders 
of  the  commanding  officer  of  each  of  the  large 
camps  of  instruction  in  connection  with  so  much 
of  the  active  army  as  may  be  camped  with  the 
reserve  army.  These  combined  manoeuvres  will 
afford  such  an  excellent  opportunity  for  the  study 


170     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

of  numbers  by  officers  of  the  active  army,  that  it  is 
thought  that  they  should  be  held  under  the  com- 
mand of  a  major-general  of  the  army,  and  that  all 
officers  of  the  army  who  can  be  spared  from  other 
duties  should  be  invited  to  be  present  at  the  man- 
oeuvres and  be  attached  to  the  staff  of  the  Com- 
manding General.  As  the  work  of  creating  the 
reserve  army  progresses,  the  autumn  manoeuvres 
should  expand  to  comprehend  the  operations  of  the 
troops  belonging  to  several  of  the  camps  of  in- 
struction, in  time  reaching  the  proportions  of  an 
active  army  on  a  war  basis,  as  proposed  in  the 
following  chapter.  In  these  monceuvres,  as  stated 
above,  the  corps  of  cadets  of  the  Military  Academy 
should  participate,  the  corps  being  organized  as  a 
Brigade  of  Cavalry,  and  a  Regiment  of  Artillery. 

The  second  year's  conscripts,  taking  the  place 
of  those  released  after  one  year's  course  of  instruc- 
tion in  the  instruction  camps,  will  be  under  the 
command  and  instruction  of  substantially  the  same 
officers  who  gave  instruction  to  the  men  of  the  first 
year's  service.  The  officers  of  the  troops  in  the  in- 
struction camps  will  be  regarded  as  officers  of  the 
reserve  army,  except  that  they  should  be  subject  to 
transfer  at  any  time  to  the  active  army  by  order 
of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

As  to  the  method  of  selection  of  the  permanent 
officers  of  the  reserve  army,  permanent  at  least 
until  discharged  at  the  end  of  their  five-year  term 
of  service;  that  is  to  say  of  the  officers  of  that 


Conscription  171 

section  of  the  reserve  army  discharged  from  the 
camps  of  instruction  after  one  year's  service  and 
training,  but  with  four  years  of  service  yet  to  ren- 
der on  call  to  the  colours  by  the  President  in  time 
of  war;  they  should  be  chosen  by  competitive 
examination  from  among,  first,  a  class  of  soldiers 
to  be  known  and  designated  as  the  one-year  volun- 
teers, and  second,  generally  from  the  men  them- 
selves, until  such  time  as  the  Military  Academy 
shall  be  able  to  graduate  enough  two-year  men 
to  fill  the  demand  for  officers  of  the  reserve  army. 

The  class  of  one-year  volunteers  in  the  reserve 
army  should  be  composed  of  young  men  who 
volunteer  for  service  in  the  reserve  army,  but  who 
may  not  have  been  drawn  for  service  at  the  con- 
scription, on  the  condition  that  they  should  stand 
first  in  the  competition  for  officers  of  the  reserve 
army  after  their  service  of  one  year  in  the  ranks 
of  the  reserves  had  been  had. 

This  process  of  officering  the  reserve  army  would 
be  put  in  practice  each  year  to  officer  the  troops 
of  the  reserve  army  who  have  completed  their 
first  year's  service  in  the  camps  of  instruction. 
It  is  believed  that  in  time  the  Military  Academy 
at  West  Point  will  be  able  to  graduate  not  only  a 
sufficient  number  of  officers  for  the  active  army, 
but  also  for  a  part  at  least  of  the  officers  for  the 
reserve  army,  and  until  such  time  arrives  the  ap- 
pointment of  officers  for  the  reserve  army  should 
be  made  as  above. 


172     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

To  encourage  the  entrance  into  the  reserve  army 
of  a  superior  class  of  young  men,  a  system  of  one- 
year  volunteer  service,  somewhat  similar  to  the 
one-year  volunteer  service  of  the  German  army, 
should  be  introduced,  such  service  leading  to  com- 
missions in  the  reserve  army.  And  for  the  same 
purpose  of  raising  the  character  of  the  officers  of 
the  reserve  army,  selected  men  from  the  active 
army  should  be  transferred  to  the  reserve  army, 
there  to  be  considered  to  rank  with  the  one-year 
volunteers  as  candidates  for  commissions  in  the 
reserve  army,  after  passing,  of  course,  the  neces- 
sary examinations  for  promotion  as  officers  in  the 
reserve  army. 

The  active  army  should  yield  up  to  the  reserve 
army  a  certain  number  of  non-commissioned 
officers  for  duty  as  drill  sergeants,  whose  place  in 
the  ranks  of  the  active  army  should  be  filled  by 
transfers  from  the  reserve  army,  it  being  the  condi- 
tion of  the  conscription,  that  all  drawn  for  service 
in  the  army  should  serve  for  the  period  of  five 
years  with  the  colours,  the  differentiation  into 
troops  of  the  reserve  army  only  to  take  place  when 
and  after  the  ranks  of  the  active  army  shall  have 
been  filled  to  war  strength. 

I  favour  the  creation  of  an  active  army  of  two 
hundred  thousand  men,  the  rank  and  file  to  be 
called  to  the  colours  by  conscription.  I  have  only 
modified  the  plan  of  creating  an  active  army 
of  two  hundred  thousand  men  at  once,  because  of 


Conscription  173 

the  impossibility  of  getting  a  sufficient  number  of 
trained  and  educated  officers  at  the  beginning 
of  the  execution  of  the  plan  to  carry  it  into  effect 
in  its  entirety. 

But  upon  one  point  there  should  not  be  the 
slightest  doubt,  viz.,  that  the  reserve  army,  being 
the  support  of  the  active  army,  should  always  be 
ready  to  yield  up  men  to  re-enforce  the  active  army 
depleted  in  battle,  or  by  the  exigencies  of  service. 
The  regiments  of  the  active  army  should  always 
be  kept  at  full  war  strength.  The  conscription 
should  be  for  the  term  of  five  years,  and  should  be 
based  upon  the  principle  of  maintaining  an  army  of 
one  million  men,  two  hundred  thousand  of  whom 
should  constitute  the  active  army,  and  eight  hun- 
dred thousand  of  whom  should  constitute  the 
reserve  army.  The  conscription  of  each  year 
should  be  based  upon  the  maintenance  of  an  army 
of  one  million  men,  with  sufficient  allowance  for 
all  losses  from  whatsoever  cause  they  may  occur. 
The  instruction  camps  of  the  reserve  army  should 
be  the  depots  for  the  replenishing  of  the  strength 
of  the  active  army.  Whether  the  reserve  army 
should  be  classified  into  an  active  or  passive  re- 
serve, that  is  to  say,  whether,  when  the  year's 
allotment  under  conscription  reports  for  duty  at 
the  instruction  camp  it  should  be  divided  into  a 
depot  reserve  for  the  active  army,  and  an  organized 
reserve  army,  I  scarcely  think  worth  considering 
at  the  present  moment,  because  it  will  require 


174     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

several  years  in  which  to  fully  develop  the  system, 
and  experience  will  teach  the  best  method  of  co- 
ordinating the  troops  of  the  reserve  army.  I  think 
the  proper  method  of  arranging  for  the  ready  flow 
of  recruits  to  the  regiments  of  the  active  army  from 
the  camps  of  instruction  is,  that  in  the  proclama- 
tion calling  out  the  contingent  for  the  year  the 
number  of  men  to  be  assigned  to  the  active  army 
shouldjbe  stated,  and  the  number  of  probable  re- 
cruits needed  by  the  active  army  in  that  year  to 
fill  losses  and  vacancies  should  also  be  st  ted, 
and  the  aggregate  of  these  two  lists  of  recruits 
should  be  called  for  service  in  the  active  army  for 
the  period  of  five  years;  the  balance  of  the  call 
being  for  the  reserve  army. 

The  camps  of  instruction  should  be  the  general 
army  depots  for  recruits,  not  regimental  depots 
be  it  understood,  but  the  general  army  depots 
whence  recruits  for  the  different  commands  of 
the  service  should  be  drawn. 

The  camps  of  instruction  should  be  located 
throughout  the  country.  One  large  camp  should 
be  established  in  New  England;  one  in  New  York; 
one  in  Pennsylvania ;  one  at  the  Chickamauga  Mili- 
tary Park,  in  Georgia;  one  in  either  Ohio,  Indiana, 
or  Illinois;  one  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  if  the  reserva- 
tion be  yet  intact;  one  at  Fort  Riley;  one  at  Fort 
Sill,  and  one  or  two  camps  on  the  Pacific  Coast. 
This  plan  of  distribution  would  locate  the  instruc- 
tion camps  throughout  the  country  in  regard  to 


Conscription  175 

population,  provisions,  railway  communication, 
manufacturing  resources,  etc.  The  government 
should  be  expected  to  buy  sufficiently  large  areas 
to  accommodate  these  instruction  camps  with 
camp  sites,  parade  grounds,  and  manoeuvre 
grounds  for  the  troops. 

The  President  and  his  military  advisers,  should 
necessity  seem  to  demand  the  immediate  crea- 
tion of  an  active  army  of  two  hundred  thousand 
men,  or  of  one  million  men,  could,  after  suitable 
legislation  has  been  had,  order  a  draft  for  two 
hundred  thousand  men  or  for  one  million  men 
as  the  case  might  be,  for  the  active  army  and  for 
the  reserve  army,  the  reserve  army  in  case  of  war 
to  be  mobilized  for  its  place  in  the  first  line  of 
defence.  The  President  would  have  to  face  the 
objection  to  such  a  mobilization  that  the  War 
Department  could  not  provide  efficient  officers  for 
such  a  large  army,  active  and  reserve.  But  that 
is  our  present  misfortune,  and  will  be  our  trouble 
until  the  Military  Academy  shall  be  enlarged  as  I 
suggest. 

After  the  first  year  of  the  enlargement  of  the 
Military  Academy  and  the  establishment  of  the 
two-year  course,  the  Academy  will  be  able  to 
furnish  a  considerable  number  of  graduates,  ap- 
proaching in  number  the  demand  of  the  active 
army  for  officers,  and  by  the  end  of  the  second  or 
third  year,  the  Military  Academy  will  not  only 
be  able  to  supply  the  demand  for  officers  from  the 


176     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

active  army  with  two-year  graduates,  but  also  will 
be  ready  to  begin  the  graduation  of  officers  for  the 
reserve  army. 

The  above  estimates  of  the  military  require- 
ments of  this  plan  are  given  as  illustrations.  In 
the  matter  of  the  batteries  of  machine  guns  I  may 
have  overestimated  or  underestimated  the  num- 
ber of  men  to  be  assigned  to  each  gun.  It  has 
seemed  to  me,  however,  that  an  allowance  of  ten 
men  to  each  machine  gun  is  ample,  and  that  an 
ample  allowance  for  casualties  in  action  has  also 
been  made. 

I  have  used  the  tables  of  organization,  edition  of 
1914,  of  the  United  States  army  as  the  basis  of  my 
calculations  for  the  new  regiments  of  infantry 
proposed  to  be  organized.  I  do  not  say,  however, 
that  these  estimates  cannot  be  improved  upon. 

What  I  contend  for  is  the  enlargement  of  the 
Military  Academy  to  accommodate  a  cadet  corps  of  at 
least  thirty-six  hundred  men,  and  the  adoption  of  the 
principle  of  conscription  as  the  means  of  filling  up  the 
active  army  and  creating  the  reserve  army. 

I  contend  that  the  first  need  of  the  army  is  an 
ample  supply  of  well  educated  and  instructed 
officers. 

/  contend  that  the  day  of  volunteer  armies  has 
passed.  As  an  officer  of  volunteers  of  the  great 
war  I  state  this  belief  with  sincere  sadness,  but 
with  unalterable  confidence  in  the  soundness  of  my 
judgment.  Believing  in  the  soundness  of  this 


Conscription  177 

opinion  I  should  be  false  in  my  duty  to  my  country 
if  I  failed  to  utter  it. 

The  conditions  of  modern  war  have  so  changed 
that  what  did  very  well  fifty  years  ago  will  not  do 
today. 

The  slow  process  of  creating  volunteer  armies 
renders  volunteers  impossible  as  a  force  for  modern 
war. 

Remember  that  Germany  declared  war  against 
Russia  on  August  1st.  That  she  violated  the 
neutrality  of  Luxemburg  on  August  2d,  that  she 
invaded  Belgium  August  3d,  that  she  opened  her 
assault  on  Liege  on  August  4th,  that  by  August 
2Oth  Brussels,  the  capital  of  Belgium,  was  in  her 
hands,  and  that  by  August  22d,  Huy  and  Namur, 
whose  fortifications  had  been  destroyed  by  her 
high-power  guns,  were  in  her  possession,  and  that 
within  twenty  days  from  her  first  assault  upon 
Liege,  the  north-eastern  frontier  of  France  was 
open  to  her,  the  gallant  little  army  of  Belgium 
having  been  brushed  from  her  path. 

How  with  such  a  record  before  us  can  we  cling 
to  the  system  of  raising  armies  by  voluntary 
enlistment? 

England  has  relied  upon  a  volunteer  army,  and 
yet  today,  one  year  and  over  from  the  declaration 
of  war  by  Germany,  she  is  not  ready.  Even  now, 
while  I  write,  she  is  discussing  the  question  of 
conscription.  She  must  have  more  troops  than 
the  voluntary  system  of  enlistment  will  give  her, 


178     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

and  she  is  slowly  but  surely  turning  to  conscription 
as  her  only  relief. 

Shall  we  not  profit  by  her  sad  plight? 

Shall  we  not  take  warning  from  the  rapid  ad- 
vance of  ready  Germany  into  and  through  Belgium? 

I  hold  that  conscription  is  the  only  way  that  a 
modern  army  can  be  created  and  maintained. 

I  ask  with  my  whole  heart  that  my  countrymen 
will  be  warned,  and  that  they  will  firmly  and  with 
calmness  adopt  the  modern  method  of  creating 
and  maintaining  armies — conscription. 

Through  conscription  we  may  hope  to  be  ready 
when  the  sad  day  shall  come,  as  surely  it  will  come, 
that  our  country  will  be  attacked  by  a  foreign 
enemy.  Without  conscription  we  shall  then  be 
as  unready  as  we  are  now  unready  to  resist  attack. 
Vast  resources  unmobilized  are  a  source  of  weak- 
ness rather  than  a  source  of  strength. 

If  ready,  as  we  should  be,  when  the  sad  day 
of  war  shall  come,  we  can  face  our  enemy  with 
resolution,  and  await  the  outcome  of  war  with 
calmness  in  the  confidence  of  victory. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  AN  ARMY   FOR  WAR 

T^HERE  is  no  natural  or  invariable  unit  of 
1  organization  and  administration  for  an  army. 
The  attempt  to  establish  such  a  unit  is  an  arbi- 
trary act:  quite  as  arbitrary  as  the  determination 
of  the  strength  of  a  company  of  infantry.  Opin- 
ions differ  upon  the  latter  point,  Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral Bates  holding  "that  the  enlisted  strength  of  a 
company  of  infantry  should  not  be  greater  than 
104,"  and  adds,  "I  believe  this  is  as  large  a  body 
as  a  captain,  not  mounted,  can  control,  and  I 
think  the  commander  of  a  company  of  infantry 
should  not  be  mounted. "  That  is  to  say,  General 
Bates  thinks  that  the  strength  of  a  company  of 
infantry  should  be  about  the  strength  of  a  com- 
pany of  infantry  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  great 
war,  whereas  the  strength  of  a  company  of  in- 
fantry of  the  German  army  is  225  men,  the  captain 
being  a  mounted  officer.  The  war  strength  of  a 
company  of  infantry  of  the  United  States  army 
is  at  present  three  officers  and  142  enlisted  men. 

i79 


i8o     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Here  we  have  three  separate  authorities,  all 
supposed  to  be  excellent,  each  differing  from  the 
other  as  to  the  very  corner-stone  of  military  organ- 
ization and  administration,  the  strength  of  a 
company  of  infantry. 

I  prefer  the  basis  of  strength  of  a  company  of 
infantry  given  by  General  Bates  to  either  that  of 
the  German  system  or  to  that  of  the  tables 
of  organization  issued  by  the  General  Staff  of  the 
army,  not  only  because  I  agree  with  General  Bates 
as  to  "  104  men  being  as  large  a  body  as  a  captain, 
not  mounted,  can  control/'  but  also  because  the 
expansion  of  a  company  of  infantry  to  145  officers 
and  men  throws  out  of  line  all  of  our  hitherto 
accepted  estimates  for  the  organization  of  regi- 
ments, brigades,  divisions,  army  corps,  and  armies. 
A  company  of  104  men  will  develop  throughout 
these  organisms  in  a  most  harmonious  manner, 
whereas  a  company  of  145  officers  and  men  under 
the  plan  of  the  General  Staff,  which  combines  the 
three  arms  of  the  service  in  a  divisional  organiza- 
tion, if  carried  along  the  line  of  progression,  will 
develop  such  large  bodies  of  troops  by  the  time  the 
organization  of  an  army  corps  or  an  army  is 
reached  as  to  produce  immobility. 

The  Division,  as  now  established  in  the  army  of 
the  United  States,  is  evidently  intended  to  supplant 
the  army  corps  in  the  military  system,  where- 
as the  army  corps,  born  of  the  great  war,  super- 
seded the  all-inclusive  division  because  experience 


A  War  Army  181 

demonstrated  its  usefulness.  This  change  was  made 
as  the  result  of  observation  and  experience  in  the 
field  during  the  war,  which  observation  and  experi- 
ence had  a  broadening  influence  upon  the  minds  of 
the  officers  then  at  the  head  of  the  army.  These 
officers,  and  I  am  speaking  of  the  officers  of  the 
regular  army,  grew  in  intelligence  and  in  broad- 
mindedness  as  the  war  progressed;  and,  as  they 
realized  the  necessity  of  the  utmost  mobility  in 
armies,  they  modified  the  organization  of  armies 
to  correspond  with  their  enlarged  perception. 

Fifty  years  have  passed,  and  we  find  some  of  the 
officers  of  the  army  wandering  back  to  the  twilight 
days  just  before  the  breaking  out  of  the  great  war, 
when  armies  were  things  of  dreams  and  military 
organization  a  matter  of  theory. 

There  was  little  time  for,  and  less  patience  with, 
theory  after  the  war  began.  Experience,  daily 
experience,  guided  judgment,  and  the  division, 
as  it  was  constituted  at  the  breaking  out  of  the 
war,  was  gradually  modified,  and  the  organization 
of  the  army  corps  was  introduced  between  the 
division  and  the  army,  becoming  a  component 
part  of  the  army  organization,  because  it  was 
found  that  the  army  corps  lent  itself  to  a  more 
harmonious  association  of  the  three  arms  of  the 
service  in  an  army,  produced  greater  mobility,  and 
consequently  greater  efficiency,  than  could  be  se- 
cured from  the  divisional  system  of  organization. 

That  the  officers  of  the  army  of  the  present  day 


1 82     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

should  be  led  away  from  the  military  system  de- 
vised and  adopted  by  Grant,  Sherman,  Sheridan, 
Thomas,  and  Meade,  and  by  such  staff  officers 
as  Townsend,  Seth  Williams,  Fry,  Vincent,  and 
Breck,  would  be  unaccountable,  but  for  the  fact 
that  new  times  make  men  restive  of  the  instruction 
of  experience,  and  dissatisfied  with  whatsoever  has 
been  demonstrated,  a  temper  of  mind  which  finds 
relief  in  change  merely  because  it  is  change,  for- 
getful of  the  fact  that  change,  mere  change,  does 
not  necessarily  mean  improvement. 

My  object  in  presenting  these  views  as  to  the 
organization  of  an  army  is  to  lend  practical  aid  to 
the  work  of  preparing  the  army  of  the  United 
States  for  war.  I  find  myself  somewhat  hampered 
in  presenting  my  views  by  the  increase  in  the 
strength  of  a  company  of  infantry  from  about 
100  to  145  officers  and  men,  and  by  the  consequent 
increase  in  strength  of  the  regiment,  the  brigade, 
and  the  division,  as  given  in  the  tables  of  organiza- 
tion of  the  army. 

I  do  not  favour  a  company  of  infantry  of  145 
officers  and  men,  but  agree  with  Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral Bates  in  preferring  a  company  of  104  officers 
and  men.  Nevertheless,  I  have  decided  to  use  the 
standard  war  strength  of  a  regiment  of  infantry 
as  given  in  the  1914  tables  of  organization  of  the 
General  Staff  for  the  calculations  of  this  chapter, 
not  because  it  is  the  best,  but  simply  because  it 
is  my  wish  to  render  a  practical  service  in  aid  of 


A  War  Army  183 

army  reorganization,  without,  however,  sacrificing 
too  much  of  the  principle  of  army  organization  in 
which  I  believe,  and  which  I  advocate. 

I  have  always  believed  in  a  brigade  of  three 
regiments  of  infantry  of  from  3000  to  3500  officers 
and  men.  But  for  the  purposes  of  this  proposition, 
I  have  decided  to  use  a  brigade  of  infantry  con- 
sisting of  two  regiments  of  standard  strength,  each 
regiment  to  consist  of  (51)  officers  and  1836  enlisted 
men,  total  war  strength  1887  officers  and  men,  or 
an  infantry  brigade  of  3774  officers  and  men.  To 
this  strength  of  a  brigade  of  infantry  I  propose 
should  be  added  a  demi-brigade  of  two  machine- 
gun  companies,  aggregating  thirty-two  machine 
guns,  and  a  company  of  pioneers,  all  to  be  under 
the  command  of  the  brigade  commander.  Whether 
a  brigade  shall  consist  of  three  moderate-sized 
regiments  or  of  two  large  regiments,  should  be 
determined  by  the  convenience  of  the  system,  and 
not  by  the  ipse  dixit  of  any  officer  or  of  any  group 
of  officers. 

By  reference  to  the  Table  "  A, "  infantry  division, 
of  the  tables  of  organization  of  the  General  Staff, 
it  will  be  found  that  the  General  Staff  has  at- 
tached "one  pioneer  battalion  of  engineers "  to 
the  division,  making  them  divisional  troops. 

I  cannot  agree  with  the  proposition  that  "pi- 
oneers," as  a  distinct  entity,  are  divisional  troops. 
Experience  in  war  teaches  that  they  are  essentially 
brigade  troops. 


1 84    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Nor  do  I  regard  pioneers  as  forming,  other  than 
technically,  a  part  of  an  engineer  regiment.  They 
are  the  axe-men  and  the  shovel-men  of  an  army. 
They  can  build  and  do  build  crib  bridges,  lay 
corduroy  roads,  throw  up  field  works,  but  they 
should  not  be  expected  to  lay  pontoon  bridges,  to 
construct  permanent  works,  or  to  head  an  assaulting 
column  in  a  breach  which  engineers  might,  under 
certain  circumstances,  be  required  to  do,  nor  are 
they  expected  to  have  the  technical  training  of 
engineers.  Indeed  I  should  regard  it  as  a  waste 
of  technical  education  to  put  engineers  to  do  much 
of  the  work  which  pioneers  should  be  required  to 
do  as  their  regular  ^duty;  and  it  was  because  of 
the  supposed  technical  education  and  superiority 
of  the  engineer  troops  that,  during  the  great  war, 
we  came  to  use  pioneers,  negro  pioneers,  instead  of 
engineers,  for  all  the  rude  work  of  a  campaign 
such  as  corduroying,  crib  bridge-building,  the 
throwing  up  of  field  works,  etc.;  although  it  is 
only  proper  to  say  that  our  volunteer  infantry 
fully  and  freely  joined  with  the  pioneers  in  this 
crude  engineering  work  of  crib  bridge-building, 
corduroying,  and  field  works  construction,  so  that 
I  think  I  am  quite  within  bounds  in  saying  that 
every  colonel  of  a  volunteer  regiment  was,  to  this 
extent,  an  efficient  practical  engineer,  often  more 
practical  than  the  engineers,  graduates  of  the 
Academy,  who  were  serving  with  troops. 

In  our  negroes  of  the  South  we  have  the  material 


A  War  Army  185 

for  the  best  pioneer  troops  in  the  world.  Under 
white  officers  they  work  cheerfully,  efficiently, 
and  unstintingly,  and  seem  to  possess  a  natural 
aptitude  for  such  work  as  they  may  be  required 
to  perform.  I  should,  in  the  light  of  the  experience 
furnished  by  the  great  war,  unhesitatingly  recom- 
mend the  employment  of  the  negroes  of  the  South 
as  pioneers  for  the  army,  the  officers  of  pioneers  to 
be  white  men.  I  may  surprise  some  officers  of  the 
army  by  suggesting  that  the  officers  for  these 
negro  pioneer  troops  should  be  drawn  from  among 
the  young  civil  engineers  of  the  country,  men 
regularly  engaged  in  the  work  of  railway  construc- 
tion, earth  digging,  drainage,  roadbuilding,  etc., 
because  they  get  closer  to  their  work  than  the 
officers  of  engineers  of  the  army,  and  in  this  rough 
work  would  be  much  more  efficient  than  they. 

One  of  the  greatest,  and  judged  by  its  result 
the  most  successful  piece  of  engineering  work  done 
during  the  great  war  was  that  of  the  rescue  of 
Admiral  Porter's  fleet  in  the  Red  River.  This 
work  was  conceived  and  carried  through  by  Colonel 
Joseph  Bailey  of  the  Wisconsin  Volunteer  In- 
fantry, the  men  of  whose  regiment  were  chiefly 
lumbermen  of  the  Wisconsin  woods,  where  also 
Colonel  Bailey  had  learned  to  become  a  practical 
engineer.  Admiral  Chadwick  in  his  book,  The 
American  Navy,  speaking  of  Porter's  fleet  and  the 
Red  River  Expedition,  says:  "The  building  of  the 
famous  dam  by  Colonel  Bailey  of  the  volunteers, 


1 86    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

and  the  successful  passage  thereby  of  the  fleet 
into  deeper  water,  is  one  of  the  great  dramatic 
events  of  the  war. " 

It  is  well  known  that  Admiral  Porter  contem- 
plated blowing  up  his  ships  when  Colonel  Bailey 
offered  to  extricate  the  fleet  from  its  perilous  posi- 
tion if  the  commanding  General  would  order 
a  sufficient  number  of  soldiers  to  his  assistance  to 
enable  him  to  work  out  his  conception. 

Bailey  and  the  volunteer  soldiers  from  the  army, 
for  the  nonce  converted  into  pioneers,  did  their 
work  thoroughly  and  well,  and  Porter's  fleet  floated 
to  safety  in  the  deep  water  below  the  obstructions 
at  the  shoals  of  the  Red  River 

The  pioneers  should  be  mobilized  only  when  war 
breaks  out  or  is  imminent.  In  peace  they  would 
be  a  useless  expense  to  the  government. 

As  I  do  not  believe  in  attaching  machine  guns  to 
a  regiment  of  infantry,  because  the  mobility  of  the 
regiment  is  lessened,  and  its  freedom  of  action 
hampered  thereby,  I  have  proposed  elsewhere  in 
this  book,  the  organization  of  machine  guns  into 
batteries  of  sixteen  machine  guns  to  each  battery, 
and  the  association  of  batteries  of  machine  guns 
with  brigades  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  and  with 
battalions  of  artillery. 

I  think  the  proportion  of  machine  guns  to  the 
other  troops  should  be  a  battery  of  machine  guns 
to  each  regiment  of  infantry  and  cavalry  and  to 
each  battalion  of  artillery. 


A  War  Army  187 

Therefore,  as  the  proposed  brigade  of  infantry 
of  this  system  is  to  consist  of  two  regiments  of 
infantry  of  the  war  strength  of  the  tables  of 
organization, — and  here  I  may  say  with  emphasis 
that  the  organization  of  a  brigade  is  as  arbitrary 
a  matter  as  the  constitution  of  a  company  of 
infantry, — I  have  attached  to  the  brigade  in  this 
scheme  of  organization  two  batteries  of  machine 
guns  of  sixteen  machine  guns  to  each  battery,  or  a 
demi-brigade  strength  of  thirty-two  machine  guns, 
the  batteries  of  machine  guns  to  be  under  the 
direct  command  of  the  brigade  commander,  and  to 
be  manoeuvred  as  a  part  of  his  brigade.  This 
system  of  putting  together  machine  guns  in  battery 
organization  I  commend  to  the  consideration  of 
those  interested  in  army  reorganization.  The 
fire  of  a  brigade  of  two  regiments  of  infantry  and 
of  thirty-two  machine  guns,  directed  by  the  bri- 
gade commander,  will  be  much  more  effective 
than  the  fire  of  the  same  number  of  troops  and 
machine  guns  under  any  other  conditions  of  or- 
ganization. 

A  division  of  troops  should  consist  of  three  in- 
fantry brigades  constituted  as  above;  and  here  I 
find  myself  fixed  in  my  opposition  to  the  plan  of 
organization  of  a  division  of  troops  as  provided  for 
by  the  General  Staff  in  the  1914  tables  of  organiza- 
tion. 

To  associate  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery 
with  engineer  troops  in  a  divisional  organization 


1 88    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

is,  in  my  judgment,  offensive  to  the  fundamental 
condition  of  military  efficiency,  mobility. 

A  division  is  too  small  a  unit  for  the  association 
of  the  three  arms  of  the  service.  The  cavalry 
would  be  hampered  in  its  freedom  of  movement, 
which  is  its  very  being.  Tied  so  closely  to  infantry 
it  would  become  almost  useless.  The  war  in  1861 
was  begun  with  substantially  such  divisions  as  the 
General  Staff  now  propose  as  the  basis  of  organiza- 
tion of  the  army;  but  experience  demonstrated 
beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt  or  question  that 
such  an  organization  was  impossible  of  success- 
ful operation  in  war. 

An  army  corps,  consisting  of  three  divisions  of 
infantry,  was  also  found  to  be  too  small  a  military 
unit  of  organization  for  the  inclusion  of  cavalry,  un- 
less the  army  corps  should  be  acting  independently, 
when,  of  course,  cavalry  would  be  associated  with 
the  corps,  and  be  placed  under  the  command  of 
the  corps  commander,  but  not  as  a  part  of  the 
corps. 

It  seems  almost  like  going  back  into  the  graves 
of  the  past  to  discuss  this  question:  a  question 
settled  in  war  for  war.  And  yet  here  we  have  it 
again  in  full  force  as  though  it  was  an  original 
proposition,  and  not  a  proposition  settled  definitely 
for  all  time  as  wrong  by  the  experience  of  war. 

Speaking  of  the  German  cavalry  in  the  Franco- 
German  war  of  1870,  General  Sheridan  says,  in  his 
most  interesting  Memoirs: 


A  War  Army  189 

Such  of  it  as  was  not  attached  to  the  infantry  was 
organized  in  divisions,  and  operated  in  accordance 
with  the  old  idea  of  covering  the  front  and  flanks  of  the 
army,  a  duty  which  it  thoroughly  performed.  But 
thus  directed  it  was  in  no  sense  an  independent  corps 
and  hence  cannot  be  said  to  have  accomplished  any- 
thing in  the  campaign,  or  have  had  a  weight  or  influ- 
ence at  all  proportionate  to  its  strength.  The  method 
of  its  employment  seemed  to  me  a  mistake,  for,  numer- 
ically superior  to  the  French  cavalry,  had  it  been 
massed  and  manoeuvred  independently  of  the  infan- 
try, it  could  easily  have  broken  up  the  French  com- 
munications, and  done  much  other  work  of  weighty 
influence  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

And  General  Sheridan  concludes  his  remarks 
upon  the  Franco-German  War  with  the  following 
pertinent  and  important  words : 

Of  course  I  found  a  great  deal  to  interest  and  in- 
struct me,  yet  nowadays  war  is  pretty  much  the  same 
everywhere,  and  this  one  offered  no  marked  excep- 
tions to  my  previous  experiences. 

The  cavalry  of  an  army  should  be  concentrated 
in  one  command,  a  division  or  an  army  corps,  as 
its  strength  should  determine,  and  be  under  the 
command  of  a  division  or  corps  commander,  and 
should  manoeuvre  and  fight  independently  of,  but 
in  co-ordination  with  the  infantry  of  the  army,  in 
accordance  with  the  orders  of  the  commanding 
general  of  the  army. 


190    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

It  is  needless  waste  of  energy  for  the  officers  of 
the  General  Staff  to  work  out  schemes  of  organiza- 
tion and  of  use  for  the  cavalry  of  the  army.  The 
whole  range  of  thought  as  to  the  best  use  of  cavalry 
was  covered  in  the  great  war,  and  the  officers  of  the 
army  of  the  present  day  have  only  to  study  the 
lessons  of  the  great  war  as  to  the  use  of  cavalry  to 
understand  the  whole  subject.  The  history  of  the 
cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  from  the  time 
of  its  being  tied  to  infantry  in  1861,  as  the  General 
Staff  now  proposes  to  tie  cavalry  to  infantry,  to 
the  closing  campaign  of  the  war  which  ended  in  the 
surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  will 
teach  not  only  what  should  be  done,  but  also  what 
should  be  avoided,  and  should  not  be  done  with 
cavalry. 

Take  General  Grant's  last,  and  the  most  bril- 
liant campaign  of  the  war,  for  illustration,  the 
brief  campaign  from  March  29  to  April  9,  1865, 
when  Grant  opened  the  campaign  by  attacking 
and  destroying  Lee's  right  at  Five  Forks,  through 
the  use  of  his  cavalry  and  infantry  in  co-ordinated 
attack  upon  the  enemy;  when  he  successfully  as- 
saulted Lee's  works  in  front  of  Petersburg  with 
Wright's  and  Park's  Corps,  compelling  the  evacu- 
ation of  Richmond  and  Petersburg;  and  then  when 
through  the  pursuit  of  the  retreating  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  attacking  by  the  left  flank, 
with  his  cavalry  always  in  the  advance,  always 
ready  to  engage  the  enemy  and  to  hold  him  in 


A  War  Army  191 

check  until  the  infantry  could  get  up;  through 
the  battle  and  victory  of  Sailors'  Creek,  and  the 
numerous  engagements  which  preceded  and  fol- 
lowed that  battle;  and  finally  in  halting  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  at  Appomattox,  the  best  and 
most  scientific  use  of  cavalry  can  be  found  so  fully 
and  completely  illustrated  as  to  conclude  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  organization  and  employment  of 
cavalry,  because,  unless  organized  as  the  cavalry 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  then  organized, 
it  could  not  have  been  used  so  efficiently  and  suc- 
cessfully as  Sheridan,  under  Grant's  orders,  then 
used  it. 

Let  us  suppose  for  a  moment  that  there  had 
been  assigned  to  each  division  of  infantry  of  the 
army  such  a  proportion  of  the  cavalry  of  the  army 
as  the  General  Staff  now  proposes,  in  their  tables 
of  organization  and  in  the  field  service  regulations, 
shall  be  so  assigned,  and  then  let  us  ask  of  what 
earthly  use  such  cavalry,  so  tied  to  infantry,  would 
have  been  in  the  series  of  actions  in  this  campaign, 
and  in  the  pursuit  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia? 

Is  it  not  clear  to  any  soldier  who  allows  himself 
to  think  with  a  free  mind  upon  the  subject,  that 
not  only  would  the  cavalry  so  associated  with  the 
infantry  in  battle  have  been  of  no  use,  but  that  it 
would  have  been  absolutely  out  of  place  and  in  the 
way?  And  especially  in  the  pursuit  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  after  Lee  had  evacuated 


192     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Richmond,  is  it  not  clear  to  any  soldier  that,  had 
there  been  divisional  cavalry  as  now  provided  for 
by  the  tables  of  organization  of  the  General  Staff, 
such  cavalry  would  have  been  in  the  way  of  the 
marching  infantry,  and  not  only  of  no  use,  but 
absolutely  a  clog  upon  the  army,  cumbering  the 
roads,  occupying  roads  needed  by  the  infantry, 
and  interfering  with,  and  interrupting  the  rapid 
pursuit  of  the  enemy,  a  pursuit  which,  being  by  the 
flank,  had  to  be,  by  its  very  nature,  more  rapid 
in  movement  than  the  retreat  of  the  enemy? 

So  far  as  this  brief  campaign  is  concerned,  not 
only  is  it  a  school  for  the  use  of  cavalry,  but  it  is 
one  of  the  finest  campaigns  in  history,  and  one 
which  every  officer  of  the  army  who  has  a  higher 
ambition  than  a  place  upon  the  retired  list,  should 
study  faithfully  and  critically.  He  will  find  here 
in  active  use  every  principle  of  the  art  of  war- 
strategy  going  hand  in  hand  with  sound  tactics. 

The  strategy  of  the  campaign  will  be  illustrated 
by  this  incident  which  I  quote  from  General 
Grant's  Memoirs.  General  Grant  and  General 
Meade  met  in  Petersburg  immediately  after  the 
evacuation  of  that  place  had  begun,  and  had  before 
them  an  engineer  officer  of  the  enemy  who  had 
surrendered,  and  who  reported  that  General  Lee 
had  prepared  an  intrenched  camp  into  which  he 
proposed  to  withdraw  from  Richmond,  and  where 
he  intended  to  fight  the  last  battle  of  the  war. 
Meade  believed  this  man,  whereas  Grant  believed 


A  War  Army  193 

him  to  have  been  sent  into  his  lines  to  deceive  him 
as  to  Lee's  proposed  movements.  The  following 
conversation  took  place.  General  Grant  says: 

My  judgment  was  that  Lee  would  necessarily  have  to 
evacuate  Richmond,  and  that  the  only  course  -for  him 
to  pursue  would  be  to  follow  the  Danville  Road. 
Accordingly  my  object  was  to  secure  a  point  on  that 
road  south  of  Lee,  and  I  told  Meade  this.  He  sug- 
gested that  if  Lee  was  going  that  way  we  would  follow 
him.  My  reply  was  that  we  did  not  want  to  follow 
him :  we  wanted  to  get  ahead  of  him  and  cut  him  off, 
and  if  he  would  only  stay  in  the  position  he  (Meade) 
believed  him  to  be  in  at  that  time,  I  wanted  nothing 
better ;  that  when  we  got  in  possession  of  the  Danville 
railroad  at  its  crossing  of  the  Appomattox  River,  if 
we  still  found  him  between  the  two  rivers,  all  we  had 
to  do  was  to  move  eastward  and  close  him  up.  That 
we  would  then  have  all  the  advantage  we  could  pos- 
sibly have  by  moving  directly  against  him  from  Peters- 
burg (Meade's  plan),  even  if  he  remained  in  the 
position  assigned  him  by  the  engineer  officer. 

Here  we  have  in  this  brief  incident,  clearly 
marked,  good  and  bad  strategy.  If  Meade  had 
been  in  supreme  command  Lee  would  undoubt- 
edly have  made  good  his  retreat,  have  effected 
a  junction  with  Johnston  in  the  Carolinas,  and 
have  attacked  Sherman  advancing  north  toward 
the  James,  with  every  prospect  of  success.  For- 
tunately Meade  was  not  in  command.  Grant's 

13 


194     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

strategy  was  sound,  was  in  accordance  with  his 
orders  of  March  29,  1865,  and  ended  in  supreme 
victory. 

The  handling  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  in  this  campaign  was  superb.  But 
the  organization  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  equally  good.  Fortunately  divi- 
sional cavalry  had  disappeared  from  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  over  two  years  before  this  cam- 
paign took  place,  otherwise  it  might  not  have 
ended  in  victory. 

Time  was  the  essence  of  success  in  this  campaign, 
and  useless  divisional  cavalry  would  have  clogged 
and  impeded  the  march  of  the  infantry  of  the  army 
to  such  an  extent  that  Lee  would  have  outmarched 
Grant,  instead  of  having  been  outmarched  by  him, 
and  would  have  escaped  instead  of  surrendering 
his  army  at  Appomattox. 

Change  is  not  always  improvement;  and  in  the 
creation  of  divisional  cavalry  not  only  has  no 
improvement  been  made,  but  the  army  has  been 
thrown  into  the  dismal  swamp  of  abandoned  and 
disused  methods  of  organization  condemned  by 
the  experience  of  war. 

1  The  question  of  the  organization  and  distribu- 
tion of  the  artillery  of  an  army  is  not  quite  so 
simple  a  matter  as  that  of  the  cavalry  of  an  army. 
There  is  something,  not  much  it  is  true,  to  be 
said  in  favour  of  the  assignment  of  the  artillery  of 
an  army  to  the  divisions  of  an  army,  as  divisional 


A  War  Army  195 

troops,  and  yet  I  must  be  permitted  to  say  that  I 
do  not  approve  of  such  a  plan  of  army  organiza- 
tion. 

I  believe  firmly  in  the  wisdom  of  the  creation  of 
army  corps.  I  am  satisfied  that  an  army  corps 
should  consist  of  three  divisions  of  infantry,  with 
machine  guns  and  pioneers,  and  that  there  should 
be  in  addition,  as  corps  troops,  a  brigade  or  a  divi- 
sion of  artillery  to  each  army  corps,  which,  with 
the  three  infantry  divisions,  should  constitute  the 
army  corps.  I  believe  in  the  concentration  of  the 
artillery  of  an  army  corps  into  one  artillery  com- 
mand, call  it  brigade  or  division  of  artillery,  as 
you  please,  said  brigade  or  division  of  artillery  to 
occupy  in  the  army  corps  the  same  individual  posi- 
tion that  an  infantry  division  occupies;  and  be 
subject  alone  to  the  orders  of  the  commanding 
general  of  the  army  corps. 

This  independent  position  of  the  artillery  has 
the  distinct  advantage  of  increasing  the  mobility  of 
the  army  corps  and  of  the  army.  It  restores  at 
once  to  the  infantry  its  freedom  of  action,  and  it 
enables  the  corps  commander  to  concentrate  and 
to  direct  the  fire  of  his  artillery  as  the  exigencies  of 
battle  shall  demand.  Whereas,  if  the  artillery  be 
distributed  among  the  divisions  of  the  army,  it 
will  be  found  to  be  impossible  to  move  the  infantry 
of  the  division  with  the  same  celerity  as  would  be 
the  case  should  it  be  free  altogether  of  artillery; 
and  as  to  concentration  and  direction  of  fire,  the 


196     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

power  to  accomplish  such  results  will  be  lessened 
should  the  artillery  be  distributed  throughout  the 
divisions  of  the  army,  if  for  no  other  reason,  be- 
cause of  the  distances  to  be  overcome  in  bringing 
about  the  concentration  of  the  guns,  and  also  be- 
cause division  commanders  are  fond  of  their  ar- 
tillery, and  are  loath  to  give  it  up  for  the  purpose 
of  effecting  a  general  concentration  of  fire. 

The  difficulty  of  protecting  the  artillery  of  the 
corps,  if  it  be  held  separate  from  the  infantry- 
divisions  of  the  corps,  is  apparent,  but  on  the  other 
hand,  the  army  is  always  required  to  protect  its 
reserve  artillery,  and  if  this  can  be  done  success- 
fully, the  corps  artillery  can  equally  well  be  pro- 
tected. It  is  conceded,  however,  that  artillery 
attached  to  a  division  is  more  easily  protected, 
because  it  is  in  the  midst  of  its  infantry  supports, 
and  because  the  general  commanding  the  division 
feels  a  more  personal  responsibility  for  its  protec- 
tion than  he  would  feel  if  the  artillery  was  in  a 
separate  and  distinct  command. 

On  the  march,  for  instance,  for  the  purpose  of 
occupying  as  many  parallel  roads  as  possible,  the 
corps  moving  under  such  a  supposition  on  at  least 
two  roads,  and  as  affording  the  opportunity  of 
keeping  the  army  closed  up  for  rapid  development 
on  any  required  front  of  operations,  the  batteries 
of  the  brigade  or  division  of  artillery  might  be 
distributed  among  the  divisions  of  the  corps  for 
the  purposes  of  the  march,  provided  the  corps  be 


A  War  Army  197 

not  moving  into  battle,  or  in  such  close  touch  with 
the  enemy  as  to  indicate  the  immediate  approach 
of  battle.  Such  a  movement  of  the  artillery  would 
tend  to  reduce  the  risk  of  clogging  the  roads;  and 
to  increase  the  rapidity  of  the  movement  of  the 
column,  the  infantry  should  surrender  the  roads 
as  far  as  possible  to  the  artillery,  themselves  march- 
ing in  the  fields  adjoining  the  roads,  which  was  the 
common  practice  adopted  in  Sherman's  army  in 
the  Georgia  and  Carolina  campaigns,  to  reduce 
congestion  on  the  roads,  which  were  wretched  in 
the  extreme. 

Such  distribution  of  artillery  among  the  divisions 
of  the  corps  should  only  be  for  protection  on  the 
march  and  to  facilitate  the  rapidity  of  movement 
of  the  corps.  On  coming  into  presence  of  the 
enemy  the  corps  commander  should  issue  his 
orders  for  the  concentration  of  his  artillery,  and 
for  the  employment  of  his  guns  upon  any  part  of 
his  line  of  battle,  where,  in  his  judgment,  their  fire 
would  be  most  destructive,  and  also  where  their 
fire  would  cover  the  movements  of  the  infantry  to 
the  best  advantage.  Although  I  have  covered  the 
point  in  the  discussion  of  machine  guns,  it  may  not 
be  amiss  to  say  that  when  the  artillery  is  firing 
from  concealed  positions  in  rear  of  the  infantry  and 
its  machine  guns  are  not  in  action,  it  is  within  the 
power  of  the  corps  commander  to  order  forward 
to  his  firing  line  the  machine  guns  associated  with 
the  artillery.  Should  the  artillery  however  be 


198     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

pushed  forward  into  the  open,  its  complement  of 
machine  guns  should  at  once  be  restored  in  order 
that  it  should  have  the  support  of  their  fire 
in  action. 

The  chief  lesson  of  the  present  war  in  Europe, 
aside  from  that  of  rapid  mobilization  and  what  it 
accomplishes,  is  the  marvellous  development  of 
artillery  fire.  I  attribute  this  marvellous  develop- 
ment of  artillery  fire  to  the  introduction  of  the 
motor  truck  or  automobile  as  a  means  of  transport 
for  ammunition.  In  no  previous  war  could  it 
have  been  possible  to  have  concentrated  the  am- 
munition which  has  been  expended  in  this  war. 
Such  a  concentration  of  guns  as  the  telegrams  from 
Europe  have  reported  as  having  been  effected  on 
the  German  front  in  battles  preceding  the  success- 
ful advance  on  Warsaw,  is  not  only  unprecedented, 
but  undreamt  of  heretofore.  In  one  of  these 
battles  it  is  reported  that  the  Germans  concen- 
trated the  fire  of  4000  guns  upon  a  front  of  com- 
paratively a  few  miles  in  extent  along  a  particular 
portion  of  the  Russian  lines.  I  do  not  wish  to  be 
understood  as  expressing  either  belief  or  disbelief 
in  the  statement  that  the  Germans  concentrated 
4000  guns  in  battery  against  the  Russians  on  one 
narrow  front.  I  merely  repeat  the  statement  as 
telegraphed  to  the  press.  The  strength  of  their 
artillery  must  be  marvellous,  however,  because  it  is 
believed  that  the  Austro-German  armies  operating 
against  the  Russians  number  2,500,000  men,  and 


A  War  Army  199 

at  the  very  moderate  rate  of  two  guns  to  each 
1000  men,  they  should  have  5000  guns  with  the 
combined  armies,  which  is  entirely  too  small  a 
proportion  of  guns  to  men.  Of  course  we  have  no 
way  of  knowing  how  many  guns  the  Austro- 
German  army  has  in  this  field  of  operations,  but  a 
low  estimate  would  give  7500  guns  with  the  com- 
bined armies  now  operating  against  the  Russians. 

The  crushing,  smothering,  blasting  fire  of  4000 
guns  on  one  comparatively  narrow  front  is  almost 
unthinkable,  and  if  true,  such  a  concentration  of 
guns  could  only  have  been  effected  under  a  flexible  yet 
centralized  organization;  and  of  course  to  have 
produced  such  a  concentrated  fire,  army  corps  and 
armies  must  have  yielded  their  guns  for  concentra- 
tion under  the  order  of  the  field  marshal  com- 
manding, to  be  served  under  the  direct  supervision 
of  the  general  of  artillery  on  his  staff. 

In  face  of  such  demonstration,  I  think  it  would 
be  unwise  to  continue  the  association  of  the  artil- 
lery with  divisions  of  infantry  as  a  component 
part  of  the  division,  as  proposed  for  our  army  in  the 
tables  of  organization  issued  by  the  General  Staff. 
Mobility  is  the  demand  of  war,  and  the  need  of  the 
extremest  possible  mobility  is  one  of  the  lessons 
of  the  present  war  in  Europe,  as  it  was  the  lesson 
of  our  great  war  of  fifty  years  ago. 

When  I  reported  to  Major-General  Oliver  O. 
Howard  of  the  army  for  duty,  in  addition  to  being 
assigned  as  aide-de-camp  on  his  staff,  I  was  also 


200     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

assigned  to  duty  with  the  chief  of  artillery  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  as  Assistant  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral. The  artillery  of  the  army  was  brigaded  by 
army  corps,  but  the  batteries  were  distributed 
among  the  divisions.  The  system  worked  fairly 
well,  as  often  unphilosophical  systems  will  work 
well  under  intelligent  management.  But  the 
theory  of  the  organization  was  correct — and  had 
there  been  necessity  for  putting  it  into  practical 
operation,  an  order  from  headquarters  would  alone 
have  been  necessary  to  effectuate  it.  After  the  cap- 
ture of  Savannah  I  was  promoted  to  be  the  Assist- 
ant Adjutant-General  of  the  Fifteenth  Army  Corps 
with  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel,  and  was  conse- 
quently brought  near  to  the  artillery  of  the  corps. 
The  chief  of  artillery  of  the  corps,  Major  Stolbrand, 
was  an  efficient  officer,  and  we  became  friends.  He 
used  to  call  me  the  "boy  Adjutant, "  as  I  had  just 
passed  my  twenty-first  birthday  by  about  four 
months.  We  had  many  talks  on  the  subject  of  the 
artillery  of  the  corps,  and  I  think  I  may  say  that 
we  both  agreed  that  the  corps  artillery  should  be 
actually  concentrated  in  brigade  formation,  dis- 
tinct from  divisional  control,  and  under  the  direct 
command  of  the  corps  commander  through  his 
chief  of  artillery,  as  the  commander  of  the  brigade. 
I  think  the  lesson  of  the  present  war  in  Europe 
in  reference  to  artillery  confirms  the  theory  of  the 
independent  organization  of  artillery  in  brigades 
or  divisions,  free  from  infantry  divisional  control, 


A  War  Army  201 

and  under  the  direct  control  of  the  corps  com- 
mander through  his  chief  of  artillery. 

It  has  been  reported  in  the  press  that  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  has  created  a  commission  from  the 
officers  of  the  General  Staff,  to  report  to  him  the 
amount  of  artillery  which  should  be  provided  for 
the  army.  Should  this  commission  care  to  main- 
tain its  credit  it  will  report  to  the  Secretary  that 
his  inquiry  cannot  at  present  be  answered.  The 
influence  of  the  war  in  Europe  is  having  an  almost 
startling  effect  upon  the  calibre  of  field  artillery, 
and  upon  the  number  of  guns  to  be  assembled 
with  an  army;  and  the  method  of  transportation 
of  ammunition  by  auto  truck  or  automobile  has 
so  completely  changed  the  relationship  of  the  two 
arms  of  the  service,  infantry  and  artillery,  that 
it  would  be  well,  before  determining  the  supply 
of  artillery  for  our  army,  to  await  the  full  reports 
of  the  strength  of  the  artillery  of  the  various 
armies  in  the  present  European  war,  especially  of 
the  German  army.  • 

My  own  opinion  is  that  a  considerable  propor- 
tion of  the  ammunition  now  being  consumed  in 
Europe  is  absolutely  wasted.  But  on  the  other 
hand,  it  will  not  do  to  rest  upon  such  a  supposition, 
because,  should  any  possible  enemy  attack  us  with 
a  well-equipped,  well-supplied,  and  numerous  ar- 
tillery, we  must  be  ready  to  meet  him,  at  least 
with  gun  for  gun. 

I  think  the  government  should  proceed  at  once 


202     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

to  manufacture,  or  to  cause  to  be  manufactured, 
covering  a  period  of  delivery  of  three  years,  at 
least  five  or  six  thousand  field  guns  of  various 
calibres,  from  the  heaviest  guns,  heretofore  con- 
sidered to  be  siege  guns,  but  which  the  present  war 
has  included  in  field  artillery,  to  the  regulation 
field  gun  of  the  light  artillery  of  the  army. 

Also  I  think  the  government  should  manufac- 
ture, or  cause  to  be  manufactured  at  least  ten  thou- 
sand machine  guns,  deliveries  to  extend  over  three 
years.  The  machine  gun  is  in  its  infancy,  not  so 
much  in  respect  to  its  design  as  to  its  handling  and 
use  in  battle.  Should  we  find  that  we  had  pro- 
vided ourselves  with  too  many  machine  guns, 
nothing  would  be  lost  but  a  little  money.  But 
should  we  find  at  any  time  that  we  have  too  few 
machine  guns,  the  loss  might  be  incalculable. 

I  believe  that  the  artillery  arm  of  the  service, 
the  field  artillery,  should  be  greatly  increased. 
Indeed  I  think  both  the  cavalry  and  the  artillery 
should  be  increased  to  the  proportional  strength 
of  those  arms  of  the  service  in  an  army  of  one 
million  men.  That  is  to  say,  the  artillery  and  the 
cavalry  should  be  so  organized  that  on  the  break- 
ing out  of  war  the  President  could  order  the  mobili- 
zation of  an  army  of  one  million  men,  the  army  to 
have  its  full  proportion  of  cavalry  and  artillery 
ready  to  take  the  field  the  moment  the  mobiliza- 
tion is  completed. 

I  do  not  mean  that  new  cavalry  and  artillery 


A  War  Army  203 

regiments  should  at  once  be  created  in  the  strength 
required  to  supply  these  two  arms  of  the  service 
for  an  army  of  one  million  men.  But  I  think  that 
the  result  can  be  secured  in  the  following  manner. 

The  regular  or  active  army,  to  consist  ultimately 
of  two  hundred  thousand  men,  to  be  organized  as 
cavalry  and  artillery,  and  to  be  so  borne  on  the 
records  of  the  army. 

A  certain  number  of  regiments  always  to  serve 
as  infantry  in  time  of  peace,  but  each  regiment  in 
the  army  to  take  in  turn  its  tour  of  service  and 
training  as  cavalry  or  as  artillery. 

The  length  of  the  tour  of  duty  of  regiments  under 
instruction  as  cavalry  and  as  artillery  to  cover  a 
year,  or  a  year  and  a  half  of  training  in  each  case, 
until  all  of  the  regiments  of  the  army,  in  turn,  shall 
have  received  instruction  as  cavalry  or  artillery : 
then  the  tour  of  instruction  as  cavalry  or  artillery 
to  be  extended  to  two  years,  and  the  round  of 
training  in  these  special  services  to  be  resumed  on 
this  basis,  and  to  continue  in  respect  to  all  the 
regiments  of  the  active  army. 

The  proportion  of  the  troops  under  instruction 
as  cavalry  and  artillery  to  be  increased  consider- 
ably beyond  the  present  proportion  of  these  arms 
of  the  service,  while  the  balance  of  the  troops  should 
serve  as  infantry.  In  a  surprisingly  short  period 
of  time  we  should  have  the  whole  regular  or  active 
army  converted  into  good  infantry  and  cavalry, 
or  good  infantry  and  artillery,  as  the  case  should  be, 


204    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

ready  on  the  breaking  out  of  war  to  go  into  the 
field  either  as  cavalry  or  artillery,  or  as  cavalry, 
artillery,  and  infantry  as  the  exigencies  of  the 
service  should  demand. 

In  no  other  way  will  it  be  possible  for  the  army 
of  the  United  States  to  be  ready  with  sufficient 
cavalry  and  artillery  at  the  breaking  out  of  war. 
Under  this  plan  the  army  will  be  fully  supplied 
with  both  cavalry  and  artillery  in  the  proper  pro- 
portion of  these  arms  of  the  service  to  the  balance 
of  the  army,  the  reserves,  which  will  constitute  the 
infantry  of  the  army.  The  whole  active  army  of 
two  hundred  thousand  men  will  be  prepared  to 
take  the  field  as  cavalry  and  artillery,  if  necessary, 
at  the  outbreak  of  war. 

The  reserve  army,  under  the  above  plan,  will 
consist  entirely  of  infantry,  which  may  be  called 
to  the  colours  at  any  moment  deemed  to  be  neces- 
sary by  the  President.  Under  the  conscript 
system,  as  above  outlined,  the  army  would  consist 
of  one  million  men — all  well-trained  soldiers. 

I  cannot  repeat  too  often  that  I  do  not  think 
that  thoroughness  of  organization  should  be  sacri- 
ficed to  haste  incident  to  the  possibility  of  our 
being  drawn  into  the  present  European  war,  be- 
cause I  can  see  no  reasonable  prospect  of  our  being 
drawn  into  this  war.  But  that  feeling  of  confidence 
in  the  maintenance  of  present  peace,  which  has  been 
expressed,  should  not  close  our  eyes  to  the  neces- 
sity of  being  prepared  for  war  in  the  future.  We 


A  War  Army  205 

are  surrounded  by  conditions  and  ambitions  which 
may  lead  us  into  war  at  almost  any  time  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  present  war  in  Europe.  No  one 
who  takes  a  broad  view  of  public  affairs  can  but  be 
convinced  of  the  truth  of  this  statement.  Now 
that  the  possibility  of  war  is  making  itself  apparent 
to  the  public  mind,  and  now  that  the  people  are 
gradually  becoming  awakened  to  the  wisdom  of 
making  preparation  to  meet  the  eventualities  of 
the  future,  let  the  nation,  calmly  and  with  clear- 
ness of  thought  and  purpose,  prepare  its  army  and 
navy  to  meet  whatever  contingencies  may  arise. 

As  affording  an  opportunity  of  contrasting  the 
relative  advantage  of  six-gun  and  four-gun  bat- 
teries, the  regiments  of  infantry  of  the  present 
service  when  converted  into  artillery  regiments, 
under  the  above  suggested  plan  for  the  conversion 
of  the  whole  regular  army  into  cavalry  and  artil- 
lery, should  be  transformed,  that  is  to  say,  their 
companies  should  be  transformed,  into  six-gun 
batteries,  which  would  allow  them  to  maintain  their 
present  company  and  regimental  organizations. 
This,  however,  is  a  matter  of  detail  easy  of  solution. 
If  the  artillery  officers  should  be  so  wedded  to  four- 
gun  batteries  as  to  make  the  struggle  for  six-gun 
batteries  revolutionary  in  its  effect  upon  the  army, 
then  the  infantry  regiments  could  be  converted 
into  artillery  regiments  of  the  war  strength  of  the 
tables  of  organization,  the  surplus  men  of  the 
infantry  to  constitute  new  provisional  regiments 


206    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

of  artillery.  But  I  must  say  that  the  only  effect 
in  my  judgment  of  such  conversion  of  the  infantry 
into  four-gun  batteries  would  be  the  unnecessary 
increase  in  the  number  of  officers  of  the  army. 
On  the  basis  of  six-gun  batteries  the  conversion 
could  be  effected  without  this  unnecessary  increase 
in  the  number  of  officers. 

The  same  remarks  apply  substantially  to  the 
provisional  conversion  of  infantry  into  cavalry. 

There  need  be  no  fear  that  the  army  would  suffer 
in  any  respect  from  the  carrying  out  of  this  plan 
of  converting  the  whole  regular  or  active  army  into 
cavalry  and  artillery.  The  present  regiments  of 
cavalry  and  artillery  would  at  once  take  their  tour 
of  duty  as  infantry,  while  a  corresponding  number 
of  infantry  regiments  would  take  their  tour  of  duty 
as  cavalry  and  artillery  regiments  respectively, 
until  the  whole  army  had  served  in  turn  by  regi- 
ments as  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery. 

I  think  the  effect  upon  the  officers  of  the  army 
would  be  broadening  and  uplifting.  They  would 
see  the  army  from  different  points  of  view,  and 
they  would  be  the  better  prepared  for  the  day  to 
which  they  all  look  forward,  when,  as  general 
officers,  they  would  have  the  responsibility  of  high 
command  imposed  upon  them. 

Promotions  to  the  rank  of  general  are  now  made 
from  among  officers  whose  whole  lives  have  been 
spent  in  one  arm  of  the  service,  varied  by  special 
service  in  Washington,  so  that  when  they  reach 


A  War  Army  [207 

the  higher  rank  they  look  upon  the  army  from  the 
standpoint  of  their  past  regimental  association. 
Passing  from  infantry  to  artillery  and  cavalry, 
and  vice  versa,  they  would  have  the  opportunity 
of  co-ordinating  in  their  minds  the  influence  and 
effect  of  the  various  arms  of  the  service,  and  so 
become  the  better  fitted  for  the  higher  command. 

As  to  the  men  of  the  cavalry,  I  have  long  held 
that  they  should  be  drilled,  armed,  and  manceu- 
vered  as  infantry  as  well  as  cavalry,  because  much 
of  their  righting  will  be  on  foot.  Over  thirty-five 
years  ago  I  wrote  that  the  last  great  charge  of 
cavalry  in  battle  against  unbroken  infantry  had 
been  made.  That  General,  the  Marquis  de  Galli- 
ffet,  when  he  so  gallantly  led  the  French  cavalry 
against  the  unbroken  German  infantry  at  Sedan, 
closed  most  brilliantly  the  history  of  the  cavalry 
charge.  This  is  not  saying  that  the  usefulness  of 
cavalry  has  come  to  an  end,  nor  that  cavalry  may 
not  charge  broken  infantry  with  success;  but  only 
that  the  new  career  created  for  cavalry  in  our  great 
war  should  be  accepted  as  having  opened  a  new 
field  of  usefulness  for  the  cavalry  of  armies. 

Modern  cavalry  was  developed  by  us  in  the 
great  war  fifty  years  ago ;  although  from  the  insti- 
tution of  divisional  cavalry  as  given  in  the  tables  of 
organization  issued  by  the  General  Staff,  it  would 
appear  that  much  that  had  been  accomplished  in 
the  development  of  cavalry  in  the  great  war  had 
been  forgotten  by  the  officers  of  the  army.  As 


208     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

taught  by  that  war,  cavalry  should  be  elite  infantry 
as  well  as  elite  cavalry.  I  do  not  mean  mounted 
infantry,  but  cavalry  which  may  fight  on  foot  as 
infantry  fights,  and  also  fight  when  mounted,  and 
otherwise  perform  all  the  functions  of  the  best 
cavalry  when  mounted  and  employed  exclusively 
as  cavalry.  If  we  stand  upon  the  teachings  of  the 
great  war  we  have  nothing  to  learn  from  Europe 
as  to  cavalry,  and  the  Europeans  have  still  much  to 
learn  from  us.  I  say  this  with  full  recognition  of 
the  brilliant  handling  of  the  German  cavalry  cover- 
ing the  advance  of  the  German  army  through 
Belgium  and  into  northern  France,  in  the  present 
war. 

I  have  already  discussed  the  association  of 
machine  guns  in  battery  organization  with  cavalry. 
This  association  will  greatly  expand  the  usefulness 
of  cavalry,  especially  when  it  is  used  as  Sheridan 
used  his  cavalry  in  the  closing  weeks  of  the  great 
war. 

Grouping  these  reflections  together,  the  follow- 
ing statement  of  organization  of  a  fighting  army 
of  the  fighting  strength  of  147,598  officers  and 
men,  say  generally  of  the  aggregate  fighting 
strength  of  150,000  men,  is  given  as  presenting 
the  best  form  of  organization  for  an  army  of  that 
strength  in  the  field  in  time  of  war.  No  account 
in  this  statement  is  taken  of  the  service  troops  with 
such  an  army.  Any  one  wishing  to  go  into  this 
branch  of  the  subject  is  respectfully  referred  to  the 


A  War  Army  209 

1914  tables  of  organization  issued  by  the  General 
Staff. 

As  already  stated,  I  prefer  a  brigade  organization 
consisting  of  three  regiments  of  infantry  of  about 
1 200  men  each,  or  of  the  brigade  strength  of  3600 
officers  and  men.  I  believe  that  a  brigade  of  three 
regiments  each  consisting  of  1836  officers  and 
men,  or  of  the  aggregate  brigade  strength  of  5508 
officers  and  men,  too  cumbersome,  and  as  throwing 
out  of  just  proportion  the  relationships  of  the  other 
commands  of  an  army.  I  also  believe  that  a  bri- 
gade of  5508  officers  and  men  is  too  large  a  com- 
mand for  one  officer,  because,  up  to  and  including 
the  brigade  commander,  each  commanding  officer 
has  so  much  detail  work  in  his  command  to  attend 
to,  of  a  personal  nature  to  the  troops  of  his  com- 
mand, that  his  whole  time  is  occupied,  and  he 
cannot  command  well  so  large  a  brigade.  Con- 
sequently I  have  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  this 
statement  a  brigade  consisting  of  two  regiments 
of  infantry,  each  of  the  regulation  war  strength 
of  1836  officers  and  men,  giving  a  total  infantry 
strength  for  the  brigade  of  3672  officers  and  men. 
Although  preferring  an  artillery  organization  of 
six-gun  batteries,  I  have  used  the  regulation  bat- 
tery of  four  guns  as  the  basis  of  estimation  in  the 
following  statement. 

I  have  purposely  abstained  from  including  in 
the  following  estimate  of  a  fighting  army  of  150,000 
officers  and  men  the  constitution  of  the  medical 
14 


210     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

corps,  the  quartermaster's  corps,  or  the  ammuni- 
tion train  of  the  army,  as  my  purpose  is  to  give 
the  organization  of  an  army  of  the  fighting  strength 
of  about  150,000  men.  The  tables  of  organization 
of  the  General  Staff  have  been  prepared  with  care, 
and  can  be  used  in  connection  with  the  following 
statement,  should  it  be  desired  to  fill  out  the  scheme 
of  a  war  army  of  the  fighting  strength  of  about 
150,000  officers  and  men  with  the  service  troops 
appertinent  thereto. 

Whether  these  carefully  prepared  tables  of 
transportation  of  the  General  Staff  would  stand  the 
test  of  war,  I  do  not  wish  to  discuss.  It  will  be 
sufficient  for  me  to  say  that  in  my  opinion  no 
general  commanding  an  army  of  150,000  men  in  war 
would  allow  himself  to  be  hampered  in  respect  to 
his  supply  trains  by  regulations  made  in  the  far- 
away War  Department.  He  would  see  that  his 
trains  were  organized  on  the  basis  of  the  war  rule 
for  transportation,  viz.,  as  small  a  number  of 
wagons  with  the  troops  as  possible,  and  as  large 
an  ammunition  train  as  possible,  and  as  large 
supply  and  medical  trains  as  necessary,  having 
regard  to  the  distance  of  the  front  of  the  army 
from  its  field  base.  An  army  can  live  and 
fight  in  rags  and  without  shoes,  but  it  must 
have  ammunition  and  commissary  supplies. 
When  its  ammunition  and  commissary  supplies 
run  too  near  the  point  of  exhaustion,  there  are 
but  two  courses  open  to  the  army,  to  fall  back 


A  War  Army  211 

as  rapidly  as  possible  on  its  field  base,  or  to 
surrender. 

Apropos  of  cutting  down  transportation  with  the 
troops,  I  may  say  that  I  have  seen  a  wagon  wheeled 
out  of  the  column,  its  contents — officers*  baggage 
and  supplies — piled  up  by  the  side  of  the  road 
and  burned,  the  wagon  being  turned  over  to 
the  quartermaster  for  the  general  train,  because 
of  violation  of  the  order  of  the  general  command- 
ing as  to  the  allowance  of  transportation  with  the 
troops. 

Just  what  the  transportation  of  the  future  may 
be  is  as  difficult  to  say  as  it  is  difficult  to  estimate 
its  amount.  Apparently  the  "army  wagon"  is 
to  be  altogether  superseded  by  the  auto  truck  or  a 
modified  form  of  the  automobile,  to  be  invented 
for  army  transportation,  and  the  ammunition 
train  of  the  future  will  be  so  much  larger  than  any 
ammunition  train  that  our  army  has  ever  had 
knowledge  of  that  it  would  be  idle  to  pretend,  at 
this  moment,  to  prefigure  it.  This  suggestion  is 
made  under  the  reservation  that  I  think  a  great 
deal  of  ammunition  now  being  expended  in  Europe 
is  being  wasted,  but,  nevertheless,  should  we  be 
forced  into  war  with  a  nation  so  well  supplied  with 
guns  and  ammunition  as  Germany,  without  our- 
selves being  ready  to  meet  the  enemy  equally  well 
supplied,  we  should  be  in  a  similar  plight  to  the 
distressing  plight  of  England,  but  without  Eng- 
land's advantage  of  having  allies  to  fight  for  us. 


212     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

STATEMENT  OF  ORGANIZATION  OF  AN  ARMY  OF  THE 

FIGHTING     STRENGTH     OF     147,598     OFFICERS 

AND  MEN,  SAY  I5O,OOO  OFFICERS  AND  MEN 

Assuming  the  war  strength  of  an  infantry 
regiment  to  be  1836  officers  and  men,  and  the 
fire  strength  of  each  battery  of  artillery  to  be  four 
guns,  the  table  of  organization  of  an  army  of 
147,598  officers  and  men  will  be  as  follows: 

Officers 

and  men 

350  ist.  General  Officers  and  Staff  Officers  for  the 
Army.  The  army  to  be  commanded  by 
a  Major-General.  Additional  Staff 
Officers,  if  needed,  to  be  detailed  from 
the  line. 

2d.  A  Brigade  of  Infantry: 
3,672  A.  Two  Regiments  of  Infantry. 
326  B.  Two  Batteries  of  Machine  Guns — 16  Guns 

to  a  Battery — 32  Machine  Guns. 
153  C.  A  Company  of  Pioneers. 

4,15* 

3d.  A  Division  of  Infantry: 

Three  Infantry  Brigades  as  given  above 
aggregating: 

11,016  A.  6  Regiments  of  Infantry. 

978  B.  6  Batteries  of  Machine  Guns — 96  Machine 

Guns. 
459  C.  3  Companies  of  Pioneers. 

50  D.  A  Detachment  of  the  Signal  Corps — for 
signalling. 

12,503 


A  War  Army  213 

4th.  An  Army  Corps: 

A .  j  Divisions  of  Infantry  as  given  above. 

B.  A  Division  of  4  Regiments,  24  Batteries , 

of  Light  Artillery,  96  Field  Guns. 

33,048  A.  1 8  Regiments  of  Infantry. 
2,934         18  Batteries  of  Machine  Guns — 288  Ma- 
chine Guns. 

Ji377  9  Companies  of  Pioneers. 

200  A  Detachment  of  the  Signal  Corps,  for 

signalling,    and    telegraphing    with 
telegraph  lines. 
4,680  B.  A  Division  of  Light  Artillery,  4  Regiments, 

24  Batteries — 96  Field  Guns. 

1,304        8  Batteries  of  Machine  Guns,  128  Ma- 
chine Guns,  with  the  Artillery. 
61 2        4  Companies  of  Pioneers  with  the  Artillery, 
mounted,  or  on  motorcycles. 


44,155 


$th.  An  Army: 

A .  Three  Army  Corps  as  given  above. 

B.  A  Division  of  Cavalry. 

C.  A  Reserve  Park  of  Artillery  if  the  char- 

acter of  the  campaign,  and  the  char- 
acter of  the  country  in  which  the 
army  is  to  operate,  should  admit  of 
the  :use  of  more  artillery  than  that 
provided  for  above. 


214     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

A.  Three  Army  Corps,  consisting  of: 

Three  Divisions  of  Infantry  as  given 
above. 

99,144         54  Regiments  of  Infantry. 
8,802         54  Batteries    of    Machine    Guns  —  864 

Machine  Guns  with  the  Infantry. 
4,131         27  Companies  of  Pioneers. 
700  Detachment  of  the  Signal  Corps — for 

signalling,  telegraphing,  and  with  an 
Aero  Battalion. 

Three  Divisions  of  Light  Artillery — consist- 
ing of  two  Brigades  each — 12  Regiments, 
72  Batteries,  288  Field  Guns. 

14,040    a.  72  Batteries — 288  Field  Guns. 
3,912     b.  24  Batteries  of  Machine  Guns,  384  Ma- 
chine Guns  with  the  Artillery. 
1,836    c.  12  Companies  Mounted  Pioneers  or  on 

motorcycles,  with  the  Artillery. 
250    d.        Detachment  of  Signal  Corps  for  signal- 
ling and  telegraphing. 

B.  A  Division  of  Cavalry  consisting  of  three 
Brigades    of    three    Regiments    each — p 
Regiments  of  Cavalry. 

11,646    a.     9  Regiments  of  Cavalry. 
1,170    b.     I  Regiment  of  Horse  Artillery  under  the 
orders  of  the  general  commanding  the 
Division  of  Cavalry — 24  Guns. 
1,467     c.     9  Batteries  of  Machine  Guns — 3  Bat- 
teries with  each  Cavalry  Brigade  and 


A  War  Army  215 

under  command  of  the  brigade  com- 
mander— 144  Machine  Guns. 
150    d.        Detachment  of  Signal  Corps — signal- 
ling and  telegraphing. 

No  pioneers  are  provided  for  the 
Cavalry  because  pioneers  are  be- 
lieved to  be  useless  with  Cavalry, 
but  each  private  should  carry* 
slung  from  his  saddle,  either  an  axe, 

a  shovel,  or  a  pick. 

147,248 

350  General  Officers   and   Staff  Officers  for  the 
army,  other  than  those  detailed  from  the 
line  of  the  army. 

147,598 

The  army  to  be  commanded  by  a  Major-General. 

Recapitulation : 

General  Officers  and  Staff  Officers  350 

[Infantry  99J44 

312  guns  |  Artillery  15,210 

[Cavalry  11,646 

1392  Machine  Guns  14,181 

Pioneers  5, 967 

Signal  Corps  1,100 

Fighting  strength  of  the  army         147,598 

As  stated  above,  reference  is  made  to  the  1914 
tables  of  organization  issued  by  the  General  Staff, 
for  data  as  to  the  ammunition  train,  the  supply 


216     West  Point  in  our  Next  War. 

train,  and  the  medical  train  and  field  hospital 
service,  for  an  army  of  147,598  officers  and  men  in 
the  field  in  time  of  war. 

So  far  as  the  aero  battalion,  under  command  of 
the  chief  signal  officer  of  the  army,  is  concerned, 
I  do  not  think  that  we  have  yet  sufficient  data  to 
give  its  constitution  authoritatively  either  as  to 
officers  and  men,  or  as  to  aeroplanes.  It  is  an 
organism  in  process  of  growth  and  development, 
and  should  be  watched  most  attentively  by  the 
officers  of  the  army. 

The  army,  so  constituted,  should  be  maintained 
at  war  strength  by  drafts  of  conscripts  from  the 
reserve  camps,  each  conscript  being  drawn  for  the 
full  term  of  service  in  the  army,  and  only  assigned 
to  the  reserve  army  when  the  active  army  has 
been  filled  to  war  strength,  such  assignment  to  the 
reserve  army  being  determined  by  the  needs  and 
requirements  of  the  service,  and  to  be  voidable  in 
time  of  war,  so  that  the  whole  reserve  shall  be 
ready  for  active  service  wherever  and  howsoever 
the  government  shall  require  their  service. 

This  statement  gives  the  constitution  of  an  army 
as  a  unit  of  organization.  Other  similar  armies  will 
have  to  be  created  in  war,  and  when  so  created, 
they  may  be  associated  in  combined  action  under 
the  command  of  a  superior  general  or  general-in- 
chief.  The  unit  of  army  organization  being  ac- 
cepted, the  development  of  the  greater  army,  made 


A  War  Army  217 

up  of  several  such  armies,  follows  as  a  natural 
consequence  upon  the  demands  of  the  war. 

It  will  be  observed  that  I  lay  stress  upon  the 
proposition  that  the  army  should  be  commanded 
by  a  major-general.  I  believe  in  the  wisdom  of  the 
military  policy  that  major-general  should  be  the 
highest  permanent  rank  in  our  army ;  the  only  ex- 
ception which  should  be  made  being,  that  in 
war,  when  a  great  victory,  determinative  in 
character,  shall  have  been  won,  the  Congress, 
upon  the  recommendation  of  the  President,  should, 
as  an  expression  of  national  gratitude  for  the  vic- 
tory, create  the  office  of  lieutenant-general,  upon 
the  understanding  that  the  President  should  nomi- 
nate the  victorious  general  for  confirmation  as 
lieutenant-general. 

The  same  remark  applies  to  the  still  greater 
rank  of  General,  which  should  only  be  conferred 
at  the  close  of  a  great  war,  and  as  the  reward  for 
transcendent  service  and  victory. 

Should  these  two  great  ranks,  lieutenant-general 
and  general,  be  held  as  rewards  for  victory  in  war, 
they  would  be  superb  rewards.  But  if  the  rank 
of  lieutenant-general  should  be  conferred  freely 
upon  officers  in  peace  without  special  war  service, 
or  upon  the  commanding  general  of  an  army  of 
150,000  men  at  the  opening  of  war,  where  is  the 
nation  to  turn  for  rank  with  which  to  commemorate 
victory  ? 

The  same  remark  applies  to  the  corresponding 


218     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

ranks  of  vice-admiral  and  admiral  in  the  navy. 
In  a  thoughtless  moment  the  last  Congress  created 
the  rank  of  admiral,  and  provided  for  the  tempo- 
rary appointment,  or  while  holding  certain  com- 
mands, of  three  admirals.  As  I  write,  I  find  it 
impossible  to  recall  the  name  of  but  one  of  these 
"Admirals,"  although  I  am  fairly  well  informed 
upon  current  affairs. 

Is  there  a  schoolboy  in  the  land  who  does  not 
know  the  names  of  Farragut,  Porter,  Dewey? 
Or  the  names  of  those  earlier  officers  of  the  navy, 
with  Decatur  at  their  head,  who  carried  the  flag 
of  the  country  to  victory  on  almost  every  sea? 

I  quite  understand  that  the  argument  has  been 
made  that  we  need  higher  rank  in  the  navy  than 
that  of  rear-admiral,  so  that  when  our  ships  join 
those  of  other  navies  in  joint  operations,  the  com- 
mand of  the  international  fleet  may  be  with  our 
flag.  This  is  straining  at  an  argument  for  in- 
creased rank  which  should  be  brushed  away  by  an 
enactment  authorizing  the  President,  on  the  hap- 
pening of  such  a  contingency,  to  confer  upon  the 
commanding  officer  of  our  ships  such  temporary 
rank  as  will  give  him  due  status  in  the  allied  or 
international  fleet.  Such  legislation  would  still 
preserve  the  lustre  of  great  rank  in  the  navy,  some- 
what dimmed  by  the  profuse  creation  of  rear- 
admirals,  because  there  is  little  likelihood  of  the 
President's  having  occasion  to  use  this  power. 
The  other  argument  that  a  fleet  should  be  com- 


A  War  Army  219 

manded  by  an  admiral  or  by  a  vice-admiral  be- 
cause of  its  strength  in  ships  and  guns,  may  be 
dismissed  with  scant  ceremony  as  unworthy  of 
serious  consideration. 

If  a  thing  be  made  common  its  value  is  lowered 
in  the  general  estimation.  If  rank  be  cheapened 
it  becomes  an  unsatisfactory  reward  for  great 
services  and  great  victories  in  war. 

The  effect  of  the  promotions  in  the  army  follow- 
ing the  Spanish  War  is  manifested  by  bills  intro- 
duced into  Congress  at  its  last  session,  in  one  of 
which  provision  is  made  for  practically  the  pro- 
motion of  one  thousand  officers,  already  in  the 
army,  without  their  having  rendered  especial 
service  to  merit  promotion ;  and  in  the  other,  pro- 
vision is  made  for  conferring  upon  generals  com- 
manding territorial  departments,  upon  the  chief 
of  staff  of  the  army,  and  upon  generals  command- 
ing armies  corresponding  to  the  command  of  a 
territorial  department,  the  rank  of  lieutenant- 
general  while  holding  such  commands,  and  for  the 
promotion  of  all  bureau  chiefs  and  all  brigadier- 
generals  of  the  line  to  the  rank  of  major-general, 
in  order,  as  the  bill  states,  that  the  officers  of  the 
army  may  enjoy  corresponding  rank  with  their 
brother  officers  of  the  navy.  If  there  be  any- 
thing in  this  argument  as  to  the  advisability  of 
establishing  corresponding  rank  between  the  two 
services,  it  would  be  far  better  to  reduce  the  rank 
in  the  navy  to  correspond  with  the  present  cor- 


220     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

relative  rank  in  the  army  than  to  advance  rank 
in  the  army  to  correspond  with  present  rank  in 
the  navy. 

Such  promotions  in  time  of  peace  destroy  re- 
spect for  rank,  and  also  destroy  the  significance  of 
promotions  in  time  of  war  for  distinguished  service 
in  the  field. 

Are  not  the  ranks  of  major-general  and  brigadier- 
general  high  enough  and  honourable  enough  to 
satisfy  the  ambition  of  any  officer?  Does  the 
army  remember  that  Grant  was  created  lieutenant- 
general  only  after  a  series  of  victories  memorable 
in  the  history  of  our  country,  and  that  it  was  as 
lieutenant-general  he  received  Lee's  surrender? 

Do  they  remember  that  the  war  closed  with 
Sherman,  Sheridan,  Thomas,  Meade,  still  major- 
generals,  and  that  it  was  only  after  the  war  that  a 
greatful  country  conferred  upon  Grant  the  great 
rank  of  General? 

Is  there  any  intimation  anywhere  in  the  history 
of  the  war  that  Grant,  Sherman,  Sheridan,  Thomas, 
Meade,  would  have  been  better  soldiers  had  higher 
rank  been  conferred  upon  them? 

Is  there  the  slightest  intimation  in  the  history  of 
the  war  that  any  officer  disobeyed  the  orders  of 
Grant,  Sherman,  Sheridan,  Thomas,  Meade,  be- 
cause they  were  only  major-generals? 

Is  it  not  singular  that  with  a  mobile  army  of  but 
thirty  thousand  men  in  the  United  States,  it 
should  be  proposed  that  chiefs  of  bureaus  in  the 


A  War  Army  221 

War  Department  should  be  created  major-generals, 
whereas  during  the  great  war,  with  a  million  of  men 
in  arms,  the  chiefs  of  those  same  bureaus  were 
brigadier-generals  and  colonels? 

In  this  discussion  of  rank  my  mind  goes  back  to 
the  days  of  my  youth  when  the  highest  rank  in  the 
navy  was  that  of  flag  officer  while  at  sea,  and  in  the 
command  of  a  squadron,  and  commodore  when 
the  flag  officer  had  returned  to  his  home ;  and  when 
the  army  was  commanded  by  Brevet  Lieutenant- 
General  Scott,  breveted  lieutenant-general  for  his 
conquest  of  Mexico. 

Those  were  days  when  rank  was  respected  in  the 
army  and  the  navy.  Rank  was  valued  then  be- 
cause it  was  not  made  common  by  too  free  promo- 
tions or  too  high  promotions,  and  because  it  stood 
for  faithful  and  efficient  service.  It  exercised  an 
inspiring  influence  upon  the  officers  of  the  two 
services  because  its  lustre  shone  brilliantly  before 
their  eyes. 

I  do  not  forget  that  the  ranks  of  general  and  of 
lieutenant-general  were  freely  used  in  the  Southern 
army  during  the  great  war,  but  then  it  should  be 
remembered  that  these  were  war  ranks,  in  many 
instances  conferred  for  gallant  and  distinguished 
service  in  the  field,  and  further,  that  great  rank  was 
all  that  the  South  had  to  give  as  rewards  to  her 
soldiers  who  had  won  her  confidence  and  her  grati- 
tude by  faithful  service  in  her  cause.  It  is  im- 
possible to  institute  a  comparison  in  the  matter 


222     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

of  rank  between  the  army  of  the  United  States 
and  the  gallant  army  of  the  South  in  the  great 
war,  because  there  is  no  common  ground  of  esti- 
mation of  rank  upon  which  it  may  be  instituted. 

I  could  not  wish  a  kinder  or  a  better  wish  for  the 
army  and  the  navy,  with  both  of  which  services 
I  have  most  sympathetic  associations,  than  that 
the  gallant  gentlemen  of  the  two  services  should 
hold  rank  in  as  high  respect  as  it  was  held  by  their 
predecessors  in  the  late  fifties  and  during  the  great 
war. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  DIPLOMACY  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENCE 

THE  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal  has 
imposed  upon  the  United  States  the  duty  of 
developing  a  diplomatic  policy  of  national  de- 
fence: a  policy  which  should  be  incorporated  in 
our  diplomacy  as  a  rule  of  action  for  the  govern- 
ment under  all  circumstances  and  under  every 
admini  stration. 

The  Panama  Canal  has  materially  changed  our 
international  relationships,  because  the  canal  may, 
at  any  moment,  become  a  cause  of  war  between  the 
United  States  and  one  of  the  great  Powers,  or 
between  the  United  States  and  a  combination  of 
two  or  more  of  the  great  Powers,  anxious  for  the 
possession  of  this  important  waterway  between 
the  two  great  oceans,  for  military  and  commerical 
purposes. 

We  have  seen  the  Suez  Canal  pass  from  the 
control  of  French  capital  and  influence  into  the 
possession  of  Great  Britain,  through  her  purchase 
of  the  shares  in  the  canal  company  which  had 
previously  belonged  to  the  Khedive  of  Egypt, 

223 


224     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

and  the  consequent  gradual  expansion  of  the 
influence  of  Great  Britain  throughout  Egypt. 
England's  entrance  into  Egypt  some  thirty-five 
or  forty  years  ago  was  in  coalition  with  France, 
and  upon  the  diplomatic  assurance,  which  assur- 
ance was  confirmed  by  Mr.  Gladstone  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  that  she  would  withdraw  from  Egypt 
so  soon  as  her  mission  of  restoring  order  and  good 
government  in  that  country  had  been  accomplished. 
There  were  those  who,  at  the  time,  smiled  incred- 
ulously at  the  solemn  assurance  given  by  Mr. 
Gladstone  of  England's  intention  to  retire  from 
Egypt  upon  the  re-establishment  of  order,  and  we 
find  her  still  in  Egypt,  her  authority  more  firmly 
established  than  ever. 

England  has  recently  dethroned  the  former 
Khedive  and  enthroned  a  successor,  through  whom 
she  now  governs  Egypt  as  suzerain,  and  through 
the  government  of  Egypt  absolutely  controls  the 
Suez  Canal,  which  has  practically  become  a  part 
of  England's  coast-line. 

Should  the  commercial  ambition  of  England  to 
possess  the  Panama  Canal,  as  she  now  possesses 
the  Suez  Canal,  become  an  active  political  force, 
in  order  that  she  may  control  the  two  great  trade 
routes  of  the  world,  she  might,  to  carry  out  this 
ambition,  decide  to  go  to  war  for  the  possession  of 
the  canal.  Of  one  thing,  however,  we  may  be 
assured,  England  will  never  go  to  war  with  the 
United  States,  or  with  any  other  first-class  Power, 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  225 

without  a  powerful  ally  or  allies,  and  it  is  natural 
to  look  to  the  East  for  the  most  likely  ally  whom 
she  will  draw  within  the  circle  of  fire.  The  com- 
bined fleets  of  England  and  Japan  would  command 
the  ocean  as  against  the  fleet  of  the  United  States, 
as  it  would  be  impossible  for  our  fleet,  unless  aug- 
mented beyond  all  possible  conception,  to  hold  the 
sea  against  such  a  naval  combination. 

Nor  is  this  the  only  source  of  danger  to  be  appre- 
hended as  to  our  possession  of  the  Panama  Canal. 
Should  Germany  seek  to  compensate  herself  for  the 
losses  and  costs  of  the  present  war  in  Europe,  it 
might  occur  to  her  ambition  to  attempt  the  seizure 
of  the  canal  as  giving  her  a  vantage  ground  for 
attack  upon  one  or  more  of  the  republics  of 
Central  or  South  America,  with  the  design  of 
annexing  their  territory  to  her  empire. 

The  danger  of  war  for  the  possession  of  the 
Panama  Canal  may  be  restricted  to  Great  Britain 
and  Japan  on  the  one  hand,  or  to  Germany  and  her 
allies  on  the  other  hand.  No  danger  of  conflict 
over  the  possession  of  the  canal  need  be  appre- 
hended from  any  other  nation  or  nations.  Russian 
ambition  does  not  lie  within  the  region  of  the  canal, 
and  no  other  nation  has  either  the  ambition,  or 
possesses  the  material  or  financial  strength  to 
enter  into  conflict  with  the  United  States  for  the 
possession  of  the  canal. 

In  the  position  which  confronts  us  we  might 
study  with  advantage  English  diplomacy,  for 
is 


226     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

which  I  venture  to  express  the  highest  intellectual 
appreciation,  drawing  therefrom  lessons  for  our 
guidance  in  the  diplomatic  defence  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  We  might  ask  ourselves  with  profit,  what 
would  Great  Britain  do  if  she  was  in  our  place? 
No  better  field  of  study  in  diplomacy  can  be  found 
than  that  of  England.  There  is,  or  rather  there 
has  been,  no  diplomacy  so  fine,  so  thorough,  and  so 
successful  as  that  of  England.  Sometimes  mistakes 
have  been  made,  and  it  looks  as  though  some  serious 
mistakes  had  been  made  by  England  in  the  diplo- 
macy of  the  present  war  in  Europe,  but  such  mis- 
takes have  been  rare  in  the  past.  It  is  a  diplomacy 
which  counts  the  cost,  but  which  also  takes  the 
chances,  what  might  be  called  the  business  chances, 
in  all  of  its  undertakings.  It  is  the  diplomacy  of  a 
proud  aristocracy,  and  as  such  is  bold,  far-seeing, 
consistent,  spirited,  continuous,  domineering,  and 
crafty,  in  these  qualities  exceeding  the  diplomacy 
of  a  republic  or  of  an  empire.  It  is  animated  by 
clear  cold  intellect  without  human  sympathy  or 
generous  emotion.  It  is  friend  or  enemy  of  every 
nation  of  the  world  as  English  interests,  for  the  time 
being,  seem  to  warrant  and  demand.  It  is  a  ten- 
acious diplomacy  which  counts  on  tiring  out  the 
diplomacy  of  every  other  nation,  and  often  is  a 
well-planned  bluff,  boldly  put  forth  on  the  chance 
that  the  other  Power  may  retire  before  its  calm 
front.  The  successes  of  British  diplomacy  in  the 
past  have  doubtless  often  surprised  the  Foreign 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  227 

Office  quite  as  much  as  they  have  disappointed 
those  who  have  yielded  before  its  encroachments. 
Conscious  of  her  weakness  as  a  military  Power, 
there  is  one  thing  written  deep  in  English  diplo- 
macy, never  to  go  to  war  with  a  first-class  Power 
except  with  efficient  allies;  with  allies  who  can 
bear  the  full  brunt  of  the  war;  and  the  strength  of 
her  diplomacy,  which  marks  the  fact  that  it  is  the 
diplomacy  of  an  aristocracy,  lies  in  the  calm  and 
clear  look  into  the  future  which  she  takes,  and  the 
wisdom  with  which  she  prepares  in  peace,  through 
alliances,  for  the  possibilities  of  war  in  the  future. 

England's  diplomacy  for  the  past  hundred  and 
fifty  years  has  been  the  strong  right  arm  of  the 
nation,  through  which  she  has  built  up  and  de- 
fended her  vast  world  empire. 

England  has  possessed  herself  of  the  Suez  Canal 
that  she  might  control  that  great  waterway  of 
commerce  and  of  military  convenience  and  power, 
on  the  route  to  India  and  the  East,  and  it  may  be 
within  the  range  of  anticipation  if  not  of  actual 
belief,  that  when  England  sufficiently  recovers 
from  the  effect  of  the  present  war,  if  her  alliances 
shall  then  seem  to  her  to  be  strong  enough  to  risk 
another  war,  she  may  reach  out  her  hand  in  an 
attempt  to  seize  the  Panama  Canal.  Should 
England  come  into  possession  of  the  Panama  Canal 
while  still  holding  the  Suez  Canal,  she  would  pos- 
sess the  two  great  commercial  and  military  routes 
between  the  East  and  the  West,  and  so  establish 


228     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

her  control  of  the  commerce  of  the  world  on  even 
more  solid  foundations  than  heretofore. 

There  is,  however,  one  check  upon  the  gratifica- 
tion of  this  ambition  of  Great  Britain,  assuming 
it  to  be  an  ambition,  in  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  lies  for  over  three  thousand  miles  upon  her 
flank;  and  this  fact  will,  I  think,  always  compel 
Great  Britain  to  restrain  her  ambition  whenever  it 
may  lead  her  to  the  contemplation  of  hostile  action 
against  the  United  States. 

As  a  further  counterbalance  to  such  an  effort  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  expand  her  commercial 
relationships  and  her  power,  and  also  as  contribu- 
ting to  the  establishment  of  something  in  the  nature 
of  a  balance  of  power  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  I  advo- 
cate the  sale  of  the  Philippines  to  Germany  on  the 
condition  that  Germany  shall  guarantee,  in  the 
treaty  of  cession,  the  possession  of  the  Panama 
Canal  in  perpetuity,  by  the  United  States.  Ger- 
many, in  possession  of  the  Philippines,  would  re- 
quire free  access  to  them  through  the  Panama 
Canal,  and  her  interests  in  the  islands  would  de- 
mand that  either  she  or  the  United  States  should 
be  in  possession  of  the  canal.  England's  domina- 
tion of  the  canal  she  would  regard  as  a  direct  attack 
upon  her  sovereignty. 

The  danger  of  a  possible  offensive  move  on  the 
part  of  Germany  against  the  Panama  Canal  is 
apparent,  but  on  the  other  hand,  Germany  should 
know  that  Great  Britain,  unless  in  possession  of  the 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  229 

canal  herself,  would  much  prefer  that  the  owner- 
ship of  the  canal  should  remain  with  the  United 
States  than  that  it  should  pass  to  Germany. 
Should  Germany  put  forth  her  mailed  hand  to  seize 
the  Panama  Canal,  England  might  deem  it  to  be 
to  her  interest  and  advantage  to  use  her  fleet  in 
support  of  the  United  States,  to  defeat  any  possible 
attack  of  Germany  on  the  canal,  and  to  insure  its 
continued  ownership  by  the  United  States. 

On  the  other  hand,  German  interests  would  be 
safer  from  attack,  with  the  Panama  Canal  in  the 
possession  of  the  United  States,  than  they  would  be 
with  the  canal  in  the  possession  of  Great  Britain  or 
any  other  Power. 

There  are  risks  and  dangers  whichever  way  the 
subject  may  be  contemplated,  but  nations  like 
individuals  must  be  ready  to  face  risks  and  dangers, 
and  by  being  prepared  to  meet  them  avoid  or  de- 
feat them. 

The  creation  of  a  balance  of  power  in  the  Pacific, 
and  in  the  Caribbean  Sea  the  creation  of  such  a 
preponderance  of  power  in  the  United  States  as 
would  insure  the  permanent  possession  of  the 
Panama  Canal  by  ourselves,  should  be  the  leading 
policy  of  our  diplomacy.  But  such  a  policy  de- 
mands that  the  United  States  should  maintain  her 
freedom  from  entangling  alliances.  And  it  may 
even  demand  that  the  United  States  should  free 
herself  from  the  obligation  to  support  doctrines, 
which,  in  the  nature  of  things,  can  serve  no  useful 


230     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

purpose  so  far  as  the  United  States  herself  is  con- 
cerned, and  which  are  in  themselves  a  constant 
source  of  danger  to  her  peace  and  prosperity. 

The  United  States  should  also  free  herself  as 
soon  and  as  completely  as  possible  from  the  various 
arbitration  treaties  which  are  the  monument  of 
Mr.  Bryan's  diplomacy.  I  believe,  generally 
speaking,  in  the  principle  of  arbitration,  but  I 
think  it  is  unsound  diplomacy  to  bind  ourselves 
by  treaty  obligations,  whether  it  may  suit  our 
policy  or  not,  in  every  case  to  go  to  arbitration. 
If  arbitration  be  a  desirable  way  to  settle  a  dispute 
between  the  United  States  and  any  foreign  Power, 
there  will  always  be  time  enough  in  which  to 
negotiate  a  treaty  for  the  settlement  of  such  ques- 
tion by  arbitration.  If,  however,  time  should  be 
lacking,  that  fact  will  be  proof  that  the  question  is 
of  such  a  nature  that  it  cannot  be  settled  by  arbi- 
tration, and  that  any  existing  treaty  providing 
for  such  arbitration  would  be  brushed  aside,  as  of 
no  avail,  by  our  possible  enemy. 

I  am  among  the  very  few  who  look  with  any- 
thing but  satisfaction  upon  the  settlement  of  the 
Alabama  Claims  with  Great  Britain  through  arbi- 
tration. I  think  Mr.  Sumner,  with  his  fanciful 
" indirect  claims,"  was  much  the  better  statesman 
of  that  period.  His  plan  was  to  hold  the  Alabama 
Claims  an  open  question  until  such  time  as  Great 
Britain  should  be  willing  to  surrender  Canada  to 
the  United  States  in  complete  satisfaction  and 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  231 

settlement  of  all  the  claims,  of  whatsoever  nature, 
held  by  the  United  States  against  Great  Britain. 
This  policy,  if  firmly  held  by  the  United  States, 
would,  I  believe,  have  ended  in  the  unification  of 
the  continent  under  our  flag. 

The  possession  of  the  Panama  Canal  by  the 
United  States  presents  what  may  be  called  a  diplo- 
matic-military problem.  It  is  military  in  that  we 
may  at  any  moment  be  compelled  to  defend  the 
canal  by  force  of  arms,  and  it  is  diplomatic  in 
respect  to  the  provision  of  a  way  by  which  we  may 
reinforce  our  garrison  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama, 
and  also  in  respect  to  the  unification  of  our  power 
and  influence  throughout  the  whole  of  the  so-called 
Republic  of  Panama. 

I  have  already  discussed  the  military  side  of  the 
problem.  The  diplomatic  aspect  of  the  case 
divides  itself,  naturally,  between  the  unification 
of  our  power  and  control  on  the  Isthmus,  and  the 
establishment  and  maintenance  of  means  of  com- 
munication and  transportation  for  our  troops  and 
munitions  of  war,  from  our  southern  border, 
through  Mexico  and  Central  America,  to  Panama. 

Our  diplomacy  in  respect  to  the  construction  of 
an  interoceanic  canal  has  been  ill- judged  and 
unfortunate  in  the  extreme.  Beginning  with  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  and  extending  through  the 
diplomatic  history  of  the  creation  of  the  so-called 
Republic  of  Panama,  the  Canal  treaty  with 
that  so-called  republic,  and  the  Hay-Pauncefote 


232     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Treaty,  we  have  steadily  advanced  from  mistake 
to  mistake,  yielding  when  we  should  have  been 
stern,  and  compromising  when  we  should  have  been 
firm. 

The  creation  of  the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama, 
which  had  its  birth  and  lives  today  under  the  pro- 
tection of  our  guns,  was  an  unutterable  mistake. 
There  was  no  necessity  for  a  Republic  of  Panama. 
It  is  a  political  anachronism.  It  has  no  inherent 
right  to  live,  and  yet  it  lives  under  our  protection, 
and  is  a  source  of  continuing  uncertainty  and  anxi- 
ety to  the  United  States.  One  of  its  latest  pro- 
jects is  a  new  treaty  with  the  United  States,  drawn, 
among  other  things,  to  provide  for  the  arbitration 
of  issues  between  the  United  States  and  the  sover- 
eign power  of  Panama,  by  a  .court  of  arbitration 
to  be  "composed  of  one  member  each  from  the  two 
countries  interested  and  one  each  from  the  repub- 
lics of  Brazil,  Chile,  and  Argentina, "  a  proposition 
so  sublimely  absurd  as  almost  to  warrant  the 
belief  that  its  very  absurdity  would  make  it 
attractive  to  the  Department  of  State,  but  for  the 
fact  of  the  recent  change  in  the  head  of  that 
department. 

Small  and  weak  Powers,  living  under  the  pro- 
tection of  strong  Powers,  in  their  own  interest  and 
in  the  interest  of  the  peace  of  the  world,  should 
cease  to  exist  through  their  annexation  by  the 
strong  protecting  Powers. 

In  accordance  with  this  principle,  the  so-called 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  233 

Republic  of  Panama  should  be  annexed  by  the 
United  States;  but  to  compensate  its  inhabitants 
for  the  loss  of  their  pseudo-independence,  Panama 
should  be  at  once  admitted  into  the  Union  as  one 
of  the  States  of  the  United  States.  We  should 
then  enter  upon  negotiations  with  Colombia  for  the 
extension  of  the  territory  of  Panama,  that  is  to  say, 
the  extension  of  the  territory  and  the  power  of  the 
United  States,  over  the  valley  of  the  Atrato  and 
the  valleys  of  the  interlocking  streams  making 
into  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Of  course  we  should 
be  expected,  and  it  would  be  simple  justice  to 
do  so,  to  grant  to  Colombia  some  certain  mil- 
lions of  dollars,  say  $20,000,000  as  proposed  in  a 
treaty  recently  negotiated  with  that  republic,  but 
without  according  to  her  any  especial  rights  of 
transport  over  or  through  the  canal,  in  compensa- 
tion for  such  cession  of  territory,  and  in  general 
oblivion  of  the  past.  But,  of  course,  no  such  pay- 
ment should  be  made  to  Colombia  except  in  con- 
sideration for  the  cession  of  territory  including  the 
Atrato  route  to  the  Pacific. 

In  consideration  of  the  admission  of  Panama 
as  a  State  into  the  Union,  reservation  should  be 
made,  in  perpetuity,  not  only  in  the  act  of  admis- 
sion but  also  in  the  treaty  of  annexation,  of  the 
right  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  to 
land  her  troops  anywhere  within  the  territory  of 
Panama,  and  to  take  possession  of  whatever  land 
or  other  property  she  should  need  for  military  or 


234     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

naval  purposes  within  the  state  of  Panama,  com- 
pensation being  made,  of  course,  therefor,  and 
generally  to  exercise  complete  sovereignty  through- 
out Panama,  without  the  necessity  of  asking  and 
receiving  permission  from  the  State  government 
to  do  so. 

A  treaty  with  Great  Britain  in  reference  to  the 
construction  of  the  Panama  Canal,  or  of  any  canal 
across  any  part  of  America,  was  a  serious  mis- 
take. It  bound  the  hands  of  the  United  States 
when,  in  carrying  out  the  great  work  of  con- 
structing the  interoceanic  canal,  our  hands  should 
have  been  unbound  and  free. 

If  it  was  thought  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty  stood  in  the  way  of  the  freedom  of  action 
of  the  United  States  in  respect  to  the  construction 
of  the  Panama  Canal,  all  that  was  necessary  for 
the  United  States  to  have  done  was  to  have  pointed 
out  to  Great  Britain  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  which  was  designed  to  assist  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  but  which  had 
always  been  a  drag  upon  the  United  States,  had 
become  obsolete,  and  that  instead  of  aiding  it 
only  hampered  the  United  States  in  the  construction 
of  an  interoceanic  canal;  and  that  as  a  consequence 
of  such  statement,  the  United  States  would  be 
glad  to  have  Great  Britain  join  her  in  the  abroga- 
tion of  the  treaty. 

Had  Great  Britain  refused  to  join  in  the  abroga- 
tion of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  as  obsolete 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  235 

and  ineffective, — and  her  action  in  respect  to  such 
a  proposition  would  have  been  determined  entirely 
by  the  firmness  with  which  we  should  have  made 
the  suggestion, — we  should  then  ourselves  have 
denounced  the  treaty  as  obsolete  and  ineffective, 
and  as  no  longer  of  use  or  benefit  to  the  United 
States,  to  Great  Britain,  or  to  the  world,  and  as 
standing  in  the  way  of  the  construction  of  the 
great  interoceanic  waterway  by  the  United  States, 
which  was  demanded  by  the  commerce  of  the  world. 
The  United  States  should  have  accompanied  such 
a  declaration  with  the  statement  that  we  proposed 
to  construct  the  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  free  from  all  foreign  influence,  and  that 
when  so  constructed  it  would  be  held  to  be  a  part 
of  the  coast  line  of  the  United  States,  but  open  to 
the  commerce  of  the  world  under  such  regulations 
as  we  should  deem  it  proper  to  make,  except  only 
to  the  commerce  of  enemies  of  the  United  States. 
Then,  in  the  natural  course  of  procedure,  we  should 
have  opened  negotiations  with  Colombia  for  the 
acquisition  of  the  state  of  Panama.  It  may  be  said 
that  Colombia  might  not  have  cared  to  cede  the 
state  of  Panama  to  the  United  States,  but  it  is 
quite  within  the  range  of  diplomacy  to  reconcile  the 
views  of  two  Powers  dealing  with  so  practical  a 
question.  We  could  have  pointed  out  to  Colombia 
the  fact  that  it  was  necessary  that  the  United 
States  should  own  and  possess  the  territory 
through  which  the  canal  should  be  constructed, 


236     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

and  that  while  we  were  entirely  willing  to  pay 
Colombia  liberally,  even  to  the  verge  of  absurd 
generosity,  for  the  cession,  it  rested  entirely  with 
her  to  decide  whether  she  preferred  to  receive 
such  compensation  for  the  cession  of  the  state 
of  Panama  to  the  United  States,  or  to  have  the 
United  States  take  possession  of  Panama  without 
granting  compensation  to  her.  This  seems  bald  as 
read,  and  yet  it  would  have  been  a  much  higher  and 
a  much  more  moral  procedure  than  that  which  actu- 
ally took  place.  Colombia  lost  Panama  without 
compensation  of  any  description.  United  States 
marines,  it  is  believed,  were  concentrated  in  antici- 
pation of  the  outbreak  of  the  so-called  revolution 
upon  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  Ships  of  the  Ameri- 
can navy  were  in  the  ports  of  Colon  and  Panama,  or 
were  approaching  those  ports,  ready  to  land  sailors 
or  marines  the  moment  American  interests  should 
be  jeopardized  on  the  Isthmus.  An  officer  of  the 
American  army  put  on  his  uniform,  and  seemed  to 
be  ready  to  direct  the  course  of  events  at  Colon, 
the  moment  the  so-called  revolution  had  broken 
out,  and  it  is  believed  that  we  assisted  in  negotiating 
the  Colombian  troops  off  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
In  a  document  sent  to  Congress  in  respect  to  the 
affair  of  Panama,  a  cable  message  is  given  from  the 
State  Department,  asking  one  of  our  consuls  on 
the  Isthmus  whether  the  revolution  had  broken  out, 
and  his  reply  is  also  given,  to  the  effect  that  no 
revolution  had  then  broken  out  at  Panama. 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  237 

A  frank,  straightforward  diplomacy  is  always 
the  best  diplomacy,  and  always  produces  the  best 
results,  while  yet  maintaining  a  good  understand- 
ing with  the  other  Power  or  Powers.  Such  a 
diplomacy  would  have  been  a  successful  diplomacy 
in  this  case,  and  Colombia  would  have  rejoiced  in 
possessing  many  millions  of  American  dollars, 
and  also  she  would  have  had  occasion  to  rejoice 
in  getting  rid  of  a  troublesome  state,  which  from 
its  territorial  position,  was  always  a  source  of 
danger  to  herself. 

While  we  should  be  perfectly  willing  to  give 
Colombia,  as  is  proposed  to  be  given  to  her  by 
the  treaty  now  before  the  Senate  for  ratification, 
twenty  million  dollars  for  the  cession  of  the  Atrato 
route  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  for  oblivion  of  the 
past,  we  should  oppose  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty  as  it  stands  today,  because  it  is  paying  too 
high  a  price  in  money,  and  in  the  concession  of 
rights  of  use  in  the  Panama  Canal  proposed  to  be 
granted  to  Colombia,  for  oblivion  alone. 

The  loss  of  Panama  to  Colombia  is  a  fait  ac- 
compli. Unless  it  should  be  made  to  the  advan- 
tage of  the  United  States  to  do  so,  I  can  see  no 
reason  why  we  should  rake  among  the  embers  of 
the  past.  Our  diplomacy  and  the  diplomacy  of 
Colombia  in  respect  to  the  construction  of  the 
Panama  Canal  was  so  ludicrous  and  yet  so  tragic, 
that  the  disposition  to  smile  at  it  is  frozen  by  the 
amazing  wrong  and  blunder  of  it. 


238     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

A  great  nation  should  state  openly  before  the 
world  what  it  deems  to  be  necessary  to  its  growth 
and  prosperity;  and  especially  so  should  it  speak 
when  it  is  about  to  undertake  a  great  world  work 
of  construction  by  which  the  commerce  of  the 
world  can  only  be  benefited. 

As  we  should  have  spoken  openly  to  England, 
to  Colombia,  and  to  the  world  of  our  rights  and 
purposes  in  respect  to  the  construction  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  so  now  should  we  speak  openly 
to  Panama  and  to  the  world,  proclaiming  the  fact 
that  the  further  continuance  of  the  existence  of  the 
so-called  Republic  of  Panama  is  no  longer  desir- 
able, and  that  the  time  had  come  for  the  United 
States  to  annex  the  so-called  Republic  of  Panama, 
granting  to  the  citizens  of  Panama,  for  the  loss  of 
their  shadowy  independence,  admission  into  the 
citizenship  of  the  United  States. 

The  Panama  Canal,  lying  in  territory  which 
should  thus  have  become  a  part  of  the  territory 
of  the  United  States,  the  United  States  being  freed 
from  treaty  obligations  to  any  Power  in  respect  to 
its  construction,  would,  in  its  very  nature,  have 
become  a  neutral  highway  for  the  commerce  of  the 
world,  except,  and  only  except,  to  the  commerce 
of  nations  at  war  with  the  United  States. 

So  far  as  the  military  aspect  of  the  question  of 
Panama  is  concerned,  the  United  States  should 
enter  at  once  into  negotiations  with  Mexico  and 
the  Central  American  republics  for  the  con- 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  239 

struction  and  maintenance  of  a  line  of  railway 
from  some  point  on  the  southern  frontier  of  our 
country,  through  Mexico  and  the  Central  American 
republics,  to  Panama,  Colon,  and  to  the  line  of  the 
canal,  which  railway  should  be  under  the  pro- 
tection and  supervision  of  the  United  States, 
and  over  which  the  United  States  should  have  the 
right  to  transport,  at  all  times  and  under  all  con- 
ditions, her  troops,  guns,  provisions,  and  munitions 
of  war  from  the  United  States  to  Panama;  the 
recognition  of  any  government  as  the  permanent 
government  of  Mexico,  being  conditioned  upon  the 
agreement  to  such  a  treaty  by  Mexico. 

So  far  as  any  part  of  this  route  shall  have  been 
constructed,  the  United  States  should  assume 
administrative  protection  and  supervision  over  it, 
and  for  such  part  or  parts  of  the  route  as  may  not 
yet  have  been  built,  the  United  States  should  at 
once  be  authorized  to  construct  the  same,  and 
when  constructed  to  associate  these  sections  with 
those  already  built,  making  a  through  line  of  rail- 
way from  the  United  States  to  Panama. 

The  financial  needs  and  responsibilities  of 
Mexico  incident  to  the  civil  war  which  has  been 
raging  in  that  republic  for  years,  will  impose  such 
obligations  upon  her  as  will  render  the  assist- 
ance of  the  United  States  necessary  to  aid  her  in 
arranging  the  burden  of  her  responsibilities. 
Mexico  cannot  possibly  establish  and  maintain 
a  stable  government  within  her  boundaries  without 


240     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

the  countenance  and  assistance  of  the  United 
States,  and  one  of  the  chief  instrumentalities  in 
the  re-establishment  of  peace,  order,  and  good 
government  in  Mexico  would  be  the  construc- 
tion and  maintenance,  under  the  protection  of  the 
United  States,  of  the  proposed  international  rail- 
way of  defence  from  our  southern  border  to  Panama 
and  Colon.  Under  such  circumstances  it  should 
not  be  difficult  for  our  diplomacy  to  conclude  a 
treaty  with  Mexico  especially  providing  for  the 
construction  and  maintenance,under  the  protection 
of  the  United  States,  of  such  an  international  rail- 
way, since  the  interests  of  the  two  nations  move  so 
harmoniously  together  in  respect  to  such  a  project. 

It  might  become  necessary  for  the  United  States 
to  assume  considerable  financial  obligations  in 
carrying  out  this  plan,  but  it  is  believed  that 
Mexico,  with  the  aid  and  support  of  the  credit  of 
the  United  States,  would  be  able  to  effect  a  com- 
plete rehabilitation  of  her  finances;  but  in  granting 
such  credit  to  Mexico,  the  United  States  should  be 
given  certain  privileges  and  rights  of  supervision, 
which,  relying  upon  the  rapid  development  of  her 
resources  should  peace  and  order  in  the  republic  be 
maintained,  would  secure  the  United  States  against 
loss  on  account  of  the  extension  of  such  credit, 
while  assuring  to  Mexico  a  peaceful  and  rapid 
growth  and  development. 

In  time  of  revolution  or  of  domestic  disturbance 
in  any  part  of  the  territory  crossed  by  the  inter- 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  241 

national  railway,  the  United  States  should,  by 
treaty,  have  the  right  to  protect  traffic  over  such 
international  railway  in  the  interest  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  countries  through  which  it  shall 
pass. 

Such  a  policy  would  not  only  result  in  accom- 
plishing its  avowed  purpose,  of  furnishing  a  line  of 
railway  over  which  reinforcements  could  be  trans- 
ported to  our  troops  in  Panama,  but  it  would  be 
also  of  value  in  promoting  the  commerce  of  the 
nations  through  which  the  railway  line  should  pass. 
Such  an  international  railway,  owned  in  part  or  in 
whole  by  the  United  States,  with  the  right  in  the 
United  States  of  policing  its  line  at  all  times  and 
under  all  conditions,  would  be  a  substantial  guaran- 
tee of  peace  and  order  in  Mexico  and  throughout 
Central  America,  and  the  prosperity  of  the  several 
republics  traversed  by  such  an  American-owned* 
and-managed  line  of  railway  would  be  assured. 

If  this  broadly  national  and  American  policy 
in  respect  to  Panama  and  to  the  international 
railway  should  be  adopted,  we  should  be  measur- 
ably assured  of  the  safety  of  the  Panama  Canal 
through  the  facility  of  reinforcing  our  garrison 
covering  and  holding  the  canal  and  the  territory 
of  Panama,  provided  we  should  have  the  troops, 
the  guns,  and  the  munitions  of  war  to  send  to  the 
Isthmus. 

Wherever  the  line  of  the  international  railway 
should  approach  the  coast  so  as  to  bring  it  within 

16 


242     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

the  range  of  the  guns  of  a  hostile  fleet,  a  new 
location  should  be  established  far  enough  inland 
to  remove  it  from  the  chance  of  hostile  interrup- 
tion. It  is  recalled  that  some  years  ago  the  United 
States  caused  certain  railway  surveys  to  be  made 
in  Central  America,  but  whether  these  surveys 
would  be  available  for  purposes  of  construction 
is  not  known.  They  could  be  used,  however,  as 
the  basis  for  further  and  fuller  surveys  for  the 
location  of  the  international  railway. 

Indeed  a  beginning  has  already  been  made  in 
establishing  our  proper  relations  with  the  Central 
American  republics  as  sponsors  of  peace  and 
prosperity  within  their  territory.  We  have  had 
a  handful  of  marines  at  the  capital  of  Nicaragua 
for  some  time  past,  with  the  result  that  that  nation 
has  enjoyed  peace  and  contentment  since  the 
arrival  of  the  troops  of  the  United  States.  The 
worst  enemies  that  Mexico  and  the  Central 
American  republics  have  ever  had  have  been,  and 
still  are,  the  ambitious  citizens  of  those  countries, 
who,  for  personal  profit  and  advancement,  have 
striven  for  power  through  revolution. 

There  is  pending  in  the  Senate  a  treaty  with  the 
Republic  of  Nicaragua,  which  should  be  promptly 
ratified,  as  it  is  in  line  with  the  establishment  of 
closer  relations  between  the  two  countries,  and 
because  it  secures  to  the  United  States  the  posses- 
sion of  a  defensible  harbour  on  the  gulf  of  Fonseca, 
and  also  insures  to  us  the  exclusive  right  to  con- 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  243 

struct  an  interoceanic  canal  across  the  territory  of 
Nicaragua.  The  compensation  for  these  conces- 
sions which  is  to  be  given  to  Nicaragua  by  the 
United  States  is  a  money  compensation  in  the 
sum  of  three  million  dollars,  which  should  be  paid 
without  a  moment's  hesitation.  The  negotiation 
of  this  treaty  manifests  the  existence  of  the  spirit 
of  friendship  which  should  prevail  throughout 
Central  America  for  the  United  States,  and  may  be 
taken  as  an  indication  of  the  favourable  reception 
which  Nicaragua  and  the  other  countries  of  Central 
America  would  give  to  a  proposal  from  the  United 
States  for  the  construction  of  an  international 
railway  from  the  United  States  to  Panama. 

The  United  States  wants  substantially  no  ad- 
dition of  territory  except  that  already  under  its 
protection,  the  territory  of  Panama,  and  the  small 
and  scarcely  valuable  extent  of  territory  required 
for  the  rectification  of  our  southern  frontier.  The 
annexation  of  Panama  would  simply  mean  the 
natural  and  proper  assumption  by  the  United 
States  of  the  sovereignty  which  now  theoretically 
exists  under  the  meaningless  form  of  a  so-called 
independent  republic.  I  do  not  fail  to  recall  the 
fact  that  several  of  our  Presidents  have  made 
injudicious  and  entirely  unnecessary  remarks  in 
respect  to  the  sovereignty  of  Panama.  But  facts 
are  facts,  and  it  is  one  of  the  facts  of  history,  ac- 
knowledged in  every  chancery  in  Europe,  that  the 
so-called  Republic  of  Panama  exists  under,  through, 


244     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

and  by  the  protection  of  the  United  States,  and 
for  the  purposes  of  the  United  States.  That  we 
should  longer  maintain  this  so-called  republic, 
in  semi-independence,  as  a  possible  centre  of  in- 
trigue against  ourselves,  is  the  surprise  of  the 
nations.  It  may  flatter  our  amour  propre  to  be 
considered  altruistic,  but  it  is  not  altruism  so  much 
as  national  thoughtlessness  that  induces  us  to 
maintain  the  pseudo  Republic  of  Panama  in  exist- 
ence. 

In  time  of  war,  an  independent  government  on 
the  Isthmus  of  Panama  might  be  of  inexpressible 
annoyance,  if  indeed  not  of  serious  danger,  to  the 
United  States  and  to  the  canal.  Conflicts,  at 
present  of  little  or  no  consequence,  have  already 
taken  place  between  the  police  of  Panama  and  the 
soldiers  and  sailors  of  the  United  States.  Such 
occurrences  indicate  a  spirit  which,  under  the 
touch  of  the  demagogue,  or  under  the  hostile  hand 
of  an  enemy,  might  at  any  moment  develop  into 
revolutionary  activity,  which  might  seriously 
complicate  our  position  on  the  Isthmus. 

In  offering  the  people  of  Panama  citizenship  in 
the  United  States  we  should  amply  compensate 
them  for  surrendering  the  flimsy  tinsel  of  so-called 
independence,  and  also  since  the  possibility  of  the 
sanitation  of  the  tropics  has  been  demonstrated, 
the  annexation  of  Panama  by  the  United  States 
would  inevitably  lead  to  the  development  of  the 
country,  which  will  be  impossible  so  lone  as  the 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  245 

semblance  of  sovereignty  remains  in  the  people  of 
Panama.  Indeed,  the  work  of  development  should 
be  undertaken  immediately  after  the  annexation 
of  Panama  through  the  establishment,  by  the 
United  States,  of  military  colonies  in  the  territory  of 
Panama  as  a  measure  for  the  defence  of  the  canal. 

The  construction  and  maintenance  of  the  inter- 
national railway  through  Mexico  and  Central 
America  by  the  United  States  would  tend  to 
restore  and  to  maintain  the  peace  of  those  coun- 
tries, whereas  Mr.  Bryan's  diplomacy  in  respect  to 
Mexico  has  been  most  disastrous  to  that  country, 
most  destructive  of  American  interests,  and  re- 
morseless as  to  the  lives  of  American  citizens. 
The  American  Ambassador  in  Mexico  reported  to 
Mr.  Bryan,  upon  his  coming  into  office,  the  condi- 
tion of  affairs  in  Mexico,  ending  his  report  with  the 
suggestion  that  the  United  States  had  two  courses 
open  for  action:  either  to  recognize  Huerta  or  to 
intervene  for  the  re-establishment  of  peace  in  that 
distracted  country.  This  advice  was  as  sound 
advice  as  was  ever  given  by  a  diplomat  to  his 
government.  The  United  States  neither  recog- 
nized Huerta  nor  intervened.  The  result  of  Mr. 
Bryan's  failure  to  appreciate  the  value  of  the  advice 
of  our  Ambassador  is  before  the  world ;  a  number  of 
American  citizens  have  lost  their  lives,  hundreds  of 
millions  of  American  capital  have  been  lost  or 
destroyed,  and  the  end  is  not  yet.  The  United 
States  by  action  or  inaction  is  largely  responsible 


246     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

for  lawlessness  in  Mexico.  Her  failure  to  realize 
conditions  as  they  exist,  and  her  withdrawal  from 
the  performance  of  her  duties  as  the  leading  nation 
of  the  American  continent,  has  measurably  brought 
about  the  disorganization  which  prevails  in  Mexico. 
Instead  of  dealing  firmly  with  the  Mexican  sit- 
uation ourselves  we  have  associated  with  us  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  several  of  the  South 
and  Central  American  republics,  to  consider  and 
decide  what  the  United  States  shall  do  in  Mexico. 
These  meetings,  beginning  with  the  conference 
assembled  at  Niagara  Falls,  which  was  called  in 
the  name  of  Pan-Americanism,  may  establish  a 
precedent  which  in  the  future  will  plague  us,  and 
may  even  hamper  our  free  diplomacy  in  dealing 
with  American  questions  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  interests  of  the  United  States. 

I  do  not  believe  in  Pan- Americanism.  I  see  in 
the  principle  of  Pan-American  action  on  all 
American  questions  a  danger  to  our  future  welfare, 
with  the  possible  result  in  the  future  of  the  imposi- 
tion of  burdens  and  responsibilities  on  the  United 
States  in  respect  to  issues  in  which  the  United 
States  has  no  direct  interest.  I  believe  the  time 
has  come  to  narrow  the  action  of  the  United  States 
in  respect  to  American  questions  to  those  questions 
and  interests  which  concern  herself,  or  which 
concern  those  nations  lying  within  the  sphere  of 
her  influence.  And  I  believe  that  we  should  leave 
to  the  nations  of  South  America,  south  of  the 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  247 

Orinoco,  the  consideration  of  all  questions  affecting 
themselves  without  the  exercise  of  influence  or 
constraint  by  the  United  States;  the  only  excep- 
tion to  this  proposition  of  dealing  with  the  affairs 
of  South  America  being  that  the  United  States 
should  maintain  a  sympathetic  attitude  towards 
Colombia  and  Venezuela,  as  facing  the  Caribbean 
Sea,  which  necessarily  includes  them  within  the 
sphere  of  influence  of  the  United  States. 

Such  a  policy,  if  adopted  by  the  United  States, 
would  relieve  us  from  the  further  enforcement  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  would  allow  to  the 
nations  south  of  the  Orinoco  complete  and  abso- 
lute freedom  in  reference  to  the  ordering  of  their 
own  affairs. 

The  abandonment  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by 
the  United  States  would,  in  my  judgment,  induce 
those  far-away  nations  of  South  America  to  draw 
closer  to  the  United  States  than  is  likely  to  be  the 
case  so  long  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  shall  remain 
in  force.  Under  the  protection  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  those  countries  feel  themselves  free  from 
the  danger  of  European  aggression,  and  conse- 
quently they  are  restive  under  the  measure  of 
obligation  for  their  safety  which  they  owe  to  the 
United  States.  Relieved  from  the  fancied  restraint 
upon  their  freedom  of  action  by  this  obligation 
to  the  United  States,  they  would  at  once  realize 
their  danger  of  attack  by  some  one  or  other  of 
the  great  Powers  of  Europe,  and  they  would  begin 


248     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

to  consider  whether,  after  all,  the  United  States 
is  not,  as  she  has  always  been,  their  best  friend. 

The  narrowing  of  our  international  obligations, 
as  often  happens,  would  intensify  those  which 
remain  in  force,  and  we  should  at  once  announce 
to  the  world  the  policy  of  the  sphere  of  influence 
of  the  United  States,  as  covering  and  protecting, 
as  with  a  shield,  Mexico,  Central  America,  Colom- 
bia, and  Venezuela.  An  attack,  with  the  sugges- 
tion of  conquest,  upon  any  one  of  the  countries 
within  our  sphere  of  influence  as  thus  outlined, 
should  be  regarded  by  the  United  States  as  an 
attack  upon  herself,  and  should  be  resisted  and 
repelled  with  her  whole  force. 

To  equip  ourselves  fully  for  the  discharge  of  this 
duty  to  the  nations  to  the  south  of  us  we  should 
be  granted  by  Mexico,  through  the  rectification 
of  our  southern  frontier,  a  port  upon  the  Gulf 
of  California  either  at  Guaymas,  or  at  some  de- 
fensible point  to  the  north  of  Guaymas  on  the 
Gulf,  and  the  cession  of  Lower  California  includ- 
ing Magdalena  Bay.  This  cession  of  territory 
would  give  us  the  debouche  of  the  Colorado  into 
the  Gulf  of  California,  and  put  us  in  the  position 
to  realize  that  vast  project  of  usefulness,  the  ad- 
mission of  the  waters  of  the  Gulf  of  California 
into  the  basin  of  the  Mohave  Desert.  Of  course 
the  United  States  should  amply  compensate  Mexico 
for  such  a  cession  of  territory,  which,  by  the  way, 
would  prove  no  serious  loss  to  Mexico,  as  the 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  249 

cession  would  cover  the  lands  of  the  rebellious 
Yaqui  Indians,  who  have  ever  been  a  source  of 
trouble  to  that  country. 

This  policy  of  the  sphere  of  influence  should 
cover  and  protect  the  islands  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
and  of  the  Caribbean  Sea.  It  would  not  neces- 
sarily lead  to  the  acquisition  by  war  of  any  of 
these  islands  owned  or  at  present  controlled  by 
any  European  Power,  but  notice  should  be  given 
to  all  the  nations  holding  possession  of  any  of 
these  islands  within  our  sphere  of  influence,  that 
the  United  States  could  not  look  with  favour  upon 
their  sale  or  alienation  to  any  Power  other  than 
to  the  United  States,  and  consequently  we  should 
be  ready  to  buy  any  island,  or  group  of  islands,  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  or  the  Caribbean  Sea  which  any 
European  Power  should  wish  to  dispose  of. 

As  to  the  negro  republics  of  Haiti  and  Santo 
Domingo  we  should  assume  responsibility  for  their 
good  government  as  we  have  assumed  responsi- 
bility for  the  good  government  of  Cuba.  We  have 
in  both  countries  taken  wisely  the  first  step  in  this 
direction.  The  time  is  fast  approaching  when  we 
should  proclaim  a  protectorate  over  these  two  re- 
publics, with  the  consequent  right  of  intervention 
to  maintain  peace  and  order  within  their  borders. 

The  world  would  gladly  welcome  the  creation 
of  such  a  sphere  of  influence  by  the  United  States 
over  Mexico,  Central  America,  Colombia,  and 
Venezuela,  and  over  the  islands  of  the  Caribbean 


250     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Sea  and  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  as  promising  peace 
and  stable  government  throughout  its  extent. 
So  long  as  these  several  countries  maintained 
peace  and  order  within  their  borders  the  United 
States  would  look  on  with  approbation.  But  upon 
the  breaking  out  of  revolution  within  the  borders 
of  any  one  of  them,  the  United  States  should  at 
once  intervene  in  support  of  the  constituted 
authorities  of  the  nation,  and  restore  peace  and 
order  within  its  borders.  As  in  the  case  of  our 
intervention  in  Cuba,  but  one  such  intervention 
would  be  necessary  to  establish  the  belief  in  all 
of  these  countries  in  the  friendly  interest  of  the 
United  States  in  their  well-being. 

The  United  States,  under  such  a  policy,  would  in 
due  course  of  time  surely  succeed  in  welding  these 
nations  into  a  firm  and  substantial  alliance  with 
herself;  and  peace  and  order  established  within 
their  boundaries  through  the  exercise  of  the 
friendly  influence  by  the  United  States,  would 
insure  the  development  of  the  commerce  and 
industry  of  these  various  peoples,  and  secure  to 
them  a  condition  of  national  happiness  and  con- 
tentment which  they  have  never  known. 

The  diplomatic  policy  of  the  United  States 
bearing  on  the  subject  of  National  Defence  is, 
after  all,  simple  and  direct.  Its  cardinal  principles 
have  been  stated.  Intelligence  and  judgment 
alone  are  needed  to  carry  such  a  diplomacy  to  a 
successful  conclusion.  But  both  intelligence  and 


Diplomacy  of  Defence  251 

judgment  are  needed  not  only  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment, but  in  the  various  countries  themselves  in  the 
maintenance  of  our  relations  with  these  Powers. 
A  revival  of  interest  in  the  diplomacy  of  the  nations 
within  the  sphere  of  influence  of  the  United  States 
is  of  first  importance.  In  every  one  of  these 
neighbouring  countries  we  should  be  represented 
by  wise,  tactful,  and  most  courteous  statesmen, 
as  it  should  be  their  duty  to  win  the  confidence 
of  these  peoples  by  showing  them  that  our  only 
interest,  beyond  the  maintenance  of  the  interna- 
tional railway  always  open  and  in  operation,  which 
should  be  their  interest  as  well  as  our  own,  is  in 
their  welfare  and  happiness. 

These  American  countries  need  capital  and 
enterprise  for  their  development.  If  American 
capital  and  enterprise  could  feel  assured  of  safety, 
and  that  a  friendly  influence  would  be  exerted  by 
our  government  for  their  protection,  the  marvellous 
resources  of  these  countries  would  be  developed 
almost  with  the  rapidity  of  the  development  of  our 
Western  States. 

It  should  be  the  purpose  of  our  diplomacy  to 
convince  these  neighbouring  nations  that  we  want 
nothing  that  is  theirs,  and  that  we  stand  ready  to 
defend  them  from  attack  and  subjugation  from 
whatever  quarter  such  attack  should  come;  and 
that  we  offer  them  our  loyal  friendship  and  ask  for 
their  friendship  in  return. 

The  maintenance  of  this  policy  in  the  face  of  the 


252    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

world,  with  calmness  but  with  firmness  and  con- 
tinuity, will  insure  the  blessings  of  peace  to  our  own 
dear  country,  and  the  development  of  friendly  re- 
lations with  the  nations  to  the  south  of  us,  which  in 
time  will  grow  strong  and  vigorous  under  the  pro- 
tection of  our  shield,  and  be  ready,  should  the 
need  arise,  to  stand  by  our  side  in  war,  in  the 
general  defence  of  the  interests  and  the  rights  of 
America,  should  war  ever  unhappily  be  forced 
upon  the  United  States  by  the  ambition  of  any  of 
the  great  Powers  of  the  world. 


POSTSCRIPT 

THE    PLAN    OF  THE    SECRETARY  OF  WAR  FOR  THE 
NATIONAL  DEFENCE 

November  20,  1915. 

THE  newspapers  of  the  6th  of  November,  1915, 
gave  to  the  country  the  plan  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  for  the  national  defence,  which  pro- 
vides for  the  increase  of  the  regular  army  to 
141,707  officers  and  men,  and  the  creation  of  a 
volunteer  army  of  400,000  men,  which,  with  the 
organized  National  Guard  of  129,000,  will  consti- 
tute a  paper  army  of  670,707  officers  and  men. 

It  is  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  that  the 
400,000  volunteers  shall  enlist  for  six  years,  three 
years  to  be  passed  in  what  may  be  called  the  active 
volunteer  army,  and  three  years  in  the  passive  vol- 
unteer army.  The  400,000  volunteers,  under  the 
Secretary's  plan,  are  to  be  subject  to  two  months' 
training  each  year  for  the  period  of  three  years. 

That  the  Secretary  can  be  under  no  illusions  as 
to  the  kind  of  army  this  plan  will  give  the  country 
will  appear  from  the  following  extract  from  his 

253 


254    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

statement,  published  November  6th,  in  all  the 
papers  of  the  country. 

The  Secretary  of  War  says : 

When  this  system  is  devised  and  made  operative 
the  nation  would  militarily  be  in  this  situation:  It 
would  have,  as  the  Constitution  provides,  an  army 
raised  and  maintained  by  it,  composed  of  a  certain 
number  constantly  under  arms,  and  a  very  much 
larger  number  definitely  identified  in  personnel, 
provided  with  equipment  and  organization,  possessed 
of  some  training,  and  subject  to  instant  call. 

The  Secretary  modestly  states  his  ambition  as 
to  the  character  of  the  proposed  volunteer  army  of 
400,000  men  by  saying  that  this  army  will  be 
"  possessed  of  some  training.11  That  he  knows  the 
exact  value  of  such  a  limited  amount  of  training, 
or  rather  how  almost  valueless  it  is  in  the  making 
of  soldiers,  is  shown  by  his  interesting  report  of 
November  15,  1914,  from  which  I  have  already 
quoted  so  extensively,  and  from  which  I  make  the 
following  extracts.  After  speaking  of  the  regular 
army  and  the  National  Guard,  the  Secretary  says : 

"And  this  is  absolutely  all.  The  only  other 
recourse  would  then  be  volunteers,  and  to  equip, 
organize,  train,  and  make  them  ready  would  take, 
at  the  smallest  possible  estimate,  six  months. "  That 
is  to  say,  six  months  of  continuous  and  intensive 
training. 

The  Secretary  further  says: 


Plan  for  National  Defence        255 

Anyone  who  takes  the  slightest  trouble  to  investi- 
gate will  find  that  in  modern  warfare  a  prepared  enemy 
would  progress  so  far  on  the  way  to  success  in  six 
months,  if  his  antagonist  had  to  wait  six  months  to 
meet  him,  that  such  unprepared  antagonist  might  as 
well  concede  defeat  without  contest. 

Again  in  his  report  of  November  15,  1914,  the 
Secretary  says: 

"Efficient  officers,  above  all  things,  cannot  be 
improvised. " 

Again  the  Secretary  says : 

It  is  furthermore  true  that  by  intensive  military 
training  any  young  man  of  good  health  and  average 
mentality  can  be  made  a  serviceable  soldier  in  twelve 
months,  and,  in  fact,  has  been  so  made.  This  has 
been  tried  abroad,  and  I  have  caused  it  to  be  tried 
under  my  own  administration  and  inspection. 

Again  the  Secretary  says  in  his  report  of  No- 
vember 15,  1914: 

Those  who  are  thoughtful  and  have  courage  face 
the  facts  of  life,  take  lessons  from  experience,  and 
strive  by  wise  conduct  to  attain  the  desirable  things, 
and  by  prevision  and  precaution  to  protect  and  defend 
them  when  obtained.  It  may  truthfully  be  said  that 
eternal  vigilance  is  the  price  which  must  be  paid  in 
order  to  obtain  the  desirable  things  of  life  and  to 
defend  them. 


256    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

And  in  his  article  published  in  the  Independent 
of  August  1 6,  1915,  the  Secretary  says: 

For  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  one  great 
lesson  of  all  of  our  wars  is  that  they  must  be  carried  to 
a  conclusion  by  citizen  soldiers  and  these  citizens  must 
be  trained.  To  thrust  untrained  citizens  into  the  field 
is  nothing  short  of  death  by  governmental  order. 

Here  I  might  rest  the  argument  against  the 
sufficiency  of  the  plan  of  the  War  Department  for 
the  defence  of  the  nation,  relying  upon  the  views 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  as  given  above,  to  sustain 
my  contention. 

But  I  ask  the  reader  to  note  especially  what  the 
Secretary  says  as  to  the  time  required  to  make  a 
soldier:  "That  by  intensive  military  training  any 
young  man  of  good  health  and  average  mentality 
can  be  made  a  serviceable  soldier  in  twelve  months. " 

And  in  his  article  in  the  Independent  above 
quoted  the  Secretary  says:  "To  thrust  untrained 
citizens  into  the  field  is  nothing  short  of  death  by 
governmental  order." 

Yet  the  Secretary  calmly  proposes  in  his  state- 
ment published  to  the  country  on  November  6, 
1915,  the  creation  of  a  defensive  army  which 
shall  consist  of  400,000  volunteers  to  be  enlisted, 
one- third  each  year  for  three  years,  so  that  at 
the  end  of  three  years,  we  should  have  133,333 
soldiers  who  will  have  had  three  annual  terms  of 
two  months*  training  under  arms;  133,333  who 


Plan  for  National  Defence        257 

will  have  had  two  annual  terms  of  two  months' 
training  under  arms ;  and  133,334  wno  wiU  have  had 
but  two  months'  training  under  arms.  That  is  to 
say,  one-third  of  the  proposed  volunteer  army 
would  have  had  but  one-half  the  training  in  service, 
distributed  through  three  years,  required  by  the 
dictum  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  make  "a  ser- 
viceable soldier" ;  one-third  of  the  volunteer  army, 
but  one- third  of  the  training  in  service,  distributed 
through  two  years,  required  to  make  a  serviceable 
soldier;  and  the  remaining  third  of  the  volunteer 
army  would  have  received  but  one-sixth  of  the 
training  in  service  acknowledged  to  be  required 
by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  make  a  serviceable 
soldier. 

Would  not  this  army  come  within  the  limitations 
of  the  proposition  of  the  Honourable  Secretary  that 
it  should  "concede  defeat  without  contest,"  when 
attacked  by  a  prepared  enemy,  since,  under  the 
War  Department's  plan  for  national  defence,  we 
should  not  have  an  army  even  with  the  limited 
training  of  six  months  under  arms  to  put  into  the 
field  to  meet  the  enemy? 

But  the  Secretary  knows,  as  is  shown  by  his 
official  report  of  November  15,  1914,  that  it  takes 
twelve  months,  or  one  year,  to  make  dependable 
soldiers.  How  can  he  then  recommend  to  Con- 
gress such  a  measure  as  that  advocated  in  his 
Memorandum  given  to  the  country  on  November 
6, 1915,  proposing  the  creation  of  a  volunteer  army 


258    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

of  400,000  men  who  may  be  "possessed  of  some 
training,"  but  manifestly,  from  his  previous 
statements,  not  enough  training  to  make  them 
soldiers? 

The  Secretary  of  War  should  be  congratulated 
on  the  fact  that  he  has  himself  confirmed  the  ex- 
perience of  the  nation,  fifty  years  ago,  during  the 
great  war,  to  the  effect  that  it  takes  a  year  to  make 
soldiers,  dependable  soldiers,  soldiers  in  fact  as 
well  as  in  name,  by  his  experiment  with  "  a  Battery 
of  Artillery,  a  Troop  of  Cavalry,  and  a  Company  of 
Infantry, "  but  for  the  fact  that  he  turns  from  his 
own  "lessons  of  experience"  to  the  dreams  of  those 
who  do  not  understand  the  subject,  and  presents 
a  scheme  of  organization  for  the  army  based  upon 
a  denial  of  the  principle  which  he  has  so  forcefully 
and  convincingly  established  in  his  official  report 
of  November  15,  1914. 

In  his  last  official  report  the  Secretary  of  War 
states  the  strength  of  the  army  as  of  date  "June 
30,  1914,"  to  be  "4701  officers  and  87,781  men," 
or  a  grand  total  of  92,482  officers  and  men,  or  less 
by  7518  officers  and  men  than  the  statutory  strength 
of  the  army. 

The  adjutant-general  of  the  army  reports  as  of 
date  June  30,  1914,  that  during  the  previous  year 
the  desertions  from  the  regular  army  had  been  I 
officer  and  3882  enlisted  men,  and  that  the  army 
lost  by  the  discharge  of  enlisted  men  from  the 
army  for  various  reasons  outside  of  the  expiration 


Plan  for  National  Defence        259 

of  enlistments,  by  order  of  the  War  Department, 
during  the  year  1044  men,  thus  making  a  total  loss 
from  these  two  causes  by  the  regular  army  of  4927 
officers  and  men  in  one  year. 

The  plan  of  the  War  Department  published 
November  6,  1915,  for  the  enlargement  of  the 
army  will  call  for  the  enlistment  of  approximately 
50,000  men  to  bring  the  regular  army  up  to  the 
proposed  standard  of  141,707,  and  the  enlistment 
of  133,333  men  for  the  volunteer  army  the  first 
year  after  the  enactment  of  the  law  by  Congress 
for  the  increase  of  the  army. 

Is  there  any  reason  to  believe,  from  the  experi- 
ence of  the  army  in  its  recruiting  service,  that  such 
large  numbers  of  men  will  voluntarily  offer  their 
services  to  the  country  in  time  of  peace  for  enlist- 
ment in  the  regular  and  volunteer  armies?  What 
encouragement  has  the  country,  from  the  ex- 
perience of  the  past,  to  anticipate  any  such  rate  of 
enlistment?  And  even  should  such  enlistments 
be  secured,  is  there  not  reason  to  believe  that  the 
same  proportion  of  desertions  and  discharges 
reported  by  the  adjutant-general,  as  given  above, 
would  cause  the  reduction  of  the  army  below  the 
statutory  allowance  of  men  for  service? 

We  have  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of 
Commerce  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for 
,the  statement  that  the  country  is  enjoying  great 
prosperity,  and  that  we  are  approaching  a  period 
of  unprecedented  prosperity. 


260    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Periods  of  prosperity  are  periods  of  full  work  for 
the  labouring  men,  and  consequently  of  slack 
enlistments  in  the  army,  and  of  increased  deser- 
tions from  the  army. 

Possibly  the  War  Department  counts  upon  the 
offer  of  two  months'  experience  of  the  pleasures  of 
country  life  to  attract  the  labouring  men  to  the 
colours  of  the  volunteer  army,  throwing  upon  the 
manufacturers  and  upon  the  other  employers  of 
labour,  the  expense  and  loss  through  the  disor- 
ganization of  their  business,  of  a  large  part  of  the 
ultimate  cost  to  the  country  of  the  proposed 
volunteer  army. 

I  do  not  believe  that  a  volunteer  army  of  400,- 

000  men   can   be   organized   and   maintained  in 
peace.     The  stimulus  of  war  and  of  danger  to  the 
nation  is  needed  to  inspire  men  with  the  ardour  to 
enlist.     Patriotism  can  be  appealed  to  when  dan- 
ger threatens,  but  in  cold,  dry  times  of  peace  it 
will  be  impossible  to  awaken  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  people  to  enlist  freely  in  the  army. 

I  believe  that  the  plan  of  the  War  Department 
as  advocated  by  the  Secretary  of  War  in  his  state- 
ment of  the  6th  of  November,  1915,  will  fail  of 
creating  the  armies  he  advocates. 

I  have  so  fully  discussed  in  this  book  the  strength 
of  the  army  required  for  the  national  defence,  that 

1  shall  only  refer  to  this  branch  of  the  subject  in 
this  postscript  by  saying  that  I  regard  200,000  men 
for  the  regular  or  active  army  as  the  irreducible 


Plan  for  National  Defence        261 

minimum  which  should  be  provided  by  Congress, 
and  that  800,000  men  for  the  reserve  army,  every 
man  of  whom  shall  have  served  continuously  with 
the  colours  at  least  one  year  in  "intensive  train- 
ing," is  the  irreducible  minimum  which  should 
be  provided  by  Congress  for  the  reserve  army. 
This  plan  would  create  an  army  of  one  million 
trained  soldiers  to  meet  an  enemy  bold  enough  to 
challenge  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation. 

/  believe  that  the  day  of  the  volunteer  soldier  has 
passed. 

I  believe  it  to  be  the  duty  of  the  nation  to  accept 
the  lesson  of  demonstrated  fact,  and  to  adopt  the 
only  logical  and  the  only  democratic  method  of 
raising  and  maintaining  armies,  by  and  through 
conscription. 

Through  conscription  the  nation  can  fill  and 
maintain  at  statutory  strength  the  ranks  of  its 
regular  or  active  army,  and  it  can  create  and 
maintain  a  reserve  army  of  any  strength  deemed 
to  be  necessary  for  the  public  defence.  Under 
voluntary  enlistment  I  do  not  believe  that  in  time 
of  peace  either  the  regular  army,  or  the  volunteer 
army  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  can  be 
brought  up  to  the  strength  deemed  to  be  necessary 
by  his  statement  of  November  6,  1915,  or  be 
maintained  at  that  strength. 

But  assuming,  for  sake  of  argument,  that  the 
plan  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  in  his 
statement  of  the  6th  of  November  could  be  put  in 


262    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

practice,  such  an  army  as  it  would  produce 
would  prove  to  be  a  disastrous  failure  at  the 
crisis.  The  Secretary's  plan  will  neither  pro- 
duce a  dependable  army,  nor  an  army  of  suffi- 
cient strength  to  make  the  defence  of  the  nation 
a  possibility. 

Can  it  be  possible  that  the  Honourable  Secretary 
supposes  that  his  volunteer  army  could  hold  the 
field  against  the  trained  soldiers  of  Germany 
under  the  command  of  a  merciless  soldier  like 
von  Hindenburg? 

I  have  sufficient  faith  in  my  countrymen  to 
believe  if  they  are  trained  so  that  they  shall  be- 
come soldiers,  and  are  organized  into  armies  of 
sufficient  strength,  that  they  can  not  only  hold  the 
field  against  the  best  German  army  which  should 
invade  our  country,  however  "so  well  commanded, 
but  also  that  they  could  drive  the  invaders  into 
the  ocean. 

But  such  an  army  as  the  Secretary  proposes  for 
the  defence  of  the  country  would  be  neither  large 
enough  nor  well  trained  enough  to  hold  the  field 
against  a  veteran  German  army,  commanded  as 
such  an  army  would  surely  be  commanded,  and 
fought  as  it  would  surely  be  fought,  with  the  one 
single  end  in  view,  victory. 

What  of  the  Panama  Canal?  Of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands?  Of  Alaska?  Do  these  possessions  of  the 
United  States  come  within  the  purview  of  the 
defence  plan  of  the  Secretary  of  War?  Scarcely, 


Plan  for  National  Defence        263 

one  would  fancy,  from  the  narrowness  of  the 
plan. 

Where  would  the  mobile  army  of  150,000  men 
which  I  have  estimated  to  be  necessary  for  the 
defence  of  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  come  from? 
Where  the  troops  required  for  the  defence  of  the 
Hawaiian  Islands?  Where  those  needed  for  the 
defence  of  Alaska?  I  do  not  speak  of  the  defence 
of  the  Philippine  Islands  because  I  do  not  consider 
them  to  be  defensible. 

If  these  possessions  be  protected  by  suitable 
armies,  how  many  troops  will  be  left  for  the 
defence  of  the  United  States?  So  few  that  we  shall 
invite  attack  by  our  very  helplessness. 

I  do  not  attach  too  much  consequence  to  the 
utterance  of  the  German  press  under  the  stress 
of  the  present  war,  and  yet  it  would  be  unwise  to 
ignore  entirely  the  element  of  warning  to  be  found 
in  the  articles  published,  from  time  to  time,  in 
German  papers,  charged  with  suggestions  of 
offensive  action  by  Germany  against  the  United 
States  after  the  close  of  the  present  war. 

Today's  New  York  Sun  contains  a  dispatch 
dated  London,  November  20,  1915,  giving  the 
following  extract  from  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung 
which  may  be  taken  as  cumulative  evidence  of  a 
hostile  sentiment  in  Germany  toward  the  United 
States,  which  should  be  a  warning  to  us  to  be 
prepared  for  any  future  action  which  Germany 
may  take  against  us. 


264     West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

Special  Cable  Dispatch  to  the  "New  York  Sun" 

London,  Nov.  20. — The  Daily  Mail  today  prints  the 
following  extracts  from  an  article  in  the  Frankfurter 
Zeitung : 

'Tew  events  of  the  war  have  caused  such  wide- 
spread or  deep  bitterness  in  Germany  as  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States  after  war  was  declared.  A  certain 
time  will  be  required  for  Germany  to  recuperate.  It 
would  be  a  pity  if  this  recuperation  should  be  dis- 
turbed by  commercial  conflicts  resulting  from  the 
present  attitude  of  the  United  States. 

"When  Germany  has  recovered  from  the  war  she 
will  undertake  a  widespread,  well  engineered  work  of 
education  in  America  as  to  the  relative  merits  of 
Germans  and  Britons.  If  necessary  the  mailed  fist 
will  also  be  applied  to  American  aberrations. 

"Meanwhile,  Germany  will  show  patience  and  con- 
sideration for  certain  weak  sides  of  the  American 
national  character. " 

Does  the  Secretary  of  War  believe  that  his 
400,000  volunteers  will  be  good  enough  soldiers, 
and  strong  enough  in  numbers,  to  meet  the  offen- 
sive of  Germany?  The  United  States  needs  at 
the  very  least  a  regular  or  active  army  of  200,000 
men,  and  a  reserve  army  of  800,000  men,  to  be 
raised  as  I  have  proposed  in  this  book,  to  make 
the  nation  safe  within  her  boundaries,  and  to  hold 
the  Panama  Canal,  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and 
Alaska;  and  the  only  way  that  such  an  army  can 
be  raised  is  through  conscription; 


Plan  for  National  Defence        265 

Wherefore  Conscription  is  the  Issue  of  the  Day! 

The  Honourable  Secretary  has  evidently  for- 
gotten the  experience  of  the  country  with  con- 
scription in  the  great  war  when  he  says:  "For  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  one  great  lesson  of 
all  our  wars  is  that  they  must  be  carried  to  a  con- 
clusion by  citizen  soldiers/' 

He  should  recall  the  fact  that  the  South  turned 
to  conscription  early  in  the  great  war  to  re-enforce 
her  armies,  and  that  the  United  States  had  re- 
course to  conscription  in  1863  to  recruit  her  armies. 

The  Copperheads  of  the  North,  and  the  people 
of  the  slums  of  New  York  City,  rioted  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  draft,  but  they  were  reduced  to  order 
by  the  display  of  military  force,  and  the  draft 
proceeded. 

The  Spanish  War  lasted  so  short  a  time  that  it 
made  no  precedents.  The  last  precedent  affect- 
ing the  nation  in  war,  is,  that  the  nation,  during  the 
great  war,  resorted  to  conscription  for  the  recruit- 
ment of  its  armies  in  the  field. 

The  country  needs  soldiers,  not  men  who  may 
have  had  "some  training"  in  arms.  The  plan 
of  the  War  Department  will  not  give  the  country 
soldiers  except  in  respect  to  the  small  regular  or 
active  army. 

The  country  needs  armies  with  which  to  hold  the 
Panama  Canal,  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  Alaska, 
as  well  as  armies  to  defend  the  Pacific  coast,  the 


266    West  Point  in  our  Next  War 

northern  frontier,  and  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts 
of  the  United  States,  but  the  plan  of  the  War 
Department  will  not  supply  these  armies. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  are  a  brave  and 
loyal  people,  and  will  readily  support  any  measure 
deemed  to  be  necessary  to  insure  the  national 
safety  and  the  national  defence.  They  will 
freely  pay  the  expense  of  an  efficient  system 
of  national  defence,  but  it  will  be  wrong  to 
require  them,  through  heavy  taxation,  to  pay  for 
what  they  will  not  receive,  which  the  plan  of  the 
War  Department  will  compel  them  to  do. 

The  Secretary  of  War  has  so  thoroughly  mani- 
fested in  his  official  utterances  an  apprehension 
of  the  conditions  of  national  defence  that  it  may 
be  permitted  to  us  to  hope  that  he  will  lead  the 
nation  to  the  light,  and  that  he  will  yet  bring 
the  nation  to  the  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the 
only  way  to  create  and  to  maintain  an  army  is 
through  conscription.  . 

M.  VZ.  W. 


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